


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THE CONCEPT OF MIND IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY



THE
CONCEPT OF MIND
IN
INDIAN
PHILOSOPHY

28499

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
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To
MY HUSBAND

*without whose constant encouragement
this book would never have seen the light of day*

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PREFACE

THE critical literature in epistemological and psychological fields in the West evaluating the nature of mind is growing enormously. The present work is an attempt to understand the structure and functions of mind from the standpoint of Indian Philosophy. It is true that there is no system of knowledge that has not been expounded by the ancient Indian seers, but for the most part, these expositions are locked up in the original Sanskrit literature, making it impossible for the ordinary student to get at them. There is not a single system of Indian Philosophy which does not deal with the concept of mind. Some are more epistemological in their analysis of the concept, while the others are psychological. A persistent effort has been made here to correlate the two aspects and arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the nature of mind.

The word *manas* literally means "measuring", and it was used in this sense in the early Vedas and Brāhmaṇas. *Manas* was considered to be part of that which was designated by name, *nāma*. It is an activity in the life of man, by which he measures his wisdom, pleasures, etc. This *manas* is said to be *annamaya*, of the form of matter, in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. It is not gross, but subtle matter. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, we find *manas* treated as a sense-organ i.e., as an instrument of knowledge with a physical basis. To link up matter which is gross, and self which is pure consciousness, *manas* or mind which is subtle matter capable of reflecting consciousness is necessary. This idea that *manas* is subtle matter is common to almost all systems of Indian philosophy.

The Naiyāyika includes self and mind in the category of substance. But their substantiality is spiritual. The self differs from matter only in that it becomes conscious sometimes. *Jñāna* or knowledge is an adventitious attribute of the self and arises in the self when there is contact between the self, mind and object. Mind is the internal sense-organ by which pleasure, pain, etc., are cognized. Since it is intangible it can only be known through

inference. To the Naiyāyika theory of perception, the existence of mind is an essential need. If there is no mind or *manas*, then we should have simultaneous perceptions through all organs, since the soul or Ātman is all-pervading. Conjunction of the mind with the soul on the one hand, and with the object on the other hand, is necessary before one can have knowledge.

The Sāṃkhya and Yoga systems hold that both matter and mind are but evolutes of ultimate reals, *guṇas*, which are the constituents of *prakṛti* the primary substance. Substantive matter is predominantly *tāmasic*. Whereas psychic matter *manas* is predominantly *sāttvic*. When we analyse mind we find only a series of fleeting states, and when we analyse our conscious experience, we find that coordinating these mental states, there is an implied unity which gives a purpose, a meaning to these states. This is explained as the Puruṣa, the self who is the enjoyer and the knower.

The treatment of mind in Yoga darśana, while accepting the above ontological status, is for the most part psychological. Yoga maintains that as a result of practice and non-attachment a person can attain to super-normal powers of the mind. Super-normal control over the body, telekinetic phenomena, super-normal cognition and extra-sensory perception are some of the powers attained by the Yogin as a result of practice. Very often the technique and the results of Yoga are said to be irrational and non-attainable. But this is not so. The term Yoga itself is cognate with the English word 'Yoke' which means 'union'. It is a method of concentration by which the psychoses of the mind are sublimated and ultimate reality is intuited. It disciplines the mind in concentration. Hence by implication we find, mind or *manas* is again treated only as an instrument which serves the purposes of the self.

The Vedāntic view, in particular the Advaitic view, is that *antahkaraṇa* or the mind, is like everything, a product of *māyā*. The self alone is consciousness, and consciousness cannot arise as a contingent factor of subject-object relation. The Advaitin agrees with the modern psychologists and says that mind is just a totality of conscious states and processes. The self which is neither mind nor matter is the ground of both mental and physical states of existences. That which reveals everything, viz., consciousness, is the basis of all experience whether it is psychic

or physical. That mind is not consciousness is established on an analysis of the three states of experience, viz., the waking, dreaming and sleeping experiences. Consciousness is not mere knowing, it involves transcendence of the objects known and the knowing process. Mind is that which has a locus in time and space, whereas consciousness is that which is not limited either by time or space, but still is that which gives a meaning to these. Mind, like matter, is only an appearance of consciousness. Just as in dreams the material substantive experience of waking life becomes only an appearance, so also in the light of pure consciousness the mental and physical experiences merely become illusions.

One important aspect of mind that emerges as a result of this study is that mind cannot be equated to self as most of the Western thinkers do. Of course to define these concepts of mind and self and then to distinguish them as each having a different ontological status is, indeed, a very difficult matter. We can only arrive at a possible distinction between them on an analysis of experience at various levels. To insist that if the pure self or consciousness were to exist it must be independently manifestable without the medium of sensations or ideas is not possible, because that which is purely a subject can never be known by itself, but only always in its objectified aspect. Even in introspection we are only aware of the object of knowledge, never of awareness itself. To apply the Occam's Razor and say that consciousness apart from mind does not exist, because it is both unnecessary for knowledge and also it cannot be known, is not correct. For such a critic forgets that continuity of awareness is impossible if there were to be merely a mind which is sensations and brain. If this continuity of awareness is denied, then experience would become meaningless.

There is a still more radical move in the West which, not being satisfied with relegating consciousness or self to the limbo of oblivion, denies that there is anything like a mind at all. Ryle compares this to a 'ghost in a machine' idea and says that what is so designated is only the neurophysical brain and certain disposition of behaviour. Such a position deliberately flies in the face of evidence. Neurophysiologists have said that there is every indication to assume that a ghost does exist in the machine. "If one uses the expressive terminology of Ryle, the 'ghost' operates a machine, not of ropes and pulleys, valves and pipes,

but of microscopic spatio-temporal patterns of activity in the neuronal net woven by the synaptic connections of ten thousand million neurones, and even then only by operating on neurones that are momentarily poised, close to a just-threshold level of excitability".¹ From the point of view of recent psychokinetic experiments conducted by Rhine and Thouless² and the fast accumulating evidence of extra-sensory perception, it is impossible not to accept a mind, if not a self.

It seems that the problem of the nature of mind and its relation to matter may be satisfactorily solved only if we think of mind as a higher form of matter capable of reflecting the nature of self which is consciousness. This mind or *manas*, the Indian Philosopher says, has no concrete abode. It is a name given to a series of conscious activities such as desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, intelligence, knowledge, thought, etc. This mind is that which is capable of referring to the past, present and future. That there is a self for whom these mental modes exist cannot be denied. Apart from the qualities of the mind it is very difficult to know the pure self at the empirical state, for the former are the only means through which knowledge can arise. Hence, the mind is an instrument, an *antahkarana* whose activity is as an indicator of the existence of the pure self. Till this fact is reckoned with, any amount of logical speculation about the nature of mind and the relation between matter and mind may prove to be futile.

As the title of the work indicates, this was first meant to be a comprehensive study of all the systems of Indian Philosophy and their accounts of the concept of mind. But the literature was so vast and unwieldy that a concentration has been made only on the ideas involved in the *Āstika darśanas*. Even there, in the Vedānta systems, only the Advaita point of view has been considered, reserving the rest for a later study.

It is indeed a great pleasure to acknowledge my indebtedness to my Professor Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, who has not only guided me in preparing this work, but also been the person to whom I owe my interest in Indian Philosophy itself.

S. C.

¹ *The Neurophysiological Basis of Mind* by J. C. Eccles, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1953, p. 285.

² Ref: to the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research '49.

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Shall I tell you what knowledge is? It is
to know what one knows and what one
does not know.

The Sayings of Confucius

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF MIND

THE NATURE of mind and the nature of its constituents have been agitating the minds of people for a long time. There have been various explanations but none that meets the situation completely. The whole literature on the subject in the West gives diverse points of view each conflicting with the other. Often the point of difference centres round the relation between mind and body. As a result, theories which are completely different from each other, and which contradict each other, have also been formulated. Either the mind is made subservient to matter or *vice versa*, in every case. Consequently, many problems of perception and will are still being debated. The basic difficulty arises because of the fact that all these thinkers differentiate mind from body on the one hand and equate mind with the self on the other hand.¹ If mind is pure body then the problem of will cannot be solved. If it is pure self, the problem of physical perception remains unsolved. These two, mind and body, as Ryle says, do not lend themselves to disjunctive treatment.

Indian philosophers, from the very beginning, have avoided this pitfall by recognizing mind or *manas* as something distinct from the self or the *Ātman*, though partaking of its nature as intelligence through association with it. Since it is subtle in nature, it is not gross matter.

The beginnings of such a conception of mind are to be found in the Vedās themselves. In the *Vājasaneyā Saṁhitā*,² the conception of mind as a psychical entity is completely discussed. This text of the *Saṁhitā* reads as though it is a continuous discourse on the nature of mind. In the very first verse of this collection, mind is characterized as something "which goes out afar".³ It is not a

¹ G. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, Hutchinson's University Library, 1949, p. 62.

² *Vājasaneyā Saṁhitā*, 30, 4, 1-6.

³ *Ibid.*, Tr. by Jwala Prasad in *Indian Epistemology*, Published by Motilal Banarsidass, Lahore, 1939, p. 29.

physical sense-organ, for then, it cannot be conceived as going out of the body, nor can it be the soul or self for the same reason. In the third verse of the same set we find the threefold division of mental activities, viz., intelligence, feeling and resolution and the description of mind as that which is responsible for all accomplishments. It is that which gives continuity and meaning to life, for it is capable of holding together the past, present and future. The fifth and sixth verses make use of the chariot simile and say that the mind of man is like the controlling principle in the wheel of the chariot and the will of man is like the good charioteer who controls the horses with the reins. This simile is found again in the Upaniṣads. From these verses it becomes evident that even in this ancient text, the psychical and epistemological functions of the mind were recognized and acknowledged. In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* also, there are a number of references to mind which conceive the forms of knowledge as *Name* and *Form*. The word mind is used very often in the sense of soul, and in some places its capacity as a psychical instrument is referred to. It is that which knows name and form, which is not equivalent to the body but something which includes the body.¹ Every object is known because it has a form and a name. Form is known by mind, hence it is a mental thing. Name is expressed by speech, hence it is a characteristic of speech. When a man knows these two things, he knows the whole universe.²

We find a more advanced analysis of mind in the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*. In the second chapter it is maintained that man is superior to animals because of his capacity to anticipate the future and remember the past. Later on in the same chapter a list of psychical qualities are enumerated.³ These are *saṁjñā* (awareness), *ājñānam* (comprehension), *viññānam* (understanding), *prajñānam* (knowledge), *medhā* (retentiveness), *dṛṣṭiḥ* (insight), *dhr̥tiḥ* (resolution), *matiḥ* (opinion), *smṛtiḥ* (memory), *manīṣā* (reflection), *jutiḥ* (impulse), *saṁkalpaḥ* (will), *kratuḥ* (purpose), *asuḥ* (life), *kāmaḥ* (desire), *vaśaḥ* (control). The motive for this analysis here is not so much a curiosity about the aspects of mental working as a desire to show that knowledge is the basis of all activity.⁴

¹ *Readings from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 10, 6, 3, Sacred Books of the East Series.

² *Ibid.*, 11, 2, 3, 1, verse.

³ *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, II, 6, Tr. by A. B. Keith, Oxford University Press, 1909.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 4.

The Upaniṣad's main thesis is that mind is subtle matter. The purpose of the Upaniṣads is to reveal *Brahman*, the supreme self, and a distinct warning is sounded to the seeker of truth not to be carried away by *manas* and its attributes, but to try to know the thinker (*mantr*).¹ It is stressed often that *prajñā* which is the self or *Ātman* is responsible for the activities of *manas*.

Mind or *manas*, therefore, plays only a secondary role in knowledge. It is not mind with all its components that is of interest to the Upaniṣadic seer, but the inner self, the knower, that which causes the mind and the senses to function—it is that which is of primary interest. It is not as if these sages were not conscious of the functions of mind and its attributes, but only that they were so intent upon finding out the innermost truth of everything, that whatever was secondary was not attended to with the same zeal. For instance, in the *Kena Upaniṣad* we find the question raised, "By whom impelled soars the mind projected?", and we get the answer, "That which is the hearing of the ear, the thought of the mind. . . . There the eye goes not, nor the mind. We know not, we understand not, how one would teach it."² The secondary nature of all things is stressed here. If at all some interest is shown in *manas* here, it is because it is that which binds the self to the world. The Upaniṣad says:

The mind, in truth, is for mankind
The means of bondage and release
For bondage, if to objects bound;
From objects free—that's called release.³

This attitude of the seers to *manas* leads to the next question, viz., if the self is the subject of experience, then, by whom and how was this world of experience created? There are a number of theories of cosmology given in the Upaniṣads. This need for a universal ground for all creation was met by the successive postulation of water, space, heat or fire, and finally the Cosmic Self or *Ātman* as the source of the world. This *Ātman* was imagined as an enormous being from whose body the different elements emerged.

¹ *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad*, 3, 8. (All Upaniṣadic translations are taken from Hume's *Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads*.)

² *Kena Upaniṣad*, 1-5.

³ *Maitri Upaniṣad*, 6, 34.

These elements were correlated to the different parts and functions of the body. As man was created, every organ, the corresponding sense, and the correlating element were also evolved. "A heart was separated out; from the heart, mind (*manas*); from the mind, the moon."¹ But these are not enough. After having created the *mūrti* or material form, making it cosmic, the *Ātman* itself enters into it. *Manas* which is thus a created part of the cosmic being is material, and its governing deity is moon. Hence it follows that *manas* is not the spiritual element of the human body as opposed to other material elements. It is as much material as the other senses are. But this materiality of mind is of a different type, since it is capable of reflecting the Self. Mind has *prajñā* or intelligence, because *Ātman* which is of the nature of pure intelligence is reflected in it.²

In the *Chāndogya*, Uddālaka instructing Svetaketu in the lore of *Brahman* tells him that when food is eaten, the finest part of it becomes *manas*.³ Commenting on this Śaṅkarācārya says that since by eating food one increases one's mind, such increase must be caused by the food that was eaten. For, when a man does not eat, his powers of speech and mind are at a very low ebb. But when food is consumed there is a gradual increase in these powers. If it is true that all activity in the body is made possible because of the energy that is made available by the consumption of food and water, then this theory that mind is increased or decreased by food must logically follow. From this it is but a step to maintain that *manas*, which is a product, must be of the nature of food. Śaṅkara himself raises an objection to this: if mind is made of food, then how is it that some animals, such as the rats and the fish, although they consume food, do not have the consequential mind? No doubt, this is so. All things are tripartite, being made up of water, fire and food, each being fit to conserve the three aspects of existence, life, speech and mind. Therefore, each organism that consumes food makes use of that food according to its need. Hence there is nothing illogical in saying that mind is made up of the finest particles of food or matter.

Manas, therefore, being material is described as that which governs the sense-organs. The ten *indriyas*—the five senses of action (*karmendriyas*) and the five senses of knowledge (*jñānendriyas*)—

¹ *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, 1, 1, 4.

² *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad*, 3, 6.

³ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6, 6, 5 and 6.

work under the control of *manas*, the central or internal sense-organ. These are dependent on *manas* for their functioning. It is only when the *manas* is in conjunction with the sense-organ that it is possible to have any perceptual knowledge. In the *Chândogya*¹ again, we find mind conceived as that which not only directs the sense-organs, but also as something superior to them. A comparison is instituted between the *sāman* and various things of life thus:

The eye is an Udgitha
The ear is a Pratihāra
The mind is a Nidhana.²

Mind is superior to all, since it pervades the objects of all other senses and even supersensible objects fall within the sphere of mind.³

In the *Bṛhadāranyaka* we have the following verse:

People say my mind was elsewhere; I did not see.
My mind was elsewhere, I did not hear. It is with the mind,
truly that one sees. It is with the mind that one hears . . .⁴

Commenting on this Śaṅkarācārya says⁵ that a doubt is raised here about the existence of mind. The reason for this doubt is that, although there is apparent conjunction between the knowing self and the object during perception with the sense-organs, no knowledge is conveyed. This is explained by saying that the lack of perception is due to the diversion of the mind from that sense-organ to other things. Hence knowledge is entirely dependent upon the attention bestowed by mind on the object of perception. This argument proves negatively that not only mind exists, but that it is also the most important requisite for knowledge.

But this is not all. The Upaniṣads maintain that what is necessary for knowledge is neither mere sense nor its proper functioning in conjunction with *manas*, but the self which perceives through

¹ *Chândogya Upaniṣad*, 6, 6, 4.

² *Ibid.*, 2, 7, 1.

³ Śaṅkara's commentary on the above. Tr. by S. Sitarama Sāstry, Memorial Edition, Sri Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam.

⁴ *Bṛhadāranyaka*, 1, 5, 3.

⁵ Roer's translation, Theosophical Publishing House, 1931.

these. The self is often called either *prāṇa* (breath) or *prajñā* (intelligence).¹ This is given in the form of a story. There is a dispute between the senses, *manas* and life as to superiority. The principle formulated is that that which is most essential for existence is supreme. Each sense in turn leaves the body and finds that for the existence of the body, it is not essential. Finally, when the turn came for breath to leave the body, it was established that all others could not be without breath.

This is a parable and therefore symbolic. All functions of the body may cease, but since there is *prāṇa* or *Ātman* left, the body continues to exist. Hence this is the cause of all bodily and mental functions. The final resting place of everything is *prāṇa*. Uddālaka, teaching Svetaketu, tells him that the mind is like a bird that is tied up to the soul. It wanders about hither and thither, not finding any rest in its flight, comes back and settles down on its resting place.² So is a man who is tired and finds rest in sleep.

This idea that mind is the internal sense-organ directed by the *Ātman* and itself directing the other sense-organs, is given in that beautiful parable of the chariot in the *Kaṭhā Upaniṣad*.³ We have already seen how this simile was made use of in the Vedic hymns also. Here, there is a comparison drawn between the chariot and man. The Lord of the chariot, the enjoyer of the fruits of activity is the *Ātman*. But for the *Ātman* the body has no meaning. This body is drawn into various channels of activity by the senses which are comparable to the horses. But the chariot driver who is *buddhi* or intellect, holds the reins which is *manas* and thus controls the horses. Here the word *manas* is used in a very restricted sense to mean only the characteristics of volition and doubt and *buddhi* is used to mean intelligence.

In this parable two things have to be noted. First, *manas* along with its determinative aspect is that which guides the senses. Secondly, we get several aspects of mind being distinguished. Mind is capable of determining, valuing, attending, doubting, etc. In the tenth verse of the same chapter we are given the order of progression from the senses to the supreme self. The senses are gross and they are derived from the subtle elements. Hence these subtle

¹ *Bṛhadāranyaka*, 6, 1, 13 and 14 and *Kauṣītaki*, 2, 14 and also *Chāndogya*, 5, 1, 6.

² *Chāndogya*, 6, 8, 2.

³ *Kaṭhā*, 3, 3, 4, 5.

substances are higher than the senses for they are the causes of the senses. Then mind with original non-perceptual qualities such as will and desire is more subtle, hence more valuable. Even greater or subtler than this is the intellect, for it is that which determines. Greater than that is *Hiranyagarbha*, the central self of all existence.

Here, *buddhi*, as before, is separately mentioned along with *manas*. Dr. Hume takes this as the result of the influence of Sāṃkhya principles.¹ The words *mahat* and *avyakta* which occur in sixth and seventh verses are used to support this theory. If by this assertion Dr. Hume meant that the beginnings of Sāṃkhya can be traced to this and similar passages there will be no objection. But if he meant that Sāṃkhya was already a full-fledged system from which these words have been taken, it is not tenable, for the *dārśanas* as such are later productions, though based on the Upaniṣads. What we see in these passages is not so much a differentiation of *buddhi* and *manas*, but an evaluation of the different aspects of human behaviour. The interest in the instrument of knowledge, viz., *manas*, is more sharply expressed in such passages.

It is because Indian thinkers have realized from very early times that *manas* is only an instrument of knowledge for the self, that Indian psychology has taken a different line of development than that of Western psychology.² The aim is always that which is beyond the workings of the mind. But to know the end, one must know the nature of the means employed. Therefore the aspects of *manas* and its workings are described in great detail in the Upaniṣads. The cognitive aspect of mental life receives a great deal of attention for it is by the mind that one attains knowledge. One such list is already referred to as occurring in the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* and the same is given in the *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, 3, 5, 2. This verse begins by saying, "That which is the heart (*hṛdaya*) and mind (*manas*). . .". This means what has already been stated, that the heart is the seat of the mind. We have various references to this in the Upaniṣads. If we examine some of the theories given by Western thinkers regarding the seat of the mind such as the Cartesian Pineal gland, the behaviouristic nerve-complex, and the more common identification of the brain with the mind, this theory of the Upaniṣads does not at all sound absurd. The heart is the central

¹ Hume, op. cit., p. 8.

² Mrs. Rhys Davids, *The Birth of Indian Psychology*, Luzac & Co., London, 1936, p. 58.

organ on which the life of an organism hangs. Without the heart there is no life, and similarly without mind there is no knowledge. The bodily functions such as movement and sensation are dependent on the working of both heart and mind. Hence the Upaniṣads maintain that the heart and the mind are fundamentally one. Because of the essential unity of the heart and the mind, they act together and perception is made possible.

The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems lend themselves to be considered a unit, since their theories of *manas* are to a large extent similar (may be said to be almost identical), although the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* lay their emphasis on the ontological aspect and the *Nyāya Sūtras* on the epistemological aspect. Both these systems reflect the ideas of *manas* that are given in the Upaniṣads. As in the Upaniṣads, here also, *manas* is not and cannot be considered the same as soul or *Ātman*. This idea is here strengthened by logical arguments and it is sought to be proved that *manas* is material.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas *manas* is one of the nine *dravyas* or substances. *Dravya* is one of the categories or *padārthas* recognized in their system. A substance is that which has qualities. Soul or *Ātman* is a substance, though spiritual in nature, having spiritual qualities like intelligence. *Manas* is similarly one of the substances. The interest in *Ātman* is here twofold. Negatively it is shown that mind is not the soul, and positively, that mind is the internal organ serving as the instrument of knowledge for the soul. Both the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems maintain that *manas* is different from *Ātman*.

Kaṇāda, before describing what *manas* is and how it functions, gives us reasons which seek to prove the existence of *manas*.¹ Both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika rely on the important factor of "attention" in their proof for the existence of *manas*. The dependence of intellectual activities, whether they be perceptual or conceptual, on attention is stressed and from this the instrument of intellection is inferred. The Vaiśeṣikas have been led to acknowledge the existence of *manas*, because of the fact that though the sense-organs are functioning, still the self does not get any knowledge of the object. *Manas* must be in contact with the object through the medium of the sense-organ on the one hand, and with the self or the *Ātman* on the other hand. The sense-organs might be in contact with the

¹ *Vaiśeṣika System*, Tr. by Faddegon, Johannes Miller, Amsterdam, 1918, III, 2, 1.

object and the *manas* with the soul; still, if there is no contact between *manas* and the sense-organ, no knowledge can arise. That is why, though objects are before us, we do not see them; though sounds are heard, we do not hear them, i.e., get their meaning and understand them. *Manas* is occupied elsewhere and that object on which the *manas* is concentrated or attending, that alone is cognized by the soul.

Commenting on this type of proof for the existence of *manas*, Śrīdhara says in his *Nyāya Kaṇḍalī*: "The contacts of the objects, the sense-organ and the soul, depend upon some other cause, in the bringing about of the due effect,—because even when the former contacts exist, the necessary effect does not appear . . . and this instrumentality upon which they depend is that of the Mind."¹ But it may be said that this is not true, since we find that man is capable of attending to more things than one at a time. Both the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas object that the feeling of simultaneity is due to the rapidity of transition of the internal sensory. The *Nyāya Sūtra* says: "The non-simultaneity of cognition is the indicative of mind."² Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāṣya* says that non-simultaneity here means the non-simultaneity of the cognitions of several things through several sense-organs.³

The next *sūtra*, as is to be expected, raises the objection that in practice this does not happen and that we do experience simultaneity of cognitions. The *Bhāṣya* cites the following example:

"(when the pupil perceives his teacher going in the forest) he has the following notions,

'This teacher reads—walks—holds the water pot—looks at the path—hears the sounds proceeding from the forest—becomes frightened—keeps on the lookout for signs of serpents or tigers—remembers the place of destination . . .'

This seems to be a very strong argument in support of the simultaneity of cognitive experience and hence the negative proof for the uselessness of *manas* as an internal sensory. But the next *sūtra* gives the counter-argument. "This perception is like the perception of

¹ *Padārtha Dharma Saṁgraha*, Tr. by G. Jha, Pandit Reprints, 1916, Sec. 10, p. 199.

² *Nyāya Sūtras*, I, 1, 16, Tr. by G. Jha, Indian Thought Series, 1917.

³ *Bhāṣya* on 3, 2, 56, Tr. by G. Jha, Vol. III, p. 16.

fire-circle and is due to the rapidity of motion." The illusory experience of simultaneity is caused by the rapidity of succession. Hence *manas* is essential for perceptual knowledge, and therefore must exist. Also, it is proved by this that there must be one *manas* only for each body, for otherwise, simultaneity of cognitions would be possible.

The *Praśastapāda Bhāṣya* on the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* gives three reasons for the existence of *manas*. They concur with the Naiyāyika and cite non-simultaneity of cognitive knowledge as the first reason. Secondly, the arising of reminiscences or remembered experiences, whilst the organ through which the original impression entered, is inactive.¹ For example, perception of the colour of an object also brings about the perception of its smell. This cannot be explained by saying that the perception due to the eye rouses the perception by the organ of smell, "because we find it appearing in the deaf and the blind also, in whose case there could be no operation of the organs of hearing or of vision".² This is based on the assumption that, if there is a correlation between two perceptions, it must be a constant correlation. There can be no intermittent concomitance. But we do find in experience negative examples of this relation of correlation. Hence the *Bhāṣyakāra* maintains that these are not concomitant and that the postulation of *manas* as the instrument of memory is necessary.

The two reasons given above are only inferential in nature.³ Because a situation arises, and since it is not possible to find any other explanation for that particular situation, it may be said that the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas have postulated a mythical entity called *manas*. But it is not so. Not being content with this inferential way of proving the existence of *manas*, the Vaiśeṣikas maintain that the experience of pleasure and pain which is immediate and direct experience, and which is established as not caused by the external sense-organs, is held to be possible because *manas* acts as the internal organ responsible for causing this experience.

At this juncture, a doubt is raised both by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika whether the mind is one or many for one person.⁴ The

¹ *Jñāna lakṣaṇa pratyāsathi*.

² *Padārtha Dharma Saṁgraha*, op. cit., p. 200.

³ "The ascertainment of a person's mental capacities and propensities is an inductive process." Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, op. cit., p. 172.

⁴ *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, III, 2, 3; *Nyāya Sūtras*, 3, 2, 56.

same answer as was given for the indicated existence of mind is also given here to prove that there is only *one* mind for one person. "If there were several minds it would be possible for several sense-organs to be in contact with several minds simultaneously; whereby there should be several cognitions appearing (through these contacts) at one and the same time; . . . but this never happens . . . there is a single mind (in one body)." ¹ The corresponding *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* goes a step further and says, not only non-simultaneity of cognitions, but also that of volitions is indicative of the fact that mind is one for one body. The efforts of man appear only one after the other. When there is effort in one direction, he does not put forth effort in any other direction. These activities indicate the singleness of mind. Western psychology also has proved with the help of the form-board and manipulation tests carried out in the investigation of the process of learning, that attention is always singly present and that attending to two or more things at the same time is not usual. ² The so-called manifold attention is only the rapid shifting of the mind from one to the other, which gives the illusion that a number of things are attended to at the same time. In reply to this proposition, the *Prāśastapāda Bhāṣya* poses a very interesting question, viz., how would you explain the simultaneous actions of moving and supporting one's own body? The answer is that "the moving and supporting of one's body also are accomplished by a *single* effort". ³ The supporting of the body, or in other words, the holding of the erect position by the body is more a physiological adjustment and, except in the initial stages, does not involve any effort of will. Even in the initial stages, it cannot definitely be said that it is an act of will or effort in the accepted meaning of the term. The processes of maturation by which the body develops and assumes postures and forms are more physiological than volitional. Similarly, the act of moving. Balancing in the act of moving, in other words, walking, does not involve constant mental effort, for otherwise we might have to postulate such

¹ *Nyāya Bhāṣya* on 3, 2, 56, op. cit., p. 16.

² "It is doubtful whether normal people ever think of more than one thing at once. Of course as in playing the piano, automatic activities go on parallel to the conscious activities, or there may be exceedingly rapid alteration from one conscious function to another. But this is not really attending to two things at once." G. Murphy, *A Briefer Course of General Psychology*, Macmillan & Co., London, 1908, p. 216.

³ *Padārtha Dharma Saṃgraha*, op. cit., p. 205.

a mental activity even to insects and worms that move and crawl. But purposive motion is definitely a thing that involves mental effort and this is accomplished only one at a time. Hence the Vaiśeṣikas are perfectly right in maintaining that moving and supporting one's own body is the result of a single effort. From all these arguments both the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas declare that *manas* is atomic in nature.¹

The *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* declares that the all-pervading nature of the self and *ākāśa* (ether) is not present in mind, which, therefore, is atomic. Praśastapāda's *Bhāṣya* maintains that all knowledge arises because the contact between the soul and the object through *manas* is the non-inherent cause of cognition. If both *manas* and *Ātman* were all-pervading, then there would be simultaneous cognition of all objects, which is not the case. Hence the reason must be one of the two, either the self or the mind, must be not-all-pervading or atomic. Self is all-pervading. Hence mind cannot be all-pervading, but can only be atomic.

Another important factor that arises out of this discussion is the substantiality of *manas*. As has already been stated, substance is that in which qualities inhere. *Manas* has qualities. The very first of them, by implication, is the capacity for conjunction. *Manas*, as the internal organ which is not all-pervading, comes into contact with the material cause of cognition. Hence, being the bearer of qualities, *manas* is a substance. *Manas*, which is atomic and one for each person, therefore, by implication, must possess the quality of disjunction or separation.

As a corollary to the view that *manas* is material, the *Nyāya Kaṇḍalī* maintains that *manas* moves away from one body into another body. That is how the results of actions in one birth are carried over into another birth. The *manas* which is corporeal and possessed of qualities sustains itself through the disembodied state by the unseen potency of the soul's actions.² This *ativāhika śarīra* (a body of transmigration) supports the *manas* until it reaches another body. The fact that *manas* can exist apart from the body is testified to by the experiences of the *yogin* who can travel all over the world in a disembodied state and back again to his body, according to his liking.

¹ *Nyāya Sūtras*, 3, 2, 59; *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, VII, 1, 23.

² *Nyāya Kaṇḍalī*, V, 2, 17.

From the fact that *manas* is corporeal or material, it, like any other material object, possesses priority, posteriority and speed. If *manas* is material, then like material objects it must be an object of touch. But Śrīdhara maintains that *manas* cannot be touched—*asparśavattvāt*—i.e., there is an absence of touch in it. It is like the self which cannot be touched, though material like the body. Still, mind produces by conjunction cognitions of all things. How the Vaiśeṣika can conceive of such a position it is difficult to understand. That which is atomic (i.e., without parts) and that which is beyond the reach of touch, how such a *manas* can come into conjunction with the material object is not explained. The whole theory of knowledge of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika schools is based on *sannikarṣa*—the relation of either *samavāya* or *saṁyoga* established between object, *manas* and self, and this is not possible unless the constituents of the relation have parts and can be touched.

Activity—specially of the type where it brings about the experiences of something other than itself—is a quality of the *manas*. Since *manas* reveals several objects quickly, so as to cause the illusion of simultaneity, it is said that *manas* moves very quickly.

After so describing what *manas* is, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas proceed to determine what it is not. The *Bhāṣya* on *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, III, ii, 22 says, "It must be regarded as unconscious; as otherwise the whole body would be the common ground (of all experiences or sensations)". This proves that mind is not conscious. It is not, and cannot be the cognizer. The internal organ does not possess consciousness, for if it were so, then both the soul and the mind, each cognizing in its own right, would make the sense-organs and the body, the common ground of their activities. But this is not so. The activity or inactivity of the body indicates always a single purpose, hence mind cannot be conscious. Several objections are raised against this position. Śrīdhara in his *Nyāya Kaṇḍalī* begins by raising the objection that consciousness may be a quality of the mind, for the unification of the sense-cognitions such as "I saw the colour, perceived the taste, and am feeling the touch", is made possible by the mind which is eternal. But the reply states that this is only a difference of names. What the Vaiśeṣika calls soul, the opponent designates as mind. That which is the substratum of consciousness is called soul by the Vaiśeṣikas and mind by the others. But, if really mind were the cognizer, then it would not need the instruments of cognition, for cognizing and all perceptions

can occur simultaneously, since the objects of perception would be all present simultaneously. Memory and recognition are the distinct marks of consciousness. Bergson gives a similar view¹ when he says, "Consciousness means before everything else memory. . . . To retain what no longer is, to anticipate what as yet is not—these are primary functions of consciousness." Similarly Durant Drake says, "It is a past event that I am remembering or a future event that I am anticipating; i.e., the object of my awareness, my datum, is something past or future".² These characteristics are, therefore, for the self and not for the mind. If mind were to be both an organ of perception—as it undoubtedly is—and conscious, then the functions of perception and memory would be constantly active. It has been pointed out that mind being a single entity cannot bring about any remembrances, whether simultaneously or successively. Simultaneous memory is not possible since mind is atomic and single and cannot act in more than one way at a particular point of time. Also, once a memory is brought out, there is nothing else to bring about, and this does not mean that mind as an instrument of memory is not present. Again, memory cannot be brought about successively because, then, remembrances would be going on *ad infinitum* and the importance of the instrumentality of the mind fades away. But if mind were to function through other organs, it would be the same as *Ātman*. If we supposed mind to be an abode of knowledge, it cannot be an instrument of knowledge also. "Mind is not conscious, because it is an instrument of consciousness, like a jar", says Śrīdhara in his *Nyāya Kaṇḍalī*.³

But the objection is raised that the mind is the *doer* or the agent, not the instrument. This is not accepted. For the experience of anything we require an instrument. Similarly, for the experience of pleasure and pain there must be some internal instrument. If this is agreed upon, it is maintained, the so-called mind is nothing else but what is called soul by the Vaiśeṣika. The character of an instrument is that it is something that is being employed by others for their own purposes. In this sense, it is the self that makes use of the mind for cognitive purposes. So mind is only an instrument.

¹ Bergson, *Mind Energy*, Tr. by Wildon Carr, Macmillan & Co., London, 1920, p. 5.

² Durant Drake, *Mind and Its Place in Nature*, Macmillan & Co., New York, 1925, p. 75.

³ Op. cit., p. 161.

The same idea, more or less, is given in the *Nyāya Sūtras*. Here it is established that mind is different from soul, and that cognition (*buddhi*) is a quality of the soul and not the mind.

The word *buddhi* is said to be the same thing as *jñāna* (cognition), *darsana* (perception), *upalabdhi* (apprehension), *bodha* (understanding), *pratyaya* (cognizance), and *adhyavasāya* (ascertainment).¹ The burden of this commentary on 3, 2, 3 is to prove the fact that what belongs to an intelligent agent cannot be said to belong to an instrument. If it is said that consciousness belongs to the instrument mind, then, the *Bhāṣyakāra* maintains that it becomes imperative to establish the nature of this "conscious person". If this conscious person is the internal organ mind, then it is this that is the cognizer, and *buddhi* is that which makes things known. A thing knows or cognizes when it has knowledge or obtains knowledge for itself. But a thing is made *known* only by an instrument. An instrument only serves the purposes of another. So it is the *soul* or *mind*, according to the opponent, that knows, and *buddhi* is that which makes things known. *Buddhi* ascertains and mind cognizes and hence *buddhi* or cognition is a quality of the mind.

But the Naiyāyikas, in reply to this argument, show that ascertaining and cognizing are one and the same thing. If this were not so, the seer, the hearer, the thinker, all would be so many distinct persons. This is not the case, and hence it proves that there must be a unity of ascertainment, or cognition cannot be the same as the *ascertainer* and *cognizer*. What is sought to be proved here is that *buddhi* or *jñāna* is a quality of the soul and not of the mind. The battle begins with the postulation of the hypothesis that apprehension may be regarded as a quality of the mind.² It is clear from the *Bhāṣya*³ that mind is considered as the internal organ or *antaḥkāraṇa*. Throughout the comment on this *sūtra*, the words *manas* and *antaḥkāraṇa* are used interchangeably.

If a quality is present in a thing at a time, that quality must be evident whenever the activity concerning it is taking place. Now, "apprehension of things is non-simultaneous". The very existence of mind is indicated by this. Hence apprehension is present as a quality with respect to a particular object at one particular time and not with respect to other objects. But, if apprehension is a

¹ *Nyāya Bhāṣya*, 3, 2, 3, op. cit., p. 289.

² *Nyāya Sūtra*, 3, 2, 19.

³ *Bhāṣya*, on 3, 2, 19.

quality of the mind, then there should be non-simultaneity of perceptions, because, as the *Vārtika* on 3, 2, 7 says, "there would be no force in any previous occupation with other objects". Uddyotakara says that apprehension or *jñāna* is a quality of the "cognitive agent, who is the controller".¹ That the cognitive agent is also the controller is true only with respect to the self who is the conscious person. The sense-organs and the mind, which are unconscious by nature, must all be controlled, and this controller is the self. For the cognition of the perceptible objects the sense-organs are the instruments of the cognizer. Similarly for the thought of the person, the instrument of thinking is *manas*. Still another reason cited by the Naiyāyika is that, if both mind and soul were conscious (cognitive) entities, it would be difficult to say which act of cognition belongs to which.

Again in the *Nyāya Sūtras* 3, 2, 28, it is urged that even mind, which is more like the soul than other substances, is not that which can claim consciousness as a characteristic. The reason that is given here (for this is the most obvious reason and is comparable to the Cartesian argument of intelligent causation), is that all material substances, sense-organs and mind function only when they are impelled to activity by something else. If these by themselves were intelligent, no external impelling agency is required. This is shown by the fact that our bodies and minds are always controlled by something other than themselves.

An eschatological reason is also produced to show that mind is unconscious. When the self is reborn, if the self were not the intelligent doer of actions, then the *kārmic* results of other intelligent doers like the body and the mind will have to be borne by the soul, which is absurd. On the other hand, if the soul alone were intelligent it would be the responsible entity making use of the instruments and acting through them.

But, the opponent of the Nyāya is not satisfied. He maintains that all the objections to consider mind as conscious and intelligent are also applicable to soul. Soul also cannot have apprehension as a quality because the soul is all-pervading and is therefore in contact with the senses, and hence there would be cognition of all things at once. This is not so, says the *sūtra* 3, 2, 20, for the process of perception involves *sannikarṣa*, the contact between mind,

¹ *Nyāya Vārtika*, 3, 2, 9, op. cit.

sense-organ and object, without which there cannot be any perception. The mind acts as a damper to the all-pervasiveness of the soul.

After the characteristics of the mind are thus established we find that the location of the mind is also fixed. It has been already stated that the Upaniṣads place the *manas* in the heart. The Naiyāyikas are more general and say that the mind lies within the body.¹ The word that is used for "lyin" is "*ṛtti*". The *Vārtika* of Uddyotakara says, the usual meanings of the word *ṛtti* such as "subsist" or "function"² cannot be applied here. For the body cannot be related as *container* to mind and the mind cannot subsist in anything. Nor can it said be that the mind functions only within the body, because the theory of perception of the Naiyāyika requires the perceiving sense-organ to go out of the body impelled by the mind, and then cause perception. This action is the action of the mind, because when mind is not present with reference to that particular sense-organ, then that sense-organ does not function. So the word "*ṛtti*" can only be interpreted here to mean that the mind without the body does not accomplish any purpose of man.³ Even if it is said that perception of the object takes place only when the mind goes out of the body to the object and then is not dependent on the body for its activity, the Naiyāyika says, the mind is quick moving and the action of the mind, in this case, of receiving sensations will only have a meaning when the mind comes again into contact with the soul that resides in the body. So the mind by itself without any reference to the body cannot function.

By now we find that both the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems have arrived at the conclusion that *manas* is material, atomic, one, and unconscious. It is an instrument of knowledge, an internal sense-organ and resides in the body. The Vaiśeṣika *Sūtras* designate *manas* as a sense-organ definitely and this is tacitly accepted by the Naiyāyikas. This acceptance is said to be based on the principle, "If I do not oppose a theory of my opponent, it is to be understood that I accept it."⁴

In the *Prāśastapāda Bhāṣya*, *manas* is explicitly mentioned as a sense-organ which is instrumental in bringing about direct experiences of pleasure and pain, and acts as the mediating organ in the

¹ Nyāya Sūtras, 3, 2, 26.

² Apte's Dictionary.

³ Vārtika on Nyāya Sūtras, 3, 2, 26, op. cit.

⁴ S. C. Vidyabhusan, *History of Indian Logic*, Calcutta University, 1921, p. 279.

experience of direct perceptual knowledge. Perception requires not only sense-object contact, but also mind and sense must be in conjunction. That is why some objects are not perceived though they have contact with the senses. The mind is otherwise engaged. While a beautiful thing is presented to the sense of sight, and the mind is concentrating on and appreciating the beauty so presented, one becomes oblivious of the actions of all other sense-organs. For such a person the noises around, the conditions of weather, bodily discomfort conveyed by the skin, all these do not exist. This fact of interested attention is that which is involved in the worship of God as an idol. It means that the eye and the mind are directly in contact with the visual object to the exclusion of other senses, and knowledge arises in the soul only with reference to that particular object.

Acts of perception can only be one at a time, since *manas* is atomic and cannot come into contact with more than one thing at a time. Bosanquet, analyzing the process of perception, says the same thing. What is given to the sense at one time is only one unitary piece of knowledge. For instance, the wall before us can only be perceived really as having breadth and height. But our perception involves the third dimension of depth also. This is made possible because the information supplied by several sense-organs is co-ordinated by the mind and constructed into a system of knowledge. Even so, according to Kant the categories of the understanding are responsible for the systematization of knowledge. The Naiyāyika goes a step further than these philosophers and says that the systematization of knowledge occurs in the soul which has *buddhi* as its quality. Mind is only an organ like the sense-organs.

The Naiyāyikas are very anxious to prove that the *manas* is a sense-organ. Before doing so, they go on to tell us about the nature of a sense-organ and sensation. Usually the definitions given of these two terms are interdependent. Russell says, "Sensations are what is common to the mental and physical worlds; they may be defined as the intersection of mind and matter. . . . It is not itself knowledge, but it supplies the data for our knowledge of the physical world."¹ Hence a sense-organ is one which is responsible for the receiving of sensations. Sensations are those which make the

¹ B. Russell, *The Analysis of Mind*, Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1924, p. 144.

object intelligible to the mind through the sense-organ. It is imperative that the sense-organs should function and be in contact with the mind before sensations of objects can have some meaning for the individuals. Whether sensations refer to primary or secondary qualities (in the Lockian sense), it is not necessary for us to determine here. It is enough for our purpose here, if we note along with G. Ryle the fact that "Observing entails having sensations". If sensations are these, then we should prove that mind is an organ which receives senses from something which is other than itself. The doubt begins even when the postulation begins. In the Upaniṣads we saw how *manas* is sometimes said to be the internal organ of sense and sometimes to be something more which controls the actions of all *indriyas*.

Both these ideas are also present in the *Nyāya Sūtras*. The Naiyāyika finds that, if he identifies the sense-organ with its physical counterpart, *manas* as a physical object becomes an evolute of a primordial matter, as the *Sāṃkhya Darśana* says. If it is not so, then the Naiyāyika will be denying his own premises that mind along with other sense-organs is material. Each sense-organ is made up of the same material as its object. That is why it is capable of receiving sensations from that object. So the Naiyāyika says the sense-organ is made up of elemental substances. The *Sāṃkhya* view urges an argument against this that things which are big like the mountains, and small like the banyan seed are all perceived by the eye. If the eye is elemental in nature, it cannot come into contact with things which are far bigger and far smaller than itself. But to this objection, Uddyotakara in his *Vārtika* replies that the lamp which is made up of the elemental substances is capable of illuminating or rendering cognizable objects which are both large and small. It is cognition that is illuminative and not the organ or instrument. The objection is carried further by the *Sāṃkhya* thinkers who say that mind which is a sense-organ cannot presumably be made up of elemental substances, for it is not of the same order as the eye or the ear or the skin. Uddyotakara says that mind is neither made up of elemental substances nor is it not made up of elemental substances. This simply means that mind is not of the nature of the elemental substances like earth, water, fire, etc. of which the other sense-organs are made. Not only does the Naiyāyika answer the objection, but he also raises a counter objection and asks why if the sense-organ is not elemental and is

all-pervading there is obstruction in its functioning. The ingenuous division between the organ and its function and the consequent postulation of the eternity of *vytti* is not acceptable to the Naiyāyika. The interest here is not so much in determining the nature of a sense-organ as in proving that mind is an organ of internal sense. It is enough for our purpose here that the sense-organs are said to be material substances, since they are obstructed in their functioning. The mind which is atomic and substantive cannot give rise to simultaneous perceptions. This is its obstruction. Hence it is a sense-organ.

Curiously enough, in *sūtras* 3, 1, 54 and 55 we find the sense-organs enumerated only as five, based on the object of the sense-organs. Mind which is elsewhere ¹ proved to be an organ of internal sense-perception is not mentioned here along with the other sense-organs as one of them. But the mistake, if it is one, is remedied in *sūtra* 58 where the objects of senses are made out to be five based on their characteristics as knowledge. That is, there are five types of knowledge possible and each type must belong to one sense-organ. But all these types of knowledge would be meaningless unless there is some means by which, they, which are external, are brought into contact with the self. This contact is provided by the mind which is the internal organ. That is why in the definition of perceptual knowledge, contact of the mind with the soul is said to be a common cause, *sādhāraṇa kārṇa*.²

Gangeśa in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* enumerates six senses, the traditional five and the mind.³ But this position of the Naiyāyika lands us in several epistemological difficulties. A sense-organ, epistemologically, would mean the special and instrumental cause of perceptual knowledge only. In this context an *indriya* is one which gives direct and immediate knowledge. Probably in this sense, since mind is the cause of the direct awareness of pleasure and pain, we may consider mind to be a sense-organ. But there are other activities in which mind is involved, such as perception, where the function of mind is no more direct but indirect. What is directly con-

¹ *Bhāṣya* on 3, 1, 16. "If you deny that to the conceiver of all things there belongs an *instrument* which brings about the *conceiving* of all things—and hold that there is no such instrument—then a similar denial may be made in regard to the instruments of the cognition of colour etc"

² *Nyāya Bhāṣya*, 1, 1, 4 and 2, 1, 25.

³ S. C. Vidhyabhusan's translation, op. cit., p. 411.

tacted by the senses is received and presented by the mind to the self. It is a *sādhāraṇa kāraṇa* to all perceptual knowledge and not a special cause or instrumental cause. Mind seems to be then a liaison between the objects and sense on the one hand and self on the other. In this sense mind cannot be an *indriya*. But in inference, memory and imagination, the mind, because of its direct activity as a special cause, must necessarily be classified as an instrument. Therefore at certain times, the mind is an instrument, and at other times it is not. Realizing this inherent contradiction if we characterize perception as direct knowledge only, Gangeśa adds a corollary to his definition of perception: "it is knowledge that is not derived through the instrumentality of other knowledge".¹ In the light of this definition of perception mind acts as special instrument in the direct perception of pleasure and pain.

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka proves the existence of mind by pointing out that the qualities of the self such as *buddhi*, pleasure, pain, etc., would never become manifest but for the activity of the mind.² The contact of the mind with the soul is necessary before cognition can take place. This mind along with the other five organs of perception constitutes the six sense-organs. The internal organ of sense not only acts as the co-ordinator for the functions of the other external senses, but also is the only way of perceiving mental states such as pleasure, pain, etc. The Mīmāṃsaka proves that the mind is atomic by arguing in the following way. Every action requires two kinds of causes, the material and the immaterial or the effective cause. The immaterial or effective cause always takes the form of either circumstances or qualities which by contact with the material cause produces the given effects. In the case of cognition, soul is the material cause because cognition is a specific quality of the soul. To bring about cognition, the soul must come into contact with another substance. This other substance must be atomic, for all cognitions are unitary and occur one at a time. This atomic substance must also reside in the body, as otherwise no contact with the soul is possible. Mind is such an atomic substance. It by itself has no colour or smell, but can bring into existence these things by contacting the organs such as the eye and the nose on the one hand and the *Ātman* on the other hand. Then

¹ S. C. Vidhyabhusan, op. cit., p. 411.

² All references to the Prābhākara School are taken from *Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsa*, G. Jha, Allahabad, 1911.

the cognition of the *Ātman* becomes the perceptual cognitions of smells and colours.¹ Thus the *Mīmāṃsaka* view of mind resembles that of the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* view.

Just as the *Nyāya* supplies the epistemological fulfilment to the *Vaiśeṣika* ontology, so also, the *Yoga* system supplies the psychological culmination for the *Sāṃkhya* metaphysics. The word "psychology" is used here in its original connotation which is "the science of the soul". The *Puruṣa* or the self that is bound by *prakṛti* must find its release and the process of release is described as *Yoga*. The ontological beliefs of *Yoga* have their basis in the metaphysics of *Sāṃkhya*.²

The most important tenet of the *Sāṃkhya* and *Yoga* is the *guṇa* theory. There are three fundamental characteristics which are seen in everything that is experienced and they are *sattva* (intelligence stuff), *tamas* (mass and inertia), and *rajas* (energy). *Prakṛti* is defined in the *Sāṃkhya Sūtras* as "Primal Matter which is the state of equipoise of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*".³ (*Sattva-rajas-tamasām-sāmyā-vastha prakṛtiḥ*.) Primal matter or *prakṛti* is nothing else but these three. But it does not mean that these are qualities which are to be found in a substrate which acts as their receptacle.⁴

The primal matrix, because of the proximity of *Puruṣa* who is pure intelligence, begins to create. The first product of creation is *mahat* or mind. This consciousness stuff, *sattā-mātra*, is the pure *sattva* where *rajas* and *tamas* exist as subordinated elements. This is that which in its course creates two different aspects of our experience, viz., the material and mental. *Vijñāna Bhikṣu* characterizes this *mahat* as mind or *manas* in the sense that its function is thinking which is determinative in character. Thinking here means *nīścaya* or judging.⁵

¹ G. Jha, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

² Das Gupta, *Yoga Philosophy*, Calcutta University, 1930, p. 36.

³ *Sāṃkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya*, Tr. by R. Garbe, Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. II, 1895.

⁴ *Sāṃkhya Aphorisms of Kapila*, Tr. by J. R. Ballantyne, 3rd edn., Trubner's Oriental Series, 1885, IV, 39. "Sattva and others are not properties of it because it consists of them."

⁵ *Yogasāra Saṅgraha*, Tr. by G. Jha, published by R. T. Tatya, 1923. Aph. 71, Bk. I; also *Sāṃkhya Sūtras*, op. cit., p. 88, note 1. "Mind is so called because its function is 'thinking' (*mānana*). By 'thinking' is here meant 'judging' (*nīścaya*). That of which this is a function is 'intellect' (*buddhi*) and that is the first product."

In Book II, Aph. 13, it is definitely stated that intellect is judgement: *Adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ*. Commenting on this Aniruddha says, "ascertainment is its peculiar modification". This does not mean that judgement is different from intellect or *buddhi*—for then we may have to account for judging as a separate quality, apart from *prakṛti*—for in the following lines the commentary goes on to say: "They are set forth as identical because a property and that of which it is the property are indivisible."

In the *Sāṃkhya Kārika*, we find a verse which not only says that "ascertainment is intellect" but also differentiates between two varieties of it.

Adhyavasāyo buddhir
Dharmoññānam Virāga aiśvaryam
Sāttvikam etad-rūpam
*Tāmasam asmad Viparyastam.*¹

The *Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya* on the first part of this *sūtra* says, "... as in the seed the future germinating shoot is contained, so is determination (in intellect). This is a jar, this is cloth: that intellect which will so determine is to be so defined."²

Now, the word *adhyavasāya* means "faculty of mental perception".³ Commenting on the *Sāṃkhya Sūtra* 13 (already referred to), Vijiñāna Bhikṣu says, "The synonyme, as well as *Buddhi* of the great principle (*Mahat*) and its specific function denominated ascertainment".⁴ This means that the word *adhyavasāya* is here used to indicate the function of ascertainment or certainty. No wish or will is indicated here. Statements like "this object is a jar, and this is a piece of cloth" are mere assertive propositions, not involving any specific action. It is not necessary for action to follow from statements. This *mahat* is the last limit; in an ascending order, up to which the subjective and objective are differentiated. Or in other words, at this stage of the evolution, the subject and object aspects of experience had not yet emerged. This *mahat* is the source of both. From this emerges *ahamkāra* or egoism. This is the knower,

¹ *Sāṃkhya Kārika*, Tr. by S. S. S. Sastry, Madras University, 1935, p. 53.

² *Sāṃkhya Kārika with Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya Kārika*, Tr. by H. T. Colebrooke and *Bhāṣya* by H. H. Wilson.

³ Monier Williams, Oxford, 1837.

⁴ H. T. Colebrooke, op. cit., p. 87.

the subject, from where emerge the feeling, willing, and knowing aspects of experience.

The second part of the verse quoted from *Sāṃkhya Kārika* says that this *mahat* so described is of two kinds as it is influenced by either *sattva* or *tamas*. *Mahat*, although *sāttvic* predominantly, still has the other *guṇas* lying dormant, and the possibilities in individuals for good and bad are therefore determined by the potentialities of *mahat*. *Mahat* in its microscopic form is that where these potencies predominate, whereas in its macrocosmic form only *sattva* is the predominating principle. Virtue, wisdom, non-attachment and possession of bodily powers are the result of the *sāttvika* predominance whereas vice, ignorance, attachment, and absence of lordly powers are the result of *tāmasic* predominance. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika holds that these qualities belong to the self and not to the mind. Aniruddha says that it is his purpose to refute this position taken up by the Naiyāyikas. The Sāṃkhya thinkers are *satkārya vādins* and maintain that the effect is already in the cause. Wisdom cannot belong to *Puruṣa* who is pure intelligence, and hence it must belong to *mahat* which is the first evolute of *prakṛti*.¹

From this *mahat* is created *ahamkāra* translated both as ego and as the self-consciousness. It is defined as *abhimāna*.² Colebrooke says, "The ordinary sense of both words (i.e., *abhimāna* and *ahamkāra*) is *pride* and the technical import is the pride or conceit of individuality".³ The "I" is the active entity where *rajas* is predominant. This activity makes it self-conscious. At the *mahat* stage, there is only pure awareness, without any sharp contrast between the subject and object aspects of experience. At this stage the activity that is *rajas* perceives in itself the objective, and the self with all its conative and cognitive elements is evolved. In other words, the ego or *ahamkāra* is a modification of the universal *buddhi* in which *rajas* predominates. The form which the conceit of the ego takes is "I exist", "I know", "I have this or that duty to perform or abstain from".⁴ Vijñāna Bhikṣu's commentary⁵ says that, when *ahamkāra* is determined by *buddhi* or judgement, the twofold

¹ *Aniruddha's Commentary*, Tr. by R. Garbe, Baptist Mission Press, Calcutta, 1892, Bk. II, Aph. 14.

² *Abhimāno ahamkāraḥ*, Bk. II, Aph. 16.

³ Colebrooke and Wilson, op. cit., p. 91.

⁴ S. S. S. Sastry, op. cit., verse 24, p. 58.

⁵ II, 16.

aspects of egohood, viz., *ahaṁkāra* and *mamakāra* (self-consciousness and the pride of self), arise.

*Budhyā niścita evārthe
ahaṁkāra—mamakāraū jāyate.*¹

The same idea is also expressed in the *Sāṁkhya Kārika*.² Though egoity is only one, the possibility of its being influenced by either *sattva* or *tamas* is always there. When *sattva* is dominant, the evolution of the eleven sense-organs and when *tamas* is predominant, the evolution of the five elements take place. The *Sāṁkhya Aphorism*³ expressly says that "along with the organs of action and the organs of understanding another is the eleventh". The separation, thus, of *manas* from the other sense-organs and calling it specially as the eleventh is significant.

The Naiyāyika objects to this enumeration of eleven sense-organs. To him the five organs of cognition are the only *indriyas*. To the Naiyāyika a sense-organ is a bodily organ with specific perceptual characteristics, *sākṣātpratīti-sādhana*. The function of one sense-organ should not be capable of being done by another sense-organ. The functions that are done by the *karmendriyas*, organs of action, are easily interchangeable. A person who is blind can never perceive colour, whereas a lame man can walk with the help of aids. Hence the *karmendriyas*, according to the Naiyāyika, cannot be classified as an *indriya*.⁴

Generally, the *Sāṁkhya* thinker rejects the belief held by the Naiyāyikas that the *indriyas* are generated from the elements and that they are eternal. When the Naiyāyika quotes scripture as authority,⁵ the *Sāṁkhya* commentator Aniruddha replies⁶ that the scriptural verse quoted should be interpreted as meaning that *anna* or food enables the sense-organs to function and not that it is the cause of the sense-organs. Another passage from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*⁷ is cited by the Naiyāyika to prove that the sense-organs

¹ *Sāṁkhya Prayacana Bhāṣya*, op. cit., p. 78.

² Verse 25.

³ Aph. 19.

⁴ *Nyāya Manjari*, 482-83, V. S. S. Press, Banaras, 1895, quoted by J. Sinha in *Indian Psychology of Perception*, p. 15.

⁵ *Chāndogya*, 6, 5, 4.

⁶ Bk. II, 20.

⁷ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 3, 2, 13.

are produced out of elements. This verse says that when death comes, the senses dissolve into their causes such as "the sight forsooth, enters into the sun" etc. The Sāṃkhya thinker holds that it is not the interpretation. Although we very often see a product being dissolved into its cause when destruction takes place, for example objects like jar being reduced to its originator the earth, there are cases where the dissolution does not end in the thing being dissolved into its originator like a drop of water being absorbed into the ground, which is not its originator. Therefore, the senses, when a person dies, are dissolved into the elements, although these are not their originators. In other words, the senses are not caused by the elements, as the Naiyāyika holds. Another theory of the Naiyāyika is that the mind is eternal. The Sāṃkhya thinker refutes this and says that there is scriptural evidence to prove the opposite.¹ "From this are produced the vital airs, the mind and all the other organs." Not only that, there is perceptual evidence that these organs suffer decay. In old age, not only do the senses like the sense of sight and hearing become impaired, but mind also decays. What is thus known to have a beginning as well as an end, how can it be eternal?—asks the Sāṃkhya thinker.

There is still another objection raised by atheists ("*nāstika matam*"—*Sāṃkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya*) who say that the senses are nothing but their physical counterparts;² e.g., the sense of sight consists of the eye-ball. To this it is replied that it is a mistake to identify the sense which is super-sensuous—*atīndriyam indriyam*—with its site. Senses are not perceptible. Aniruddha's commentary strengthens this argument. If the senses were to be identified with their sites, then a man whose ears are cut should be deaf, and a man who has cataract should be able to see colours. But both are known to be impossible from experience. Hence the senses must be something other than their gross physical counterparts.

Still another objection is raised by the Pūrvaapakṣin, viz., that the opinion of the Sāṃkhya thinker that there is only one self-consciousness which because of diversity of powers does the various functions—*Śakti-bhedād vilakṣaṇa kārya kāri*³—is self-contradictory. Because, if a difference in power is conceded, then the oneness

¹ *Muṇḍaka*, II, 1, 3.

² *Sāṃkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya*, op. cit., Aph. 23.

³ *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Aph. 23.

of the self-consciousness does no more hold good. He continues to ask, is it not illogical to assume that the various kinds of organs arise out of one single *ahamkāra*?¹ To this it is replied that mind is the single leading sense-organ, and the other ten are kinds of powers of this mind.² Actual experience may be cited in support of this argument. Experience tells us that all sense-organs function as modifications of egoity.

After this long discussion about the nature of *indriyas*, the Sāṃkhya thinker says that mind is dual in nature. It is the eleventh *indriya*.³ The five *jñānendriyas* and the five *karmendriyas* are the evolutes of *ahamkāra* when *sattva* and *tamas* become dominant in turn. *Rajas* is the common factor for both. The mind is also an *indriya* like the others, but its peculiarity is that among the organs of cognition, it is an organ of cognition, for it perceives the senses of pleasure and pain, and among the organs of action, it is an organ of action, for it acts like the other *karmendriyas* as the cause of knowledge. Hence it is but right that it should be mentioned separately and not along with the other senses as it has been already observed. Vijñāna Bhikṣu is of the opinion that *manas* alone is of the pure *sāttvika* form, whereas the other ten sense-organs are due to the predominance of *rajas* and the elements are due to the predominance of *tamas*.⁴ What are perceived as mere sensations by the *jñānendriyas* are connected together into concepts by the *manas*. Thus the mind identifies itself with both the organs of intellection and of action. Aniruddha explaining this says that without the superintendence of *manas*, the senses do not function.⁵ Similarly the *karmendriyas* also do not function without the superintendence of *manas*, for a man often acts; i.e., walks or does things, in an absent-minded way and when it is pointed out to him, he says that his mind was occupied elsewhere and not with the action that was being done. That is why it is said, mind identifies itself with both the types of organs.⁶

¹ "Ekasmād ahamkāraṃ nānā vidha indriya utpatti kalpanāyām nyāya virodhaḥ", *Sāṃkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya*, II, 24.

² "Ekasyaiṣa mukhyendriyasya manasaḥ-anyodaśa śakti bheda ityaḥ", *Sāṃkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya*, II, 25.

³ *Sāṃkhya Sūtras*, op. cit., Bk. II, Aph. 18.

⁴ *Ibid.*, op. cit., Bk. II, Aph. 18.

⁵ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 1, 5, 3. "My mind was elsewhere, (therefore) I did not see", etc.

⁶ *Sāṃkhya Sūtras*, op. cit., *ubhayātmakam manaḥ*, Bk. II, Aph. 26.

In the 27th *Sāṃkhya Kārika* we get a more interesting account of mind, where it is described not only as belonging to both the organs of sensation and action, but also its differentia as an organ of knowledge is given as being *saṃkalpa*. Gauḍapāda's commentary on this *kārika* states that the mind is that which *purposes* or intends the *functions* of both the organs of sense and action. In other words the functioning of mind, which is common to both sets of organs, is the basis for their functions. Mind reflects on what is given by these organs and transmits a considered opinion to the soul through individuation and intellect. Intellect is the supreme organ which is responsible ultimately for all knowledge to the *Puruṣa*. The *Sāṃkhya Sūtras*¹ say that, among the two types of *indriyas*, the external and the internal, the principal one is mind or *buddhi*, just as in the world, there is always a superior servant, serving the purposes of the master. All the organs, including the *manas* (*antaḥ-karaṇa*, the internal organ) are subordinate to this *buddhi* which is the link between the pure *Puruṣa* and the external world.

If there is only one *ahamkāra*, how is it that the *indriyas* (both of action and knowledge) together with *manas* are produced out of it?² Even granting that in some way they are so produced, how is it possible for *manas* which is one of them, to identify itself with the other sense-organs? In answer to these questions, it is stated that because egoity, *ahamkāra*, is made up of the three *guṇas*, it is possible for it to transform itself into these several forms.³

Manas is an *indriya* like the other sense-organs, because as the *kārika* says, it is produced along with the other organs from the *ahamkāra* and has *sādharmya* with them.⁴ But still it is capable of identifying itself with the other *indriyas*. This action is explained with the help of an analogy in the *Pravacana Bhāṣya*. "As one single man supports a variety of characters, through the force of association—being through association with the beloved, a lover; through association with one indifferent (*virakta*), indifferent; and through association with some other, something other,—so the mind also, through association with the organ of vision, or any other, becomes various. . . ." The same idea is expressed differently by Aniruddha when he says, it is "just as there are (different)

¹ Aph., 40.

² *Sāṃkhya Aphorism*, 27.

³ Ibid., "Gunaparināma bheda".

⁴ *Sāṃkhya Kārika*, 27.

conditions in one single person, leanness and thickness, etc. which depend on the use and non-use of this or that food". Hence *manas* is a sensory-motor organ.

These organs of intellect and action have their specific function, in spite of what the Naiyāyika says. But these are only instruments, serving the purposes of another. The very name *indriya* means that they serve the purposes of *indra* or *Puruṣa*.

In general, the nature of these sense-organs must be understood. The internal sensory is threefold, viz., *buddhi*, *ahamkāra* and *manas* (the *antaḥkaraṇa*). Vijñāna Bhikṣu defines a sense thus: "An *indriya* is the instrument of the Lord of the body, or the soul. The essential nature of a sense-organ consists in its instrumentality and in being an effect of *ahamkāra*."¹ The external organs are capable of functioning only in the present time, whereas the internal sensory functions in all the three times, viz., past, present and future.² This position of the *Sāṃkhya Kārika* leads to many difficulties as to the nature of time. It is a logically proved fact that there is no bare present. Every moment that we designate as present is something that is a combination of the immediate past and the immediate future. Probably what is meant here is that in perceptual cognition the external organs of sense are directly involved, whereas in inference and *Śabda* greater emphasis is laid on the mental than on the perceptual. It has been already stated that these senses are not their physical counterparts, but determinate modifications of *ahamkāra* or egoism. The *jñānendriyas* may be compared to sensory impulses and the *karmendriyas* to motor impulses.

Now, it is questioned, why these internal organs are called senses and if they are senses, whether there is any difference between these senses and the external sense-organs. This brings us to the ontology of the *Sāṃkhya*. There are two primal entities *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* is that which evolves into *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, *manas* and the other organs. But it does so for the sake of the *Puruṣa*. *Puruṣa* is pure consciousness, but non-active. When this *Puruṣa* is reflected in the pure *sāttvika* part of *prakṛti*, viz., *mahat*, the eternal *Puruṣa* wrongly identifies itself with this reflection. All the organs, both external and internal, function so that this individual particular *Puruṣa* may have experience. The intelligence aspect of *Puruṣa*, when it is limited by *mahat* and energized by *rajas*, evolves into the

¹ *Sāṃkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya*, op. cit., Bk. II, 19.

² *Sāṃkhya Kārika*, 33.

psychical aspects of individuals. So, the *sūtra kāra* says, whatever serves a purpose is an instrument, an organ. Here *manas*, *ahamkāra* and *buddhi* are serving the purposes of *Puruṣa*; hence they are instruments. The soul or *Puruṣa* is influenced by the functions of these internal organs. But of all these instruments, *buddhi* is supreme. Just as in cutting the wood, the blow itself is the chief means of cutting the wood, although the axe is also important because of its special power of being sharp etc., so also here, all the other senses except *buddhi* are only instruments and their usefulness is primarily dependent on the power of *buddhi* to cause the soul to have experience. *Buddhi* is the primary organ whereas the others are all secondary organs, since it is indispensable for soul's experience. *Manas* again is the chief organ with reference to external senses. Without *manas*, there will be no contact between the self and the objects. Once this contact is established, *buddhi* stores up all impressions and makes memory possible.

Thus the material character of *manas* is definitely emphasized in Sāṃkhya school. *Manas* belongs to the physical order of things and thus it is contrasted with the self which is pure consciousness.

The Vedāntic view of *manas* is different from what has been so far detailed in very important respects. It is common knowledge that any theory of epistemology depends upon the corresponding theory of ontology and it follows from this that the concept of mind of any school of thought depends upon its ontology. Thus, it will be seen hereafter that the Vedāntic view of *manas* bears a close correspondence to its metaphysical outlook.

Gauḍapāda is "probably the earliest systematic Advaitin".¹ He is regarded as Śaṅkara's *paramaguru*, teacher's teacher. The main work of Gauḍapāda from which we derive his Advaita is the *Māṇḍūkya Kārika*, an exposition of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. It is considered one of the most important sources of Advaita, and is quoted profusely by all later writers including Śaṅkara. Another important source book for the *kārika* is the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*.²

The central thesis of the *kārika* as well as of all Advaitic literature is that, ultimately, there is nothing other than the self that is real. The self is Brahman, the ultimate reality. All the experience of "otherness" is because of wrong and illusory knowledge. With

¹ T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Gauḍapāda—A Study in Early Advaita*, Madras University, 1952, p. 1.

² T. M. P. Mahadevan, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

this as the basis the *kārikas* prove that every aspect of experience is illusory.

Īśvara is *Brahman*, the ultimate reality, seen through the veil of *māyā* and hence he is regarded as the creator of this world of plurality. If the cosmic *jīva* alone is real and if everything else is illusory, a question is raised who creates this manifold world. To this it is answered that actually there is no world created. The whole manifested and unmanifested world of things and ideas is but the imagination (*kalpana*) of the mind of this cosmic self. "*Cittaspan-ditam eva.*"¹ The process of creation, if at all there is one, is explained in the following manner. During *pralaya*, all the things and ideas are destroyed. They remain as potencies in the mind of *Īśvara* and during creation, these again take form and shape, born out of the residuary knowledge and *vāsanās* and are limited by them. The individual *jīva* is also then created; he is a "product of imagination and competent to effect further imagination".² This creation is often compared to the rope-snake illusion. Only here, the difference is, the *Īśvara* knows which is the "rope" and which the "snake" whereas the individual *jñāna* is capable of knowing only the "snake" and imagines that to be the truth.

This individual *jīva* is encased in many coverings called sheaths (*kośas*). These are said to be five, quoting the authority of the *Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*.³ They are *annamaya*, that which is made up of food and matter; *prāṇamaya*, vital breath which is subtler than the physical; *manomaya*, mental sheath being subtler than the breath; *vijñāna maya*, intellectual sheath, which is responsible for all empirical knowledge; *ānandamaya*, which is made up of bliss. The *kārika* first mentions these sheaths and says that these must not be confused with the real self. All these *kośas* can be regrouped into three. The first one *annamaya* forms an entity by itself; it is the gross body. Next the three sheaths of *prāṇa*, *manas* and *vijñāna* can be grouped together to refer to the psychical principles; and lastly the *ānandamaya*, indicating bliss or happiness. This division of the self shows that the psychical states are only subtler forms of the physical, and as such, it is to be inferred that Gauḍapāda accepts the Upaniṣadic theory that mind is material and is only an aspect of the perishable body.

¹ *Kārika*, IV, 72.

² *Ibid.*, III, 2.

³ *Ibid.*, III, 2.

The waking self comes into contact with the external world in nineteen ways. These are the five organs of perception: sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste, the five organs of action (*karmendriyas*), the five vital breaths (*prāṇas*), the mind (*manas*), intellect (*buddhi*), egoity (*ahamkāra*), and the mind-stuff (*citta*). The waking self which so comes into contact with the external world has its cosmic counterpart which is called the *Vaiśvānara* self.

In dream, the self is also active and is conscious of what is within (*antahprajñāḥ*), and this self is known as *taijasa*. It is also said to be *svapnasthāna*, for the basis of action of the self here is dream. Śaṅkara suggests¹ that this *taijasa* self is related to the *Vaiśvānara* self as effect and cause, because the impressions left by the mind in the waking consciousness are those which are the object of dream consciousness. That is why the dream-self is called *antahprajñāḥ*. Śaṅkara in explaining this says, "from the standpoint of the sense-organs, the mind is internal".²

It is suggested here that *manas* along with *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, and *citta* is an instrument of knowledge for the self and that all these make up the internal organ of knowledge for the *taijasa* or the dream self. The fact whether the mind is a sense-organ or not depends on the views taken of the externality of the objective world. When the sense-organs of sight etc. are involved directly in knowledge, it is usually held that the organs are external. When the mind alone is involved, the objects are said to be internal as in a dream. This is borne out by what Śaṅkara says, "The Lord, i.e. the *Ātman*, with his mind turned outward, imagines in diverse forms various objects perceived in the (outside) world such as sound etc., . . . similarly turning his mind within, the Lord imagines various ideas which are subjective".³ This passage must mean that for knowledge to arise, the mind as well as the external sense-organs must function. Since the mind is acting as an *antahkāraṇa*, an internal cause, it may be counted as an integrating instrument of knowledge.

In a number of places in the *kārikas*, "mind" is used to mean "self". This should not lead to the idea that mind and consciousness are one, as some Western thinkers say. Here mind means the

¹ *Vedānta Sūtras* with Śaṅkara's commentary, Tr. by G. Thibaut, Sacred Books of the East, Oxford, I, 14.

² *Ibid.*, I, 4.

³ *Ibid.*, II, 13.

Ātman which is unborn and which is without end.¹ "Mind in this sense is the ground of the world, conditioned by *Māyā*",² and this is known as *jīva*, which is responsible for empirical knowledge. This empirical knowledge arises when mind and the external sense-organs function.

For the reason which has already been given with reference to Gauḍapāda's ideas of mind, it is necessary to become well acquainted with the metaphysical theory of Śaṅkara before an attempt is made to understand the concept of mind according to Śaṅkara and post-Śaṅkara Advaitins. Śaṅkara in his introduction to the commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras* gives his whole philosophy in a nut-shell. "Of the spheres of the two concepts of 'Thou' and 'I', the object and the subject, with their natures opposed to each other like darkness and light, when it is established that one cannot intelligibly be of the nature of the other, the more is it unintelligible for their attributes too to be one (in the substrate of) the other; on this account, the superimposition of the object, the sphere of concept of 'Thou', and of its attributes, on the subject, the intelligent self, the sphere of the concept of 'I' and superimposition of the subject, which is the reverse of that (object), and its attributes on the object, can properly be only an illusion."³ After thus pointing out the illogicality of the superimposition, Śaṅkarācārya says, still it is being done, for it is natural for man to make this mistake. This mutual superimposition of the self and the non-self is known as *adhyāsa* and is the basis of all relative experiences. The world of sense-experience contradicts the world of illusory experience like seeing the snake in the rope. The snake experience is real, as long as it lasts, but is seen to be false only from the standpoint of sense-experience. Similarly from the standpoint of experience of the real Self the sense-experience becomes illusory. It is from the standpoint of relative or phenomenal experience that mind has to be evaluated.

More than in any other school of thought, there is the danger of identifying consciousness with the empirical mind in Advaita. Consciousness here "is a contentless consciousness, in which there is no consciousness of either 'I' or 'this', *aham* or *idam*",⁴ whereas

¹ Ref. to III, 46, 54, 61-62, etc.

² T. M. P. Mahadevan, op. cit., p. 151.

³ *Bhāmati, Catuṣṣūtri*, Tr. by S. S. S. Sastri and C. Kunhan Raja, Theosophical Publishing House, Madras, 1933, p. 1.

⁴ S. K. Saksena, *Nature of Consciousness in Hindu Philosophy*, Nand Kishore Bros., Banaras, 1944, p. 44.

mind and the *indriya* have no connotation without their contents or modes of action. From the point of view that everything that is is consciousness, *manas* and other empirical things cannot but be non-different from it; but from the point of view that *manas* etc., are experiences, they cannot, for practical purposes, be identified with consciousness.

The difference between the realistic Naiyāyika and absolutistic Advaitin is that for the latter, consciousness is an independent, eternally existing real, whereas for the former, it is the result of the combination of circumstances and is usually caused by *manas*, *indriya* and *viśaya* acting together. The Naiyāyika believes that it is possible for the soul to exist without consciousness at certain times, as this consciousness is only a result of the collocation of circumstances. Śaṅkara denying this position says that the very first reason for holding that consciousness is not a quality of the self, but is identical with it, is because of Śruti sayings.¹

Again the Naiyāyika holds that the relation between *Ātman* and consciousness is one of *samavāya*. Śaṅkara says that the relation of *samavāya* is one which involves *regressus ad infinitum*, hence no relation at all.² Consciousness and the self are therefore one. But for practical purposes, consciousness is used to denote the knowledge relation of the self with its objects. It is in this context that it is said, when the self that is pure consciousness becomes limited by adjuncts, it is known as the individual *Ātman* which is the knower and to whom knowledge is supplied by means of the organs of knowledge and sensations. These changing states of knowledge are the self modified by *buddhi* and these are usually taken to be *svabhāva* or nature of the self. But this is true only of the *citta vṛttis* (mental modes). This distinction of the knower, known and the process of knowledge does not exist for the *cinmātra* *Ātman*. When we say the self acts or that the self is the *kartā* and the *jñātā*, all that is meant is that the self here is that which is limited by the *upādhis* or adjuncts. Śaṅkara raises all possible objections³ to the self being limited by the *upādhis* and maintains that all instruments of knowledge including *buddhi* or cognition are limiting adjuncts for the self. "The self is here said to be of the nature of the essence of the mind's (*buddhi*'s) qualities, because those qualities such as

¹ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, III, 9; 2, 8, 7; *Taittirīya*, II, 1; II, 3, 18, etc.

² *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya*, II, 3, 13, op. cit.

³ *Sūtra Bhāṣya*, II, 3, 40, op. cit.

desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, and so on constitute the essence, i.e., the principal characteristics of the self, as long as it is implicated in transmigratory existence. Apart from the qualities of the mind, the mere self does not exist in the *saṃsāra* state; for the latter owing to which the self appears as an agent and an enjoyer, is altogether due to the circumstances of the qualities of the *buddhi* and the other limiting adjuncts being wrongly imposed on the self.”¹

So, from the empirical standpoint, the self which is known only through its limiting adjuncts and which becomes identical with the qualities of the mind is what we have to consider here. This connection of the *buddhi* and the soul exists as long as the soul is in the state of *saṃsāra*.²

This limiting adjunct is known in different places by different names such as *manas*, *buddhi* (intelligence), *vijñāna* (knowledge), *citta* (thought).³ This difference in nomenclature depends on their functions. It is called *manas* while it is in the state of doubt, and *buddhi* while it is in the state of determination. *Saṃsayādi vṛttikam manaityucchate, niścayādi vṛttikam buddvitiḥ*.⁴ By whatever name it is known, it always refers to the internal organ of knowledge *antaḥkaraṇa*. Such an internal organ is an essential necessity, for, if the soul, sense-organ and objects alone were enough for perception, then there would be perpetual perception, since soul is eternal, and the sense-organs and objects are always interacting. If these three are not sufficient for perception to take place, even if these are present always, no perception would follow. Hence it is necessary to have an internal organ “through whose attention and non-attention, perception and non-perception take place”.⁵ In support of this view Śaṃkara quotes the Upaniṣadic text which says, “My mind was elsewhere, I did not hear; for a man sees with his mind and hears with his mind”.⁶ From this it is clear that Śaṃkara accepts the Upaniṣadic statement that *manas* is a necessary, though internal, instrument of cognition. All empirical experience is because of *antaḥkaraṇa*, and hence it is the primary limiting adjunct of the self.

Whatever the ontological explanation, *antaḥkaraṇa* is, from an empirical level, created just as all other things of experience are

¹ *Sūtra Bhāṣya*, II, 3, 29.

² *Ibid.*, II, 3, 31.

³ *Ibid.*, II, 3, 32.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 3, 32, Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam.

⁵ *Śaṃkara Bhāṣya*, II, 3, 32, G. Thibaut, op. cit.

⁶ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, I, 5, 3.

created. Explaining the scheme of creation Śaṅkara says, first the subtle elements are created of which ether is the first and then all other elements in their subtle form come into existence. So also the psychic element of *antaḥkaraṇa*, the *indriyas*, are also produced. Upholding the Śruti words¹ it is maintained that all these originate from Brahman and go back into Brahman. These organs themselves are of the nature of the elements, although they are sometimes mentioned separately from them. Again on scriptural evidence, viz., "Food (earth) when eaten becomes threefold; its grossest portion becomes faeces, its middle portion flesh, its subtlest portion mind", Śaṅkara admits that mind is subtle matter.

The two words *manas* and *antaḥkaraṇa* are interchangeable for Śaṅkara, but due to division of functions, the same *manas* is referred to by various names as *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahamkāra* and *citta*.² *Manas* or *antaḥkaraṇa* by itself is that which refers to the past, present and the future. This internal organ is that which controls and rules over the other organs of sense-perception. It is the apperceptive agent. In support of this Śaṅkara quotes Śruti. *Buddhi*, which is the determinative aspect of *antaḥkaraṇa*, is understood in five ways, corresponding to the cognitive organs. These along with the five *karmendriyas* are under the control of *manas* which is the chief *indriya*.³ It is problematic here whether Śaṅkara meant the *manas* to be a sense-organ since *buddhi*, an aspect of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, is involved with the *jñānendriyas* during the process of perception, or whether he meant *manas* to be merely a co-ordinating factor, not having anything directly to do with the sense activities. *Manas* may be considered as that which co-ordinates the organs of perception and the organs of action. This would be something like the theory of the Western physiological-psychologists who say that the motor and sensory impulses are controlled and directed by the brain which is the seat of the mind. The different aspects of the mental activities as given in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* are here accepted by Śaṅkara.⁴ The psychical and logical activities of the *manas* are those that are given in the Upaniṣads.

According to Śaṅkara mind is minute. But this minuteness is not the same as the *aṇutva* of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas. It is subtle and

¹ *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, 1, 3, 34.

² *Sūtra Bhāṣya*, II, 3, 32 & II, 4, 6.

³ *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya*, II, 4, 6.

⁴ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 1, 5, 3, and *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya*, II, 4, 6.

limited in size,¹ because at death when mind leaves the physical body, it is not perceived. If it were big and made up of parts, it should be capable of being perceived. Hence, it is *sūkṣma* or subtle. Again, *manas* should be limited in size, since unless it is so, it cannot pass in and out of a body.² Even the self, because of its association with *buddhi*, the limiting adjunct, becomes limited. *Manas* along with the other *jñānendriyas* appears as *vyttis* in the body giving rise to knowledge. Hence *manas* must be limited and subtle.³

Although mind is thus the co-ordinating factor, yet it is not the agent of knowledge but only an instrument of knowledge. *Manas* or *buddhi* is never the *kartā*. Quoting scripture⁴ Śaṅkara says, the self is definitely different from the *buddhi* and though the former alone is the agent of action, still it is dependent on *buddhi* and *indriyas* to provide knowledge of it. "An agent does not cease to be an agent because he requires some assistance in his work. A cook remains the agent in the action of cooking, although he requires fuel, water and so on."⁵ Again if *buddhi* were to be the agent, then it cannot at the same time be an instrument. If this were so, then, it is to be regarded as the object of self-consciousness which is of the nature of consciousness, implied in statements like "I go, I come, I eat, I act, etc." Then *buddhi* or *manas*, being the object of self-consciousness, can no more be the instrument of self-consciousness. Then there must be assumed another instrument to make self-consciousness possible. The whole problem is simply one of names, says Śaṅkara.⁶ If only what the opponent calls *buddhi* is accepted to be essentially a *jīva*, then self-consciousness becomes possible, for it is the nature of the self to be conscious. Also, if the self as an agent is not differentiated from *buddhi*, the instrument, actions involving will and meditation, where *buddhi* itself is controlled by the self, become impossible. No doubt this agency of the self is due to its limiting adjuncts, for the self by itself is pure consciousness without being either an agent or an enjoyer and this is borne

¹ Śaṅkara Bhāṣya, II, 4, 7.

² Ibid., II, 3, 29.

³ "Atom or *aṇu* is in the Advaita Vedānta not an ultimate indivisible discrete constituent of matter, but is the smallest conceivable quantum of matter." S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 592, footnote 7.

⁴ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II, 1, 17.

⁵ Śaṅkara Bhāṣya, II, 3, 37.

⁶ Ibid., II, 3, 38.

out by the statement of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, "as if thinking, as if moving".¹ So *manas* is material and subtle and is an instrument of the self. The self that is conscious of itself is not the pure self but the active *kartā* who has qualities.

The five *jñānendriyas*, the five *karmendriyas*, *manas*, are all animated and controlled by the principle of unconscious life, the *mukhya prāṇa*. This *mukhya prāṇa* is the chief breath of life which is divided into five vital breaths. Just as anatomy makes the brain the controlling authority for all actions and knowledge, so also here *manas* is conceived as the central functionary on which the *karmendriyas* and *buddhi-indriyas* are dependent. These eleven, on the whole, make up for the whole conscious life of the individual. The reason for maintaining this number as eleven is elaborately discussed by Śaṅkara.² There are in the first place five types of perceptions which are gained through the five intellectual organs of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. Therefore there must be only five organs or *indriyas* through which *manas* acts. Similarly there are five organs of action because of five classes of action. Correlating these different organs, there is the internal organ, *antaḥkaraṇa* or *manas*. These ten organs are all limited to the present whereas *manas* has the quality of going beyond the present into the past and the future. Whenever Śaṅkara talks of the *indriyas*, he always refers only to sense-functions and not to their physical locations. The functions of mind are specifically acknowledged to be five. "Let us then follow the principle that the opinions of other (systems) if unobjectionable may be adopted, and let us assume that the five functions of the *manas* are those five which are known from the *Yogaśāstra*, viz., right knowledge, error, imagination, slumber and remembrance."³ It has already been shown how Śaṅkara accepts the list of psychical qualities cited in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*.

The problem whether *manas* is an *indriya* or not is dealt with mostly in post-Śaṅkara literature on Advaita. It has already been stated that to the Advaitin, *buddhi*, *manas*, *citta*, *vijñāna*, *ahamkāra*, all connote the same thing—the *antaḥkaraṇa* in its different aspects. To decide whether this is a sense-organ or not, we must first of all determine what a sense-organ is. Three possible answers can be

¹ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV, 3, 7.

² *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya*, II, 4, 6.

³ *Ibid.*, II, 4, 12; also *Yoga Aph.* 7.

given to this question. Like the Buddhists it may be said that the sense-organs are merely the peripheral organs—the *golakas*. This view is rejected on the ground that certain animals, e.g., serpents, can hear, although they have no ears. Also, plants etc. which are endowed with hearing have no end-organs at all. Secondly, with the Mimāṃsakas it may be argued that sense-organs consist of the *śakti* or potency that resides in the end-organs. Quoting the law of parsimony, the Mimāṃsaka says that it would be right to assume the *śakti* alone for purposes of cognition rather than assume each sense-organ endowed with such a potency. But if this were so, says the Śāṅkarite applying the law of parsimony, it would be sufficient to assume the self capable of knowing things, since it is all-pervading. The Mimāṃsaka himself accepts the fact that the self is capable of being limited in the body as cognition etc. Hence, he would be forced to deny all sense-organs if he were to apply the law of parsimony here. Hence, this view of potency is not also correct. The third possibility is that the sense-organs are not distinct substances, not to be confused with either the orbs or their powers. To cut a piece of wood, both an agent and an instrument are required. Similarly the action of cognition requires the self which is an agent, and an instrument, the sense-organ. The reason expressed here is too general. "The self acts upon the sense-organs to incite them to action; but in doing so, it does not require any instrument. If it did, it would lead to infinite regress."¹ The Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas say that the senses are elemental and that each is made up of its corresponding cognitive substance, e.g., the eye is made up of fire atoms whose peculiar characteristic is colour: But this argument becomes inconclusive (*anaikāntika*), when the sense of hearing is considered. The sense of hearing is ether that is limited by the ear cavity and its special quality is not the capacity of manifesting sound, but sound itself. Also, the mind, which helps in the manifestation of the other sense-organs, must be made up of all the characteristics of all the elements of which the sense-organs are made. But at the same time, mind knows the self, hence it must be also non-elemental like the self. Hence to avoid all these contradictions the Advaitin maintains that the senses are material, but they are subtle and not to be identified with their physical

¹ J. Sinha, *Indian Psychology of Perception*, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1934, p. 12.

counterparts. They are not objects of perception, but can only be inferred from their activities.

All Advaitins do not agree on the point whether *manas* is an *indriya* or not. The Bhāmati school led by Vācaspati Miśra claims that the mind is a sense-organ like other sense-organs. Giving a faithful commentary on *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya* Vācaspati maintains along with Śaṅkara that *manas* is a sense-organ.¹ Another reason for holding the *manas* to be an *indriya* is that it is the instrument of internal perception of pleasure and pain. Perceptual experience of external things is brought about by the *vytti* of the *manas* through the external sense-organs. But internal experiences of pleasure and pain which are also direct experiences must have an instrument, and that is *manas* acting as an *indriya*. If this is not accepted, it follows that either the experience of pleasure etc., is not perceptual or that *indriyas* in general are not causes of perception.

According to the Vivaraṇa view of Advaita, *manas* need not be considered a sense-organ. The sense-organs make the other objects known, but are never self-revealing. At best they can only be known through inference and verbal testimony. Then if *manas* is a sense-organ, it cannot be the object of *pratyakṣa*. The *Vedānta Paribhāṣa* says in this context, "There is no evidence for this that the internal organ is a sense-organ",² and goes on to show that the verse from the *Gītā* saying that the "sense-organs with the mind as the sixth",³ cannot be interpreted to mean that *manas* is also an *indriya* along with the other sense-organs. There cannot be any contradiction in the mind being made the sixth, although it is not included in the list of the *indriyas*. There is another Śruti text⁴ which claims the mind as something other than the sense-organs and superior to them. In this text, *manas* and *buddhi* though mentioned separately are only different forms of one *antaḥkaraṇa* which is different from the sense-organs. The position of the Vivaraṇa school is not unassailable. As S. S. S. Sastry says, "The texts are inconclusive and

¹ *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya*, II, 4, 17. "In Smṛti eleven sense-organs are mentioned and on that account the mind must, like the ear and so on, be comprised of the sense-organs."

² *Vedānta Paribhāṣa*, Tr. by S. S. S. Sastry, Pub. by Adyar Library, Madras, 1942, 11 to 14.

³ *Gītā*, XV, 7.

⁴ "Objects are superior to sense-organs, the mind is superior even to the objects." *Kaṭha*, III, 10.

are susceptible of being interpreted either way".¹ The force of this statement becomes all the more clear when the context in which the Śruti texts are given is considered. Professor Hiriyanna says, in his translation of the *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya* on these two verses of the *Kaṭhōpaniṣad*,² "The object of these two mantras is merely to indicate that the person is beyond everything else, for there is nothing to be gained by knowing that anyone of the others among the series is subtler than the other. Consequently not much value need be attached to the exact place which any of the phenomenal entities ought to take in the series."³ What is sought to be proved here by these two verses taken together is not that *manas* is not a sense-organ, but that it is more subtle than the external senses.

The Vivaraṇa school advances some more arguments to prove that *manas* need not be a sense-organ. If *manas* is taken to be an *indriya* it becomes an instrument along with the other instruments of perception and its functions must be limited to direct experience of perceptual things. But *manas* also acts in other means of valid knowledge like *anumāna* etc., where it does not function as a sense-organ. Hence *manas* cannot be a sense-organ. To the argument that without *manas* functioning as an *indriya* there can be no perceptual experience of pleasure and pain, the *Vedānta Paribhāṣa* states that the perceptual character of cognition does not depend on it being generated by the sense-organs and that the characteristic of perceptual cognition is its immediacy, *aparokṣatva*. In this matter S. S. S. Sastry says, "We do admit the functioning of *manas*, but perceptuality depends in the last resort on the manifestation of non-difference of *vytti*-defined consciousness from object-defined consciousness; for this purpose, the presence or absence of a sense-channel, the sense-character of *manas*, these are irrelevant questions."⁴ If this is accepted, it follows that not only mind is not necessary as a sense-organ, but also that the existence of the external sensations as organs of perception becomes irrelevant.

As against this argument, there is this to be said for the Vivaraṇa view. The cognitions of pleasure and pain are immediate experiences and hence they are perceptual. Knowing a thing with the mind does

¹ *Introduction to the Vedānta Paribhāṣa*, op. cit., p. xviii.

² *Kaṭhōpaniṣad*, 3, 10 and 11.

³ Prof. Hiriyanna, *Kaṭhōpaniṣad*, Sri Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam, 1915, p. 74, footnote 1.

⁴ *Introduction to the Vedānta Paribhāṣa*, op. cit., p. xviii.

not make the mind an *indriya*. "Mind is an auxiliary to *pramāṇa*. It is the locus, not the instrument of valid knowledge."¹

To the Advaitin, mind or *antaḥkaraṇa* is only a name for the totality of conscious states of which pleasure and pain are but two different aspects. The physiological counterparts of these psychical states such as touch, taste, sound and sight are all explainable, and these sensations are presented to the mind in the ordinary way. The cognition of these several sensations as pleasurable or painful is because of the apperceptive nature of the mind. Hence no *inner sense* is necessary for the perception of these psychical states. Along with the modern introspectionists, the Advaitin believes that the mind is capable of looking on itself and knowing its subjective states without the aid of an internal sense. These psychical states of pleasure, pain, desire, volition are all mental and hence do not require any other sense to perceive them. Epistemologically, a sensation indicates a cognitive state and at the same time refers to the given object as the cause of the sensation. So, it is difficult to see if pain and pleasure can be called sensations. No doubt, pain and pleasure are felt, but we cannot point to anything and say that it is painful or pleasurable in the same way in which a red rose is the object which produces the sensation of redness in us. Thus pain and pleasure are more feelings than sensations,² and hence it is not justified to assume mind as the internal sense-organ producing the sensations of pain and pleasure.

Summing up all that has been said so far, we see that irrespective of the metaphysical theories, all the *āstika darśanas* of Indian thought conclude that mind cannot be identified with the self who is the knower. In Western thought the word mind is usually taken to mean both the subject of consciousness and also the psychical states and the processes of consciousness which manifest the self. But the word mind as used in Indian philosophy does not mean this. At best we may say, it refers to the empirical view of mind given by Western philosophers. It is considered positively as a substance and primarily as an instrument of knowledge. To the Naiyāyika, *manas* is not only material but also the internal sense-organ, responsible for the experiences of pleasure, pain and other

¹ S. S. S. Sastry and T. M. P. Mahadevan, *A Critique of Difference*, University of Madras, 1936, p. 3.

² Titchner, *Text Book of Psychology*, Macmillan & Co., New York, 1909, pp. 160-92.

such internal states. The materiality of *manas* is clearly emphasized in the Sāṃkhya Yoga where it is derived from *prakṛti*. The Advaitin believes that mind along with all other things is only a creation of *ajñāna*. But empirically, mind is subtle matter and also limited in size. The fact that it is material and functions as an instrument of knowledge does not necessarily make it rank as a sense-organ, according to the Advaitin. There is little difference of opinion amongst all the orthodox systems of thought as to the proof of the existence of mind. Almost all of them make use of inference to prove that mind exists, and to all of them it is material and unconscious.

CHAPTER II

KNOWLEDGE THROUGH THE MIND

KNOWLEDGE is the basis of rational and intelligent activity. It is because of knowledge that all living beings are able to react to their environment. A living being behaves in a different manner towards different objects and differently at different times. This is because of its knowledge of the surroundings in which it lives. Through knowledge we have an awareness of things which are other than ourselves. There may be disagreement amongst Indian philosophers about the self-awareness of knowledge, but that knowledge reveals or makes known an object at the empirical level is not denied by any school of thought. Every system of thought believes that knowledge or *jñāna* is the nature or a quality of the self acting through the mind, reaching out to the objects and making them known to the self.

There is a passage in the *Aitareya Upaniṣad* intended to characterize man.¹ The question is raised "who is this?"; the answer follows "we worship him as the self". When further elucidation is sought the answer given is, "whereby one sees, whereby one hears . . . that which is the heart and mind. . .". After having enumerated the physical functions such as seeing, hearing and speaking by which one recognizes the self, the characteristics of *manas* are also enumerated.

First we have *samjñāna*. This word means consciousness. But Mrs. Rhys Davids, following Deussen, translates the word as "knowing again".² The *Ātman* that is knowledge, forgets its true nature and wrongly thinking itself to be ignorant, learns again through *manas*, knowledge of objects, both internal and external. The word "consciousness" means to "be aware of". *Manas* makes the *Ātman* aware of objects. That is the first function. Before knowledge can be gained, one must have awareness.

¹ *Aitareya*, 3; 5, 2.

² Rhys Davids, *The Birth of Indian Psychology*, Luzac & Co., London, 1936, p. 89.

Second in the list is *ājñāna* or perception. Again Mrs. Rhys Davids translates this word as "coming to know". Both mean the same thing. When one comes to "know" a thing or "perceives" a thing, or as Śaṅkarācārya says, after directing the mind towards the object, one becomes the lord of it in the sense one possesses knowledge of it. Hence the second function of *manas* is not only to be aware of an object but also to perceive it through the senses. These two functions are not identical, because one can be aware of objects which are not directly being perceived. Awareness does not necessarily mean attentive perception. In the penumbral regions of our perceptual field, there are ever so many objects which are not perceived but of which we are aware.

Next in the list is *vijñāna*. This is the power of discrimination. This discrimination is the result of knowledge acquired by a study of different branches of knowledge. Hence it follows that, if there is attentive perception or *ājñāna*, we get the resultant *vijñāna* or discriminative knowledge. Then, that which follows in the list is *prajñāna* or intelligence. This word is here used in the limited sense of an adjunct of *manas*. The man with knowledge must necessarily have intelligence. Intelligence is a quality which is not only inherent in *manas* (because the self which is of the nature of pure intelligence is reflected in it), but also it is a thing that can be developed, or made more manifest by training. The necessary training is provided by a discriminative study of various branches of knowledge and thus *prajñāna* is acquired.

Medhas or wisdom comes next; wisdom is that which is had when a person is able to remember the knowledge which is acquired by an attentive study. The power of retaining the import of books read is also an attribute of mind. Then come insight or *drṣṭi* and steadfastness or *dhṛti*. The former can mean both perception with the senses as well as seeing with the mental eye. After stating the purely psychic aspects of mind, the Upaniṣads give a list of those mental activities which depend upon external stimuli. For the mind to act well, body and the sense-organs must be kept in good condition. Similarly, firmness of mind is also an essential requisite for the acquisition of knowledge.

Thought or *matī* and thoughtfulness or *manīṣā* are the next in the list. These show the particular content and the generic nature of mind. A man might have knowledge, but if he has no thought with which he could make use of his knowledge, there will be no

value for his knowledge. A man with even a little knowledge is acclaimed as being wise and respectfully listened to. Social relations and determining the courses of action are all dependent on thought and the capacity for thought. These are also aspects of mind.

But man is not all thought and knowledge. He is also a creature of impulse. *Jūti*, distress of mind, is produced because of impulsive activities. Hence *jūti* is described as a mental quality. Memory or *smṛti* is different from the capacity which is required to remember studied knowledge (*medhas*). Without *smṛti* practical life would be impossible, although life is possible without *medhas*. The continuity of day to day life is possible because of *smṛti*. Closely following this we have *saṁkalpa* or the power of conception. After having dealt with perceptions and memory, the Upaniṣad gives us the conceptual items of *saṁkalpa* and *kratu* (conception and purpose). Thinking of forms or having abstract and universal ideas is an essential part of mental life. Based on this capacity of ideation, one can have purposeful activity. To think of a purpose that lies in the future is in itself an act of conception. But of these two, conception is prior and purposiveness is the "application"¹ of the conceived idea. This idea develops into planned activity because of the capacity of the mind for purposiveness.

The next term *asu* or life is not strictly a mental characteristic. We can call it mental only in the sense that without life as basis there can be no *manas* at all.

Kāma and *vaśa* are the last two terms. *Kāma* is the desire for a thing that one has not yet attained. But mere desire is not enough. When this is backed up by will for possession or desire for company² (*vaśa*), then overt behaviour issues. The one is passive and the other causes dynamic action, and they are comparable to wish and will respectively as used by Mackenzie.

The Upaniṣad passage ends by saying, "All these, indeed, are appellations of intelligence (*prajñāna*)". The reference to intelligence here is not in the narrow sense of an attribute, but in the wider sense of *Ātman*. The section begins with a question who is the self and how to worship him. The answer ends by saying, this is the self or *Ātman* that is worshipped, and the *Ātman* is known or characterized by all these qualities and activities.

¹ Śaṅkara's Commentary on 3, 5, 2, of *Aitareya Upaniṣad*.

² Ibid.

There is yet another list of mind concepts given in the *Chândogya*.¹ Here mind is not treated separately as it is done in the last list. It is given along with the other things which constitute a *more* in terms of which man has to be understood. Nārada approaches Sanatkumāra and requests him to teach him Brahman. Nārada had already acquired the knowledge of the Vedas and the empirical sciences such as mathematics and politics, but Sanatkumāra characterizes all this as merely name, meaning that which denotes. Denotation by itself is not enough. So speech is described as *more* than name, for speech causes name. From here onwards, we get a series of "more" each being regarded as the cause of the preceding one and therefore including it. Just as two seeds or fruits can be enclosed in the palms, so also both speech and name are included in mind or *manas*. Here *manas* is used to mean the "internal organ endowed with reflection" and this is greater than speech because unless *manas* reflects, speech cannot function. Hence *manas* is greater than the other two. Here *manas* also means, according to Śaṅkara, the function of intention or being aware of intention. Speech is used and actions are performed only when there is intention to do so. From here, we get a series of mental functions, each being described as "more" than and including the other. *Samkalpa* which has already occurred in the *Aitareya* list is also mentioned here. There it has the meaning of conception or the power of ideation. The word also means "determination".² Following Śaṅkara, we have to understand by this word "settling what is to be done by distinguishing between that which is to be done and that which is not to be done". It may be said that it is the capacity to realize an idea in thoughts and the capacity of realizing such thoughts in action. The first we may call conception and the second will. But these are not so very distinguishable as they appear to be. Will is involved in conception and *vice versa*. Hence there is nothing wrong in saying that *samkalpa* denotes will here. That this is a mental act higher than *manas* or the function of intention is what is sought to be established here. The willing aspect of *manas* is maintained to be greater than the intending aspect.

Citta is a word which has the double meaning of thought and intelligence. Śaṅkara interprets this word to mean the power by which a thing is known properly and also that by which the past

¹ *Chândogya*, 7, 1-15.

² Apte's Dictionary.

and the future purposes are known. This is a greater faculty of mind than even will and knowledge. For, whatever knowledge and will power a man might have, if he has no intelligence and thought (i.e., if he has not the capacity of realizing the purposes of facts and events at the correct time) then all his knowledge whether it be of scriptural texts or of the empirical sciences will be of no use to him, for no one will listen to what he has to say.

Dhyāna is given as being "more" than *citta*. In the context here the word means "uninterrupted, concentrated reflection on certain duties" etc. mentioned in the scriptures.¹ But the word also means concentration in general. This is considered to be greater than intelligence, for intelligence alone without the contemplative calm is of no use to man. Man becomes God-like (*Deva manuṣyaḥ*) when he has the capacity for concentrated contemplation, since good judgments are possible only when there is concentration.

Vijñāna or the capacity to know the meaning of scriptural texts is higher than all these mental facts, because it is this knowledge that makes contemplation possible. This also has been included in the *Aitareya* list.

Those which follow after this being "more" than these are physical in character. They are *bala* (power or strength), *anna* (food), *āpas* (water), *tejas* (fire or heat) and *ākāśa* (space). *Bala* or power can mean both mental strength and physical strength. The former is not possible unless there is the latter. Strength arises from food, water and heat. This also is true because it has already been said that mind is made up of the finest particles of food that is eaten by an individual.

Then comes *smara* or remembrance. This also occurs in the *Aitareya* list. All that has been mentioned so far is made possible only because of the power of remembrance. The last in the list, but not the least in importance, is hope or *āśā*. Without hope of eternal life or realization, there can be no meaning for human existence. The one saving grace in human suffering is the hope that, if not here, at least in some future state, man would be free from sorrow and suffering. Every action is done in the hope that some result would follow. Even failure of successful results from an action does not deter a man from hoping for better things next time. Man is bound in the fetters of hope of one kind or other. The seeker

¹ Śaṅkara's Commentary.

after ideas hopes to gain knowledge and thus release from his mental tension, the seeker after worldly goods hopes to gain pleasurable experience. Hence, hope is that which causes all activity and it is the highest mental factor without which everything else would be meaningless. Thus ends the *Chândogya* list of mental abilities. The analysis is more from the point of view of practical life of a person who is in search of truth and knowledge than from any epistemological view of the nature and means of attainment of knowledge.

There is another list given in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*¹ and quoted in the *Maitrī Upaniṣad*,² without the mention of which an account of the characteristics of mind in its search for knowledge as given in the Upaniṣads would not be complete. These texts deal with the fact that the mind is responsible for all perceptions. The existence of mind thus established, we have the nature of mind expressed in a few passing remarks. These may, more profitably, be called mental states or processes than adjuncts of the mind. These are *kāma* desire, *saṃkalpa* determination, *vicikitsā* doubt, *śraddhā* belief, *aśraddhā* disbelief, *dhyti* and *adhyti* steadiness and unsteadiness, *hrīḥ* shame, *dhiḥ* meditation, and *bhīḥ* fear. Some items of this list have already been dealt with. The results of desire are determination and doubt, and these are always followed by the swing between belief and disbelief while steadiness and unsteadiness of purpose are always coefficients of belief and disbelief. Shame and fear are also the result of desiring that which is not. The emotional states of one's life when one is motivated by desire are mentioned in the above list. All these are because the mind is groping in search of knowledge. As said in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, the mind always leads the self to the object known.

Where one's mind is attached
—the inner self
Goes thereto with action being
attached to it alone.³

The aim of these several lists of the characteristics of mind given in the Upaniṣads is only to maintain that even though the mind is instrumental in the acquiring of knowledge, it is only for the sake of the self that mind acts. From the epistemological point of view

¹ 1; 5; 3.

² 6, 30.

³ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4, 4, 6, Hume's translation.

it is interesting to note that mind is not only conceived of as an *indriya* but also as that which determines the nature of the knowledge so received.

It has been already stated that for the Naiyāyika, *manas* is definitely a sense-organ. No knowledge is possible for the self without *manas*. It is the *antaḥkaraṇa*, the special cause which is internal. Hence, the Nyāya theory of perception involves the use of mind in both external perception, such as the perception of colour, and internal perception of pleasure and pain. The definition of *pramā* or valid knowledge given by the Naiyāyika as true representational experience is indicative of the cognitive conditions. The object which is out there must be truly presented to the self or *Ātman* by the mind and the sense-organs.

Perception is defined in various ways progressively. Gautama subscribes to the view that knowledge is derived from a contact between *indriya* (sense-organ) and *artha* (object).¹ This definition is considered too wide by Gaṅgeśa who modifies this and says, "perception is immediate knowledge". (*Sākṣāt pratītiḥ pratyakṣam—Tattvacintāmaṇi*.) This immediacy is made possible, for, according to the ontology of the Naiyāyikas, each sense-organ is capable of perceiving only things of its own nature. The eye perceives colour, for it is made up of fire atoms and fire is a quality of such atoms. So the physical activities of perception are explained.

But the perceptual process involves not only the function of the external sense-organs, but something more which is not indicated in the definition of perception given above, viz., the contact of the mind with the sense-organ and the contact of the mind with the soul. These two are not mentioned specially because they are the *sādhāraṇa kāraṇa* of all perception and of all knowledge. The important cause of perception as a special means of valid knowledge is the sense-object contact. To prove this, the following example is given in the *Nyāya Bhāṣya*. When a man is sound asleep, there is no contact between the self and the sense-organ. Still when there is a loud noise or a sudden pain the person wakes up. The knowledge is imparted to the self here primarily because of the sense-object contact. The impact on the sense-organ is so severe that it is able to induce the sleeping mind to function and provide knowledge for the self. Similarly also in the case of the preoccupied

¹ *Nyāya Sūtras*, 1, 1, 4.

mind.¹ Hence these waking cognitions are brought about primarily by the sense-object contact. The mind reflects this immediate apprehension and makes it definite and discriminative.

An interesting point about the Nyāya theory of perception is that according to it no cognition can be directly apprehended. Knowledge for the soul is always secondary *anuvyavasāya*. Cognition cannot by itself make itself known, for it is never self-illuminative (*sva-prakāśaka*), but manifests only other things (*para-prakāśaka*). Therefore to cognize a cognition, another cognition is necessary. Perception can only relate the "this" with the "that". To make this relation knowable, it must be made to assume the form of "I know that, this is a pot". Such cognition which is secondary is called *anuvyavasāya jñāna*.² To produce this *anuvyavasāya* is the function of mind.

Perception or *pratyakṣa* is the primary source of all knowledge, for all methods of knowledge presuppose perception.³ Inference, comparison and verbal testimony, all these would be impossible without perceptual knowledge as their basis. This perceptual knowledge has already been defined as that which is the result of immediate perception. The older definition of perception, viz., as sense-object contact, is not satisfactory, for not only is it too wide and includes other modes of knowledge as already mentioned, but it is also narrow in that it begs the question. The workings of a sense-organ and the nature of the stimulation is known because of perceptual knowledge; then to define perception in terms of sense-object contact is to beg the question. When perceptual knowledge is defined as that caused by immediate perception not dependent upon any previous knowledge, it fits the case. To perceive a thing is to know it immediately. As L. T. Hobhouse says, ideas of sensation and reflection are not characterized so much by their dependence on any sense-organ or any special kind of physiological stimulus, but by their immediate presence to consciousness.⁴ Still it does not mean that sense-object contact can be dispensed with in ordinary perception. The organs of sense such as the eye, the ear and the nose have to be in contact with the object before a perception of

¹ *Nyāya Bhāṣya* on II, 1, 26.

² *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Tr. by S. C. Vidyabhusan in his *History of Indian Logic*, Calcutta University, 1921, p. 418.

³ *Nyāya Bhāṣya*, on 1, 1, 3.

⁴ L. T. Hobhouse, *Theory of Knowledge*, Methuen & Co., London, 1896, Vol. 1, Chap. I; also Dr. Susan Stebbings, *Logic in Practice*, p. 13.

these senses can arise. Like this, *manas* is a sense-organ, acting like one in the internal perceptions of psychic states like pleasure and pain.

The Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas maintain that there are two types of perceptual knowledge, the indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and the determinate (*savikalpaka*) perception. Praśastapāda says that in the former, there is the immediate apprehension of mere form of the object (*svarūpa mātra*)¹ and that it has no discrimination or assimilation. In determinate perception there is a presentative as well as a representative element involved. This is *anuvyavasāya jñāna*. Still this is called presentative, mainly because the presentative process predominates. Here mind receives sensations through the external sense-organs and presents them to the self in a codified manner. In as much as the self is concerned, this knowledge is mediate, since it involves the use of the external sense-organs. Apart from this the mind also functions as the internal sensory and is the cause of emotions.

According to Nyāya, pleasure and pain (*sukha* and *duḥkha*) desire and aversion (*icchā* and *dveṣa*), cognition (*jñāna*) and volition (*prayatna*) are the qualities of the soul. But these qualities are not always evident. The self knows that it has these qualities only when the *manas* as a sense-organ comes into conjunction with the self as possessed of these qualities. But for the *manas* acting as the internal sensory, knowledge of the qualities, says the Naiyāyika, would be impossible.

The Naiyāyika believes that pain is positive in nature. When the pressure from a want becomes excessive, there is a feeling of pain. When this is satisfied, there is a feeling of pleasure.² In *Nyāya Darśana* the definition of pain is given as *Bhādhana lakṣaṇam duḥkham*—the characteristic of pain is to obstruct. In other words that which is disagreeable causes pain. When this is removed and agreeableness is introduced, we have pleasure. Pleasure is *amukūla* and pain is *pratikūla*. Everything that opposes mind is pain, and everything that is opposite of this is pleasure. This theory of the Naiyāyika resembles the theories put forward by Wundt and Dewey

¹ *Padārtha dharma saṅgraha*.

² Keśava Miśra in *Nyāya Bhāṣya*, Indian Thought Series, p. 103. "Pleasure is regarded as pain because of its being mixed up with pain; and pleasure (accompanied by pain) is called pain in the same manner as honey mixed with poison is called poison."

who say that when an action is furthered pleasure is produced and when an action is hindered pain is caused. The *Nyāya Bhāṣya* commenting on this *sūtra* says that the motive for action lies in the possibility of its being pleasant or painful. But this should not be interpreted to mean that the Naiyāyikas are pure hedonists. They recognize that spiritual pleasures are more lasting and valuable than worldly pleasures. In fact, the pleasures of this world become painful in the light of the higher spiritual pleasures.

What happens when a person cognizes the fact that an object gives him pleasure and another pain, is that he desires to obtain the pleasurable thing; this desire in its turn causes him to put forth effort to obtain it. If this is the process that goes on, it follows, the *Bhāṣyakāra* says, that all these must be the properties of the intelligent being, the self, and not of the unintelligent *manas*.¹

The *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* maintain² that since the causes of pleasure and pain are different, these must be two different things and not the two aspects of one and the same thing as the Naiyāyika holds. To the Naiyāyika pleasure is not a thing separate from pain, because every act of pleasure involves pain and *vice versa*. When the impediment, which is pain, is removed pleasure is seen to be there. But the *Vaiśeṣika* maintains that pleasure and pain are different because their causes are different. Since the effects of pleasure and pain are also different, these two must be different. The effects of pleasure as given by *Praśastapāda* are *anugraha* (a feeling of pleasure), *abhiṣvanga* (attachment or attraction towards an object), and *nayanaṇḍi prasāda* (brightness of the eyes and the face, etc.). The effects of pain are, that condition of the mind which gives rise to anger, ideas of harm and a depression of spirit.

Pleasure and pain, says *Praśastapāda*, can be with reference to the past as well as to the future objects. Past objects are remembered as objects of pleasure and this brings about present pleasure. The pleasure here is in retrospect, so also pain.

With regard to the future objects, pleasure is produced by reflection. Even when there is no object of pleasure nor memory of such an object, the *Bhāṣya* says, wise men feel pleasure, "because of their knowledge, the peaceful nature of their minds". Knowledge here means the knowledge of the self, and peaceful nature of the mind means the control of the senses and the consequent tranquillity.

¹ *Nyāya Sūtras*, 3, 2, 34.

² *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, 10, 1, 1.

Such pleasure and pain are perceived by the mind as immediate perceptions. This is not cognition or *jñāna*. The *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*¹ maintain that *jñāna* is always characterized by doubt and assurance (*saṁśaya* and *nirṇaya*) and these are absent from the experience of pleasure and pain. One is never doubtful whether an experience is pleasurable or not. Pleasure and pain are also not forms of cognitions. They are not either perceptions, inference or other forms of knowledge which are given to the individual. For pleasure and pain are not causally, (i.e., invariably) connected with the antecedents of perceptual and inferential forms of knowledge.² Again because conjunction with *manas* is *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa* for both cognition and emotive experience of pleasure and pain, it cannot be concluded that all these are only different forms of one and the same thing. All these are heterogeneous activities although arising from the same cause, viz., conjunction of the mind with the soul.³ *Manas* or internal perception is direct knowledge about mental or subjective facts. In introspection of this type, the mind turns back on itself and perceives the characteristics of the self such as pleasure and pain. The mind as a sense comes into contact with soul, and this contact or *sannikarṣa* is one of *samyukta-samavāya*. In self-perception of this sort, where the soul or the self comes to have knowledge of its own states, the mind acts as the instrument and the self as the conceiver. If this were not so, then all sense-experience which is instrumental in nature will have to be denied. If the instrument of conception is denied then no conception is possible. At this juncture, we find the Naiyāyika making a startling modern differentiation between conceiving and cognizing.⁴

It is sought to be maintained that the act of conceiving needs no instrument, while the act of cognizing needs an instrument.⁵ But the two, viz., conceiving and cognizing, cannot be differentiated. Uddyotakara, commenting on this *sūtra* raises an objection; if both cognizing and conceiving are done with the help of an instrument, and that every cognition must be through an instrument, then the

¹ 10, 1, 2.

² *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, 10, 1, 5.

³ *Ibid.*, 10, 1, 6-7.

⁴ Gilbert Ryle, *Concept of Mind*, p. 206. "Observing entails having sensations. The words 'observing' and 'sensation' mean here mere physical observation and having a concept of sensation or 'heeding' respectively." See also Campbell Garnett "Mind as Minding", *Mind*, July 1952.

⁵ *Nyāya Sūtras*, 3, 1, 17.

cognition of mind (i.e., self-cognition of mind) also must be through an instrument. Vācaspati Miśra goes a step further and says, the mind cannot be an instrument of its own cognition for no instrument can operate on itself. If to solve this trouble another instrument for the cognition of the psychic states is postulated, this instrument requires yet another for its cognition and so on *ad infinitum*. Hence it is maintained that the postulation of an instrument for the cognition of pleasure and pain is not right. To all this the Naiyāyika replies that mind is cognized not by perception but by inference. It is this process of inference, which is indicative of the existence of mind, that acts as the instrument. Again in the case of the Yogin, who has direct perception of the mind, the instrument of perception is the mind-soul contact aided by the powers derived by Yogic practice. Later Naiyāyikas like Udayanācārya (in his *Parīśuddhi*) maintain that this cannot be a correct answer since no amount of Yogic power can make the Yogin go against nature. That is why even Yogic powers cannot make the instrument of cognition self-cognitive. Therefore, Udayanācārya says, the object of cognition is mind, whereas the instrument of cognition is the mind aided by the faculties born of Yoga. Since these are not the same there is no question of self-operation. He goes even further and maintains that there is no incompatibility of one thing being both "instrument" and "object". It is an instrument when it is acted on by the agent and it is an object when it is subjected to effects of actions that do not belong to it. Vācaspati Miśra says that this position does not involve any incongruity, because it is by its own existence that mind is capable of having its own cognition. Mind as an existent is cognized by mind in its capacity as an instrument, just like the light of the lamp which is instrumental in revealing itself.¹ To use the words of Dr. D. M. Datta we are here "required to distinguish between mind as a term of the relation and mind as the medium of relation, which latter alone can be called an *indriya*".² But even this argument leads to difficulties. Both these aspects of the mind are mental, and if one can be conceived as an *indriya*, why not the other? Again, if the first aspect requires a second one why not this, in its turn, require another, since all are equally mental? The whole confusion starts because the Naiyāyika

¹ Commentary on *Nyāya Bhāṣya*, 2, 1, 19.

² *Six Ways of Knowing*, op. cit., p. 57.

insists on treating internal perception as being similar in every way to external perception.¹

Pleasure and pain are the direct causes for those psychological states known as desire and aversion (*icchā* and *dveṣa*). Praśastapāda says “*icchā* consists in wishing for something not already obtained either for one’s own sake or for the sake of another. It proceeds from the contact of mind and the soul, through pleasure or remembrance. It is the source of effort, of remembrance, virtue and vice.”² After stating this, Praśastapāda goes on to give a list of the different forms of desire. (1) Lust—desire for sexual experience; (2) Hunger—desire for food; (3) Affection—desire for the repeated experience of an object; (4) Aspiration—desire for bringing about something not near at hand; (5) Compassion—disinterested desire for removal of others’ troubles; (6) Dis-inclination—desire for renunciation of an object after finding something wrong with it; (7) Disposition—desire to impose or deceive others; (8) Inclination—unexpressed desire.

This is followed by a list of effects of *dveṣa* or aversion. Aversion proceeds from “the contact of the soul and the mind by pain or by remembrance (of pain)”. A man always remembers the person he hates or loves and everything pertaining to that person.

(1) *Krodha*—anger is the first evolute of aversion. It also produces certain physical changes. (2) *Droha*—ill-will. This is not perceptible outwardly as anger, but is a deep-seated inclination. (3) *Manyu*—resentment. When retaliation is impossible, aversion is hidden in the mind. (4) *Akṣamā*—jealousy. (5) *Amarṣa*—indignation.

All these mental states arise out of pleasure and pain primarily and out of desire and aversion secondarily. Just as Jung gives the pain-pleasure scheme as the basis for all emotive activity and behaviour, the Vaiśeṣika also says that from the dual qualities of pleasure and pain all other emotive experiences can be derived and understood. *Prayatna* or effort and will for activity arises out of this.

According to the Sāṃkhya theory of perception, perception is a cognition which takes the form of the object because it is brought into contact with it.³ The *manas* thus contacts the external objects

¹ *Six Ways of Knowing*, op. cit., p. 57.

² *Padārtha Dharma Saṃgraha*, op. cit., p. 560.

³ “*Yatsambandhasiddham tadākārolekhi Vijñānam tat pratyakṣam*”, *Sāṃkhya Aph.* 1, 89.

through the sense-organs. The Naiyāyikas maintain that this process of contacting is not an unnatural or difficult one, because the senses are themselves of the same nature as the object which they are capable of perceiving. The Sāṃkhya thinkers refuse to accept this contention of the Naiyāyikas, because the sense-organs are the first evolutes of *ahamkāra* and not the elements. Moreover the composition of the sense-organs is different from the composition of the elements out of which the gross objects are evolved. Here, the mind, meaning the totality of internal instruments of knowledge along with the *indriyas*, is not material in the sense in which the Naiyāyikas mean. The *indriyas* being psychophysical in nature are capable of motion and hence they go out, reach the object, and thus establish contact. If the *antahkaraṇa*, internal sensory, is to have knowledge of the external object, the sense-organ that is involved must reach out to the object. That is why the Sāṃkhya thinkers maintain that sense-organs do not apprehend objects which they do not reach.¹ Commenting on this Aniruddha says that the sense of sight cannot reveal things that are either too far from it for it to reach, nor can it reveal objects that are obstructed by impenetrable objects like a wall. This means that the *ṛtti* or the function of the sense-organs is limited. The Sāṃkhya thinkers say that the senses are capable of motion because of their particular *śakti* and answer the Naiyāyika by pointing out to him, how, if the sense of sight is made up of light and if they can apprehend objects without moving to them, the whole universe could be perceived at the same time, which does not happen.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu makes the position clear by saying that the sense-organ by itself never leaves the body, but only its particular modification known as its *ṛtti* or *function*. That is how the eye is capable of seeing light which is far off. When challenged to prove the existence of such a *ṛtti* the Sāṃkhya thinker says that the proof of the existence of the *ṛtti* lies in the fact that knowledge is gained of such an object existing outside the sense-organ.

But this *ṛtti* is not part of the organ, nor is it a quality of the organ. If it is said to be a part of the organ, contends Vijñāna Bhikṣu, there can be no perception, since the organ is split up. If it is a quality it cannot glide forth, as qualities cannot move or have motions. If so, the Naiyāyika says, the sense-organ must

¹ *Sāṃkhya Aphorism*, 104.

logically be substance, for substance alone can move. But this objection is not accepted, because movement need not necessarily be only in substance, and one must be prepared to accept motion wherever it is experienced. This is how the epistemological problem of the relation between the object and the sense is solved by the Sāṃkhya.

But there is still the problem of the arising of knowledge in the individual. For this, the internal sensory has to be examined. *Mahat*, *ahamkāra* and *manas* are jointly known as the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). These three have separate functions in the process of gaining knowledge. *Mahat* is characterized by its judging capacity, *ahamkāra* by its conceit, and *manas* by its capacity for its resolution and doubt (*saṃkalpa* and *vikalpa*). Apart from these distinctive features, they also have a common function, viz., the circulation of the five forms of vital airs. When these internal organs are functioning, the vital airs are present, and when they cease to function, the internal organs also cease to function.

Manas is said to be characterized by *saṃkalpa* and *vikalpa*. That activity of *manas* called *saṃkalpa* is that "which co-ordinates the indeterminate percepts into determinate perceptual or conceptual forms as class-notions with particular characteristics. . .".¹ Vijñāna Bhikṣu says² that the only characteristics of *manas* are *saṃkalpa* and *vikalpa*, thus ruling out any determinative activity for *manas* with regard to knowledge. Determination or *niscaya* is the function of *buddhi* or intellect. The two *vyttis* of *manas* are *saṃkalpa* which according to Vijñāna Bhikṣu means *cikīrṣā* or desire to act and *vikalpa* which he says can be either a doubt or *bhrama viśeṣa* (a form of delusion).

We have already seen how Īśvara Kṛṣṇa makes *saṃkalpa* the differentia of *manas*, and he describes it as reflection or discrimination. But Vācaspati Miśra says that the function of *manas* here is to separate the *that* from the *what*, the substance from the qualities and then to recognize the genus: all these activities belong to *manas*. The function of *manas*, therefore, is selective attention which analyzes and synthesizes at the same time. It assimilates and discriminates. All this is involved in the differentia of *manas*. At this stage of the knowledge-process *ahamkāra* intervenes and appropriates the

¹ Das Gupta, *Yoga Philosophy*, University of Calcutta, 1930, p. 264.

² Commentary on Bk. III, Aph. 30.

experiences as belonging to itself; thus "I see the table". At the level of the *manas*, cognition is still impersonal and predominantly objective, but at the level of *ahamkāra* it assumes the shape of subjective experiences. This division of perceptual judgements into that which is purely indicative of the object and that which relates this to the subjective element is dealt with in great detail by Bosanquet. The impersonal judgements which "seem to have stood for judgements whose subjects were not especially designated by means of ideas, but were accepted as merely the given in perception",¹ are comparable to the function of *manas* in perception as described by the Sāṃkhya thinkers. The qualitative, demonstrative judgement given by Bosanquet,² which involves both analysis and synthesis is perhaps also comparable to the functions of *ahamkāra* where the person becomes conscious of the object as object.

Even after the *ahamkāra* refers the perceived object to the self, the process of acquiring knowledge of the object is not complete. Every experience of the individual involves the act of will or determination. So at this stage the perceptive content is taken charge of by the *buddhi* or intellect (*mahat*) whose characteristic is *adhyavaśāya*. The intellect is conative and resolves how to act towards the cognitive element. This capacity of determination belongs purely to the intellect. Vācaspati Miśra, discussing the process of perception, reiterates the purport of Sāṃkhya³ and says, of all organs both internal and external *buddhi* or intellect is the supreme. He compares the process to that of the "village accountant collecting taxes from the householder, remitting them to the mayor, who in turn remits them to the Governor who looks to their reaching the King's treasury".⁴ The external sense-organs perceive the objects immediately. *Manas* reflects upon them, sorts them out and pigeon-holes them as it were, and presents them to *ahamkāra* which appropriates the experience as belonging to itself which is in turn determined and judged by the *buddhi* for the eternal *Puruṣa* who is the self. Thus the process of perception involves not only the external sense-organs but also the internal sensory *antaḥkāraṇa*.

Now, it seems as though the one internal organ of the Naiyāyika is here split into three organs, viz., *manas*, *ahamkāra*, and *buddhi*. But to view these as three separate existent entities, each acting on

¹ B. Bosanquet, *Morphology of Knowledge*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1888 p. 101.

² Ibid.

³ Sāṃkhya Aphorism, 40.

⁴ Sāṃkhya Kārika, notes on 77 by S. S. Sastry, op. cit.

its own and independent of the others, would be entirely wrong. The functions of these internal organs are all unified and can only be separated conceptually. *Buddhi*, *ahamkāra* and *manas*, all three together constitute *antaḥkaraṇa*. The Sāṃkhya Yoga is not a faculty psychology. Appropriation of an experience by the *ahamkāra* is only the result of the determination of the *buddhi* as to the nature of the experience. All these three are only modifications or different aspects of one *antaḥkaraṇa*.

All these three aspects of the internal sense-organ along with the external senses may function either simultaneously or successively. The Naiyāyikas are definite about the idea that the senses never function simultaneously. They cite this non-simultaneity as an evidence for the existence of the mind as an internal sense-organ. But the Sāṃkhya thinkers believe that these *indriyas* act successively as well as simultaneously. The following examples are cited by Aniruddha. "A thief is perceived in a faint light; the sense of sight reaches the object of perception; the conclusion is arrived at by the internal sense (*manas*) 'this is a thief'; then the matter is referred to *ahamkāra* (*abhimanyate*) as 'he will take my money away'; then *buddhi* determines 'I will catch the thief'." In this experience the sense-organs are functioning one by one. But in the case of seeing a tiger in the night by the flash of a lightning, a man runs away instantly. Here all the four organs function simultaneously resulting in the action of the individual running away. Actually the functions might have taken place successively; still we speak of them as if they took place at once.

The forms of mental activity have been very broadly divided into five types by Yoga. They are *kṣiptā* (restless wandering), *mūḍha* (infatuated, forgetful), *vikṣipta* (distracted), *ekāgra* (one-pointed, single-in-intent) and *niruddha* (restricted, restrained). These are the five attitudes of mind that are normally found in man. *Kṣipta* is the wandering mind. When the mind is unable to settle on any one thing, when due to the energy of its composition (i.e., *rajas*) its attention is always shifting, it does not tend to be steady. Similarly the second condition of *mūḍha*, which is being either forgetful or being infatuated, is the state of *tamas* when the mind is full of deep sleep or unawareness of the right course of action because of deep passions like love or anger. The third state of the mind, *vikṣipta*, is that which is found in the average man when the mind is tossed about between evil and good. Occasionally it is steady. More often

than not, the unsteadiness, says Vācaspati Miśra in his *Tattva-vaiśārādī*, is either acquired or brought about by disease, disinclination, etc. When the mind is in these three states it is not fit for contemplation. It is only in the next two, *ekāgra* and *nirodha*, that contemplation is possible. *Ekāgra* is that state where due to steady following of one path of concentration on one thing, the mind attains knowledge of the nature of reality. This in turn removes ignorance, thus making the mind ready for the next stage where even this mental concentration on one thing is restricted and the *manas* turns towards *Puruṣa* realizing its own nature.

The fifth Yoga aphorism gives the general characteristics of these *ṛttis*. These send forth modifications of themselves, which are classified as "hindered" and "unhindered" or "painful" and "non-painful"—*kliṣṭa* and *akliṣṭa ṛttis*. Vyāsa says, "The painful are those that cause the afflictions and become the field for the growth of the vehicle of actions. The non-painful are those that have discrimination for their objects and which oppose the functioning of the 'qualities' . . . potencies (faculties) of the same class are generated by the modifications themselves; and the modifications are caused by potencies."¹

The *ṛttis* that are so characterized are five in number: *pramāṇa*, *viparyaya*, *vikalpa*, *nidrā* and *smṛti*.² Of these, *pramāṇa* is of primary interest here for us. The cognition is defined by Vācaspati Miśra as that which brings about *pramā* or true knowledge. *Pramā* is "an illumination of a thing not already presented and is caused by the operation of the self".³

The means of giving rise to such knowledge is *pramāṇa*. Although there are three such *pramāṇas* recognized by the Sāṃkhya Yoga thinkers, our interest here lies in *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*, because not only is *pratyakṣa* a basic *pramāṇa* but also it is that where there is contact between *manas* and the sense-organ.

Perception is defined as "that source of valid ideas which arises as a modification of the inner organ when the mind-stuff has been affected by some external thing through the channel of the sense-organs".⁴ The nature of *antaḥkaraṇa ṛttis* and the place of *manas* in them has already been discussed. Here, it is definitely stated that perception depends in the first instance on the mental modification,

¹ Vyāsa *Bhāṣya* on 1, 5, Tr. by Woods, Harvard Oriental Series.

² *Yoga Aphorism*, 7.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Vyāsa Bhāṣya*, Tr. by Woods.

citta vṛtti, and secondly, that the contact between the object and the mind is carried out through the sense-organs. Vācaspati Miśra maintains that in perception it is not the universal that is perceived first and that the particular is not the inseparable dependant of it. In the *nirvikalpaka* stage of perception, the Naiyāyika holds, only the bare universal without the qualities of the particular is seen. But Vācaspati Miśra says it is impossible for the mind to see either the universal or the particular alone at any stage of perception. "The object consists of a genus and of a particular. The object does not have these two as its properties, but it consists of these two by a relation of identity."¹

Puruṣa who is the real cognizer and who is of the nature of intelligence, illumines the *citta vṛttis*. A question is raised here how the illumination which resides only in the *Puruṣa* is to be found also in the *citta vṛtti*. The answer is that, by this time, in the process of evolution the *Puruṣa* has already become identified with its own reflection in *buddhi*. It is this reflection that is the cause of the *citta vṛttis* becoming illumined. The question of self-perception rises out of this context. The self infers its own existence from its reflection in the cognitive instruments. Just as the existence of the original can be inferred from the copy or the reflection, the self realizes its existence because of its reflection. This very realization is through the mental mode which assumes the form of self. This seems to be contradictory. It may be asked, how can the self cognize itself if the act of cognition does not belong to itself? The reply is, because the nature of the self is self-luminosity and it can illumine both itself as well as the object. This leads to the ever persistent problem of self-perception: how can the self be both object and subject at the same time? This possibility cannot be denied, because even in self-cognition, if it is to be termed a cognition, the relata of cognition (*viz.*, the subject and the object) must be there. Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra say that the pure self is the subject in self-apprehension and the empirical self is the object. This is the most vulnerable point in the Sāṃkhya Yoga ontology. If *Puruṣa* is only one, then the above-stated self-cognition is not possible. If it is many, then the original tenets of the theory are contradicted. Also the self is always the knower or the spectator (*dr̥ṣṭr*) and hence it can never make itself an object of knowledge. As James Ward has said,

¹ *Yoga Bhāṣya*, op. cit., 1, 7.

"To identify I and Me is logically impossible. . . . The I cannot be the Me, nor the Me the I. At the same time the objective Me is impossible without the subjective I."¹ To get out of such a difficulty Patañjali says, the self can be perceived by intuition which is yogic perception attained by yogic practices.

The next mental mode which attracted the attention of Yoga thinkers is *viparyaya*. It is "knowing of the unreal, possessing a form not of its own".² It is *mithyā jñānam*. The *Bhāṣya* explains the meaning of the word *mithyā*. The characteristic of valid knowledge is that it is unsublatable. Here the knowledge that is derived through *viparyaya* is sublated by a later cognition. Vācaspati Miśra adds a rider to this, that sublation is possible because *viparyaya* "cognition is contradicted by the common knowledge of all mankind". The example that is cited is the perception of two moons in the place of one real moon. This and similar misconceptions are ordinarily known as erroneous perceptions, because they involve the function of the sense-organs and the sublation may occur then and there. But there are some psychic erroneous cognitions whose removal alone can give peace to the individual. These are the products of *māyā* or *avidyā* or nescience.

There are five types of psychic misconceptions which act as hindrances, *kleśas*, holding back the *Puruṣa* from knowing its real nature. These are *avidyā* ignorance, *asmitā* egoism, *rāga* attachment, *dveṣa* aversion, *abhiniveśa* clinging to life.

Avidyā is a positive entity. It is that kind of knowledge which is opposed to true knowledge.³ This is the basic misconception because the others are all only its different aspects, hence it is called *kṣetram*, the field. This *avidyā* can be present in four different forms in all the other misconceptions. They are the dormant form, the attenuated form, the intercepted form, and the sustained form. The dormant form is that where *avidyā* exists in the form of a seed-concept, possibly comparable to instincts, which become active as soon as they confront these objects. The example given by Vācaspati Miśra is "as curds exist in milk, so *avidyā* exists in latent form".

The next two forms of *avidyā* are interrelated. The dormant form of *avidyā*, when it comes up with regard to specific functions, may

¹ James Ward, *The Psychological Principles*, Cambridge University, 1918, p. 379.

² *Yoga Sūtras*, 1, 8, Sacred Books of the Hindu series.

³ "*Vidyāviparītam jñānāntaram avidyā*" *Yoga Bhāṣya*, II, 5.

be suppressed by practice. Suppression here does not mean destruction of the *avidyā* but only pushing it back into the depths of the mind. The afflictions become alternated, i.e., they appear and disappear again and again alternately; for instance, when attachment is not present anger is present and *vice versa*. Also, attachment may be with reference to one object and anger may be with reference to another object. This state of mind leads on to *udāra* where the mind becomes fixed on one object. One important characteristic of all these mental modes is that they are removable by habituation to contraries and manifested by the operation of appropriate causes.

Asmitā or egoism is different from *ahamkāra* which is the second evolute of *prakṛti*. The latter is merely the subjective element asserting individuality. But the former definitely means the subjective element in psychical experience. *Ahamkāra* may be said to be the universal aspect whereas the *asmitā* is the individual aspect with all its concomitant troubles. *Puruṣa* is always the subject of consciousness and *buddhi* is that which is responsible for the experiences of *Puruṣa*. When there is a wrong identification of these two, the sense of personality is born. The power of knowledge is different from the instrument, and when these two are together the senses of enjoyment and sorrow come into existence. When these are differentiated, there is isolation for the *Puruṣa*, says the *Bhāṣya*. In as much as no isolation is possible as long as there is this feeling of personality *asmitā*, it forms one of the mental afflictions which hinder right knowledge. In Plato's *Phaedo*, we get a similar idea. "And the mind's power of thought is strongest when it is distracted by neither sight nor hearing, pain nor pleasure, nor anything sensual, but is, as far as it can be alone by itself. For then leaving the body to itself and avoiding to the maximum extent contact or community with it, the soul can strive towards Being."¹

Rāga or passion "is that which dwells upon pleasure".² The next aphorism³ must be considered along with this. Aversion "is that which dwells upon pain". There are certain things which give pleasure and certain others which give pain. The mind automatically is drawn towards pleasurable things and away from painful things. "Sometimes", as Swami Vivekananda says in his *Rāja Yoga*, "we find pleasure in very queer things, but the principle remains,

¹ Tr. by Desmond Steuart, Euphorion Book, London, p. 28.

² "*Sukhānūśāyī rāgaḥ*", Aph. 7, Bk. I.

³ "*Dhukkānūśāyī dveṣaḥ*", Aph. 8, Bk. I.

wherever we find pleasure, there we are attached.”¹ The *Bhāṣyakāra* says, “The greed or thirst or desire, on the part of one acquainted with pleasure, ensuring upon a recollection of pleasure, for either the pleasure or for the means of attaining it, is passion.” This means two things. First, the individual must be aware that a thing can give him pleasure. Only then there can be attachment to it and the desire for its perpetuation. Secondly, this is made stronger by the recollection of the pleasure once so experienced. These two, viz., experience and recollection are essential for the individual to develop a passion for the object of pleasure. Similarly, the same explanation holds good with regard to pain. The object which gives pain must not only be remembered, but also recollected as the object which gave pain. Most modern theories of learning and memory are based upon this fact that pleasure as a resultant helps learning and pain hinders it. That pleasure and pain are the two main motive forces for all actions is an undeniable psychological fact. One of the polarities which govern all motives, according to Freud, is the pleasure-pain polarity.

There is also another way through which knowledge is gained by the mind. This is *vikalpa* or predicate relation, and it is knowledge gained through imagination “without any corresponding perceptible object”² or “is devoid of objective substratum”,³ and it is the result of verbal expressions of knowledge. This is neither a *pramāṇa* nor a *viparyaya*, erroneous cognition. It is abstract imagination based on language. Because it is devoid of objective substratum it cannot be a *pramāṇa*, and it is not *viparyaya*, for it is not sublatale, nor proved by further knowledge. The example that is cited in the *Bhāṣya* is “*Puruṣa* is of the nature of consciousness”. Here the predicate relation between consciousness and *Puruṣa* can neither be proved by any *pramāṇa* nor can it be brushed aside as an erroneous cognition. It is purely abstract thought. If this *citta vṛtti* or *vikalpa* is not accepted, no abstract thinking would be possible.

Śaṅkara does not give a systematic account of the *pramāṇas* in his *Sūtra Bhāṣya*. But from his criticism of the Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist epistemology, we can gather by implication the views of Śaṅkara. The Vaiśeṣika is a realist and the Mahāyāna Buddhist is

¹ p. 158.

² *Yoga Sūtras*, I, 9, Wood's Translation.

³ *Ibid.*, Sacred Books series.

either a subjective idealist or a nihilist; so much so, in refuting their arguments the Advaitin establishes his own.

For all knowledge to arise, three things are necessary: the knowing self, the object known and the process of knowing. That the self is the knower and the agent of all activity has already been established. At the empirical level, Śaṅkara says, the subject and object are like light and darkness being opposed in qualities; still there is always the superimposition of the qualities of the one on the other. This false identification of the real self with the body, senses and mind is essential before knowledge can be attained.¹ This is necessary, because without the senses working, cognition cannot arise and the senses must have an *adhiṣṭhāna* (a base of operations).

The mechanism of knowledge according to the Advaitin can only be understood when the Advaitic theory of perception is understood well. The general position is that ultimate consciousness, which is only one, is known in its several modifications as *pramāṭrcaitanya*, the consciousness that is determined by the internal organ *vr̥tti*, *viśayacaitanya*, consciousness determined by the object known. So, "the perception of an object means, the self-shining of the *cit* through a *vr̥tti* of a form resembling an object of knowledge".² It has already been noted that the *antaḥkaraṇa* is the general name for all the psychic activities. The modes of this internal organ or *vr̥ttis* are acknowledged to be fivefold because of the five sense-organs. It is through these forms that the *antaḥkaraṇa* reaching out to the object and after establishing identity between the two gives rise to knowledge.

According to the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṃkhya Yoga, the sense-organs are *prāpya kārins*. They go out to the object and when direct contact is established, apprehension takes place. According to the Advaitin, *manas* which is subtle substance goes out to the object through the sense-organs and, after establishing identity of consciousness defined by the internal organ and consciousness defined by the object, gives rise to knowledge. The non-Advaitic schools say that it is the sense-organ itself that goes out to the object, whereas according to the Advaitin, it is the mind that goes out, and the difference in perceptual knowledge such as seeing, hearing, touching, etc., is said to be because of the difference in the

¹ *The Introduction to Sūtra Bhāṣya*, Tr. by Thibaut, p. 7.

² Das Gupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, 1922, p. 472.

instruments which are required for those types of knowledge. These are called *citta vṛttis*. To the question what for are the sense-organs if it is the *antaḥkaraṇa* that is responsible for knowledge, it is replied that these sense-organs serve as the cause for the mental modes or *vṛttis*. Sense-object relation is necessary for the mental mode to arise.

This theory of the Advaitin that the mind goes out to the object, seems to be more plausible than the accepted theory that light from the physical object strikes the eyes and creates impressions in the brain. The movement of the mind is not meant here in any metaphorical sense, but in the sense of an actual going forth; the mind moves out and after reaching the object envelops it. No Western philosopher admits the necessity for the mind to go out to the object. The mind is active in perception, but its activity is limited to receiving impressions from the external sense-organs and co-ordinating these. The view expressed by the Advaitin that even in the collecting of the raw materials for sense perception the mind goes out is not acceptable to the Western thinkers. This trouble arises because, ordinarily, one believes that the senses act first and then the mind; because the senses are usually identified with the physiological organs and when these are impressed, sensations are said to arise for the mind to act on. But this is not so. The fact of attention, so ably cited by the Naiyāyika, is evidence enough to show that mere sense affection can never give rise to knowledge. The senses are recognized and treated as senses only in so far as they are the channels through which the mind apprehends the objects. Even if the brain is considered as being adequate to combine the different senses, still how such purely cerebro-spinal vibrations in a particular nerve centre can produce mental activity is not explained. The purely neural explanation and the fact of psychical reaction do not tally. "Physico-chemical explanations of the behaviour of bodies can be pushed to a point where they make nonsense. We cannot in any way understand why mentality should emerge in certain physico-chemical conditions and disappear in others. We cannot understand why mentality should be exhibited only in bodies of a certain sort. For a parrot to exhibit mentality is perfectly conceivable; it just does not seem to occur."¹ William James says, "The general law of perception is this: that whilst part

¹ C. W. H. Sutton, "A Revaluation of Mind," *Philosophy*, Vol. XXXX, No. 108, Jan. 1954.

of what we perceive comes through our senses from the object before us, another part (and it may be the larger part) always comes out of our own mind".¹ Hence it is right that the Advaitin emphasizes the out-going of the mind. The mind is material, no doubt, but a very subtle material and is analogous to light, and hence can go out to the object and assume its form.

It may appear strange that not only should the mind go out to the object but also assume the shape of the object. Now, every object has parts and these parts come into contact with the sense-organ as unitary parts. This is said to be co-ordinated somehow and the original form of the object is reproduced. But this position is not accepted by philosophers and psychologists alike since it leaves much to be explained. Psychologists like Stout and Brentano maintain that this function can only be done by a mind which acts in a teleological manner. Ward goes a step further and assumes the existence of a self as a necessary prerequisite for perceptual knowledge to arise. But still the basic difficulty of co-ordinating the atomic sensations and attributing a meaning to the whole remains unsolved. That which comes very near to the Advaitic theory is that given by the Gestalt School, which views the whole problem from a synthetic angle. The form of the object is not perceived atomically but as a whole structure, and later on there is an analysis of this concept into its constituent parts. The difference between the Vedāntic theory and the Gestalt theory is that to the Advaitin the *vytti* is the result of the activity of both mind and the senses, whereas according to the Gestalt, there is no such interaction. The point of resemblance, however, is that in perception the mind knows at once, immediately, the whole of the object.

But this theory of perception leads us into two epistemological troubles. Firstly, it is the out-going mental *vytti* that goes to the object and takes the form of the object at the place in which the object is and at the time in which the object is. If this is so, perception of distant objects like stars, some of which are no more, but whose light waves alone are responsible for a perception of them as they were in some past time, cannot be explained. S. S. S. Sastry says, "We hear at the same time sounds both near and far, some more faintly than others. The ticking of a clock, the talk next door,

¹ "A Briefer Course of General Psychology" Macmillan & Co., London, 1908, p. 329.

the noise of clothes washed in the backyard are all heard at the same time. Does the sense of hearing split itself into different parts and reach to the different localities? . . . Seated midway between two sources of different sounds, one hears both, but seated midway between the two radio sets of the same power and receiving the same programme, one hears only one set of sounds. Why should this happen, if the sense of hearing travels to both sources whether simultaneous or in succession?"¹ This type of difficulty will be there, even if we are to say that the light from the object out there reaches the eye and thus creates the knowledge of the object. What is perceived is only the light rays of the star which has vanished long ago, and the perception of the star at present is only an illusion. At best we may say that the knowledge of the star is inferential based on the perception of its rays. Similarly the perception of different sounds presumably at the same time is not solved by postulating the theory that the sensations come to the mind and not *vice versa*. Along with the Naiyāyikas it may be maintained that the alleged simultaneity is due to the rapidity of perception rather than the mind going out to all these things at the same time. Even if we say the different sensations reach the organs, it is not possible to explain how the mind which is single and limited in dimensions can receive all these stimuli simultaneously and *interpret* them at the same time as different things.

The second epistemological difficulty is that this theory of the Advaitin sounds very much like representationism. How can we be sure that the likeness is of the object that we are seeing? How can we know in the first instance that it is a likeness, for such knowledge involves a prior knowledge of the form of the object. This leads to a postulation of a series of *vyrttis ad infinitum*. This doubt will be dispelled, if we recall that, according to the Advaitin, in perception there is an identity of object-defined consciousness (*viśaya caitanya*) with the cognitive consciousness (*pramāṇa caitanya*). In other words, the object is known and understood, not because of any representative element involved in the perceptual process, but because of the immediacy involved in the identity established between the different defined forms of consciousness. This is the most fundamental condition of all perceptual knowledge. Also, the basic principle of Advaita is that the self alone is real. Hence both the object and

¹ Notes on *Vedānta Paribhāṣa*, pp. 188-89, op. cit.

the *antaḥkaraṇa* are only empirically existent. But the difference between the *antaḥkaraṇa* and the object is that the former is transparent enough to reflect the conscious principle because of the predominance of the *sattva* element and the latter is not capable of this reflection. But the consciousness that is determined by the object takes the essence of the object as its nature, hence it is possible for knowledge of that particular type to arise.

Like the Naiyāyika, the neo-Śāṅkarites also divide perception into two kinds, the indeterminate and the determinate. Indeterminate perception is relationless perception which does not involve sensations, but which is derived from sentences which are spoken, like, "This is that Devadatta". The Naiyāyika says that indefinite perception is because of *viśeṣaṇa buddhi*, which is an awareness of the qualities of the qualified. When the Advaitin is questioned how a thing that is caused by sentences which are spoken can be considered perception and not *śabda*, he replies that sensuous nature is not the criterion of perceptual knowledge.

Determinate perception is that which involves relations and is of the type, "I know the jar". The three facts involved here are the object, the knowing subject and the process of knowledge. All these are only different modifications of the one consciousness. In indeterminate perception, there is the identity established between the *pramāṇa caitanya* and *viśaya caitanya*. But in determinate perception, the knowing mental mode (*pramāṇa caitanya*) is identified also with the *pramātṛ caitanya*, the knowing empirical self. In determinate perception, the identification between the cognition-defined consciousness with the *antaḥkaraṇa*-defined consciousness is implicit. What is sought to be proved here is the "being of the object is not dependent of and separate from the being of the self".¹ This is not the same as the *anuvyavasāya jñāna* of the Naiyāyika. There the steps involved in determinate perception are each unitary, and knowledge for the self arises only through this reflective cognition. But here, though a distinction between the self and the object is drawn, they are not considered independent and separate from each other. A cognition is self-luminous and does not require another means to make it conscious.

In the internal perception of pleasure and pain, the external sense-organs are not functioning. The subject-defined consciousness

¹ Sinha, *Indian Psychology of Perception*, op. cit., p. 130.

which is *antaḥkaraṇa* and the mental mode which is known as pain and pleasure are within; their identity is achieved without any external aid. *Sukha* and *duḥkha* are qualities of *manas*, hence no other *vytti* is necessary to manifest them. The *vytti* is not different from either the *manas*, because it is only the out-going of the *manas*, or is it different from the object, because it gets itself transformed into the essence of the object. Hence, there is direct cognition of pleasure and pain without the necessity of external organs. This is the theory of the Advaitin with regard to external and internal perception which involve the use of *manas*.

The Naiyāyika treats recognition or *pratyabhijñā* also as a form of definite perception. To recognize a thing is to know it as a definite object; so, broadly speaking, recognition is a *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*. But in a narrower sense, we ordinarily consider recognition as a complex psychosis of presentative and representative processes. What is perceived is recollected as the object of a previous perception, and these two combined are what is ordinarily known as recognition. It follows, therefore, that recognition is dependent on memory, and that it is a complex process. But the Naiyāyika believes that it is not a case of a complex psychosis, but a case of a single qualified psychosis.

It has already been said that *jñāna* or apprehension is a quality of the soul. If this were so, a question is raised, how is the recollection of a single cognition possible, since all cognitions subsist in the soul simultaneously? It is answered that the mind comes into contact gradually with such parts of the soul that are impressed by the cognitions, hence recollections also occur only one by one.¹ Also, recollections belong to the soul, for it is the cognizer. The mind is only an instrument of cognition and as such it cannot have any recollections.

The causes of recollections are listed as twenty-five. We shall take them up one by one as enumerated in the *Nyāya Bhāṣya*.²

(1) Attention (*prañidhāna*). This is fixing the mind on the thing to be remembered, by pondering on its peculiar characteristics.

(2) Association (*nibhandha*). This is explained, firstly, as being merely a chain association each being the cause for the recollection of the other, and secondly, as an association that exists between the object and that which acts as a symbol for it, e.g., the word

¹ *Nyāya Bhāṣya* on 3, 2, 25.

² *Ibid.*, 3, 2, 44.

referring to an object. This interpretation of association explains both the behaviouristic and the Freudian view. To the behaviourist, association is caused by direct stimulus, each leading to the other. To the Freudian, everything is remembered only in the form of symbols.

(3) Retention (*abhyāsa*). By repeated exercise, one is able to recollect easily.

(4) Indicative (*liṅga*). This includes in a more detailed manner the several types of associative recall as we come across them in Western Psychology. This is divided into four kinds.

- (a) Where there is conjunction between two things such as smoke and fire, seeing smoke always recalls the existence of fire.
- (b) Inherent indicative where, because of causal relation, one recalls the other as the horns of a bull.
- (c) Co-inherent indicative where, because the two things inhere in the same thing, each recalls the other like hands serving to recall the feet.
- (d) Contradictory indicative, where the thing mentioned calls up its contradictory like light and darkness.

These four forms of association are freely used in the modern technique of psychological testing to measure intelligence. If by intelligence we mean the sum total of knowledge within the experience of an individual and his capacity to use it, then we find that the more he is capable of recalling these relations of association the greater is his intelligence.

(5) Distinguishing features (*lakṣaṇa*). The Naiyāyika believes that the particular somehow reveals the nature of the universal also. Here the position is, if the universal is seen, the special qualities of the particular are also recalled.

(6) Likeness (*sādrśya*). When the image is seen, the original is recalled.

(7) Ownership or possession (*parigraha*).

(8 & 9) Supporter and supported (*āśraya, āśrita*). These two mutually recall each other.

(10) Relationship (*sambandha*). As the King and the attendants.

(11) Sequence (*ānantarya*) as sprinkling the rice and pounding it in the mortar.

(12) Separation (*viyoga*) as of husband and wife.

(13) Similar employment (*ekakārya*) as of fellow disciples.

- (14) Enmity (*virodha*) as between a snake and ichneumon.
- (15) Superiority (*atishaya*) awakening the memory of that which has exceeded.
- (16) Acquisition (*prāpti*) reminding us of one from whom something has been or will be received.
- (17) Cover (*avadhāna*) such as a sheath reminding us of the sword.
- (18) Pleasure and pain (*sukha* and *duḥkha*) reminding us of that which caused them.
- (19) Desire and aversion (*icchā* and *dveṣa*) reminding us of one whom we liked or hated.
- (20) Fear (*bhaya*) reminding us of that which caused it.
- (21) Need (*ārthitva*) that which is wanted or prayed for.
- (22) Profession (*kriya*), chariot reminding us of the charioteer.
- (23) Affection (*rāga*) as recollecting a son or a wife.
- (24 & 25) Merit and demerit (*dharma* and *adharma*) through which there is recollection of joy and sorrow experienced in a previous life.

The list given above seems to be overlapping here and there. But as the *Bhāṣyakāra* himself says, the purpose of this enumeration is not to provide an exhaustive inventory of all causes for recollection, but only to suggest what might be the nature of such causes. The *Nyāya Vārtika* says ¹ "... for recollection is only the recognition by the same cognizer of the previously perceived thing, it appearing in the form 'I have known this object before'; and it is clear that in this the same cognizer recognizes what he had known before; and this recognition is what is called recollection. . .". Again, later on, the same idea is emphasized, "... for recollection is the name of that recognition of things which is preceded by the cognition thereof. . .".² From these two quotations it is evident that the Naiyāyika holds not only that recognition is a single psychosis, a single perceptual act, but also that it is not different from the act of recollection. Recollections are caused by memory associations and *pratyabhijñā* is "Knowing that a thing now perceived is the same as what was perceived before".³ Since recognition refers to only one thing at a time, it is unitary perception. The previous experience of the object leaves impressions which colour the present sense impressions. This is a perception where the representative factor is

¹ 3, 2, 39.

² *Nyāya Vārtika*, 3, 2, 42.

³ *Mitabhāṣiṇī*, p. 25, referred to by S. C. Chatterjee in his *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, op. cit., p. 225.

predominant and the perceptive factor is subservient. The *Bhāṣya*¹ says, "When one applies to, or connects with the same object, two cognitions which appear at different times (one appearing after the other), there is what is called recognition. . .". Again the same idea is reiterated,² "Recognition is the name of that recollective cognition which is involved in the conception that we have in regard to one and the same thing in the form—'I now cognize the same thing that I had cognized before'".

To the Naiyāyika recognition is perceptual and direct, because for him whatever is caused by the stimulation of the external sense-organs is directly perceptual.³ Recognition involves sense-stimulation and perception of the object directly. So, the whole experience is perceptual and direct, though the presented content assumes a meaning only with reference to the sub-conscious impression in the mind (*samskāra*). No doubt, in perception it is the mind that reaches out to the objective world through the sense-organs. But this will assume a recognitive value only when it is linked up with impressions already existing in the mind. *Pratyabhijñā* is a conscious reference of a past and a present cognition to the same object.

Although the Naiyāyika says that recollecting and recognition are one act and that recognition is not a complex psychosis, the element of memory in recognition cannot be ignored. Nor can we ignore the fact that perception and memory arise respectively out of present sensation and imagination out of that which has been. These two cannot be fused together. If they are done so, then the question arises, what is the nature of the object so perceived? If it is that which served as an object only in the past, then recognition becomes only memory and the present perceptual content is not accounted for. It cannot be merely a presented fact, for recognition implies identification with something that has been in the past. Faced with these doubts, the Naiyāyika says that the thing's relation to the past is that which qualifies its present perception. Even in all ordinary perceptions, there is always an element of recognition involved in the ideas, thoughts, etc. Only, in the present perception, this representative character is so much in the background that it is not evident ordinarily. In recognition, the representative aspect comes to the foreground leaving the presentative character subdued. Hence the Naiyāyika maintains that it is a single unitary psychosis.

¹ *Nyāya Bhāṣya* on 3, 1, 7.

² *Ibid.*, 3, 2, 2.

³ *Nyāya Sūtras*, 1, 1 4.

Smṛti or memory is defined in the *Tarkasaṃgrahā* as that knowledge which is caused by residual impressions only.¹ Hence it is completely dependent on *saṃskāra* or residual impressions. Memory is caused when *manas* comes into contact with these *saṃskāras* and thus it is a direct cognition.

Naiyāyikas are not uniform in treating *pratyabhijñā* as identical with *smṛti*. The very purpose of defining *smṛti* in the words quoted above, by Annambhaṭṭa, is to eliminate *pratyabhijñā* from the definition. The difference between the two consists in the presence or absence of the things recollected.²

The Naiyāyika not only identifies memory with recognition, but also maintains that memory is always non-valid knowledge. There is no doubt that memory refers to objects that were once perceived, but still as it is not the result of direct sense-object relation, it cannot claim validity in its own right. In memory this character of presentation is lacking. It is at best only re-cognition and not cognition. Memory, therefore, has only borrowed validity. *Anubhava* or experience is true or false according as it corresponds to the object as it exists externally or not. But *smṛti* or memory is made to depend entirely on the truth or falsity of the *anubhava* from which it originates. *Smṛti* is only a mediate knowledge, since it depends on prior perceptual knowledge, and as such is not directly in connection with the objects.

Even this position of the Naiyāyika does not seem to be tenable. We cannot deny the validity of knowledge because it refers to a previously experienced object. Memory is that which is responsible for the continuity of life and its experiences. The self or the cognizer is the same in both memory and perception and the Naiyāyika himself treats this as an evidence for the permanence of the soul. Hence on the very basis of their argument they cannot hold memory to be invalid knowledge. If memory is false, all inference would also be invalid, for *parāmarśa*, the corner stone of all inference, is dependent on memory. Russell says, "This immediate knowledge by memory is the source of all our knowledge concerning the past; without it there would be no knowledge of the past by inference, since we should never know that there was anything past to be inferred."³ Even according to the Naiyāyikas the question of the

¹ "Saṃskāra mātra janyam jñānam", Sec. 24.

² Ibid., p. 176.

³ *Problems of Philosophy*, Williams and Norgate, 1912, p. 76.

validity of memory cannot arise, because memory abdicates all claims for either truth or falsity in favour of its archetype, direct experience or *anubhava*.

The Sāṃkhya Yoga philosophy maintains that *smṛti* or memory is a form of a mental mode *citta vṛtti*, which brings about either pain or pleasure to the individual.¹ *Smṛti* is responsible for the continuity of knowledge and experience. It is defined as the psychosis which does not add surreptitiously (*asampramoṣa*) to a once-experienced object. Memory is caused by all mental *vṛttis*, viz., *pramāṇa*, *viparyaya*, *vikalpa* and *nidrā*. In memory the object is always that of a former knowledge or something less than the object given in a former knowledge. It is never more than this. A question is raised in the *Bhāṣya*, "Is it the object, or the act of knowing that is remembered?" Memory must belong to both. A further question is raised by the *Vārtika*: "If, in so far as both refer to cause (i.e., experience), there is similarity between the idea (*buddhi*) and the remembrance, then what difference is there between them?" That is, if both the idea and memory give us a knowledge of experience as well as the object of experience, then what is the difference between them? Or, how is perception different from memory? A twofold answer is given to this. (1) Perception is a process of knowing, *grahaṇa*, and is an apprehending, *upādāna*. This cannot happen with things already known, for perception involves novelty of knowledge. An idea or *buddhi* only illumines that which has come into contact with the sense-organs. It is presented. Here it is the form or *rūpa* that is the predominant element. (2) In memory what is predominant is the *ākāra* or the configuration of the object and also the object already known by the other *citta vṛttis*. Such a memory is of two kinds. Firstly, the experiences and the objects that are remembered are those that have been imagined. Secondly, the object of experiences and the experiences have been actually experienced. The former may be classified under misconception, but it is also called memory, because it resembles memory. These are known as dreams. In short, "experience is the getting to an object, and memory is a fluctuation preceded by a getting to an object".

All activities of the mind leave behind their impressions. These are called subliminal impressions or *saṃskāras*. In the Yoga theory of mental restraint, these *saṃskāras* play a very important part.

¹ *Yoga Aphorism*, 7.

When a particular mental state passes away and another takes its place, the first one is never completely lost but is presented in the form of latent impressions, which are always trying to become manifest and drag the self towards them. In other words, we may adopt the modern nomenclature and say, these *saṃskāras* form the unconscious, always agitating to become expressive, but always forced down by mental discipline. According to Freud, the unconscious is the determining factor of life's activities, the conscious forming only a very thin crust of the mental make-up. According to Yoga also, these *saṃskāras* are the potencies which generate activities. These potencies are the causes for actions and the actions, in turn, produce potencies. These *saṃskāras* become stronger as they go on manifesting themselves in actions and each repetition makes the potency stronger than before. The action is always circular. As Ganganath Jha says, "The *saṃskāras* are like the roots stuck deep in the soil which grow with the growth of the plant above, but even when the plant above is destroyed, the roots remain undisturbed and may again shoot forth as plants whenever they may get a favourable season."¹ The removing of these impressions from the mind is a necessary part of Yogic discipline before the individual can attain true knowledge. The process prescribed for this removal is quite interesting. "The restriction of them is by means of practice and passionlessness."² Practice is repeated exertion or *abhyāsa* in the control of activities or in substituting with activities which do not act as hindrances. Passionlessness is that state where the *citta* is rid of a thirst for seen objects such as the pleasures of the senses and the objects that are revealed in the scriptures as being rewards and which are of the nature of attaining heaven. Mastery of these desires is necessary for the concentration of mind.

Concentration on anything is possible only when the inabilities of the body and the mind are removed. These are listed as "sickness, languor, doubt, heedlessness, listlessness, and worldliness, erroneous perception and failure to attain any stage of concentration and instability in the state when attained—these distractions of the mind stuff are the obstacles".³ The *citta vṛttis* already listed are the positive elements which make the mind work away from concentration, whereas these are negative obstacles obstructing the mind from

¹ *The Study of Patanjali*, University of Calcutta, 1920, p. 99.

² *Yoga Aphorism*, II, 12.

³ *Yoga Sūtras*, Bk. I, Aph. 30.

functioning in the right direction. The former acts as the lure for mind wandering and the latter as the inhibiting elements. Of these nine obstructions, those that belong to general usage are the first seven. The last two are those which are particularly obstructions to the person who is seeking Yogic concentration.

All these activities of the mind leave behind them traces, potencies—*saṃskāras* which tend to produce them again and again. So, if these afflictions are to be removed, their *saṃskāras* also must be rooted out. This is done by practice and by cultivating passionlessness, as already stated.

But then, it is a fact that the mind can never be absolutely empty. If these *kliṣṭa vṛttis* are to be removed, then something else must take their place. It is a psychological fact that a present perception would resuscitate all associated tendencies. Every activity is based, on the one hand, on sense-impressions caused by the senses coming into contact with the object and on the other hand, on the *saṃskāras* of the *citta* which have been stored up and which are associated with these sense-impressions. So it is not only the individual perceptual differences that modify the resultant knowledge, but also these *saṃskāras* or memory that colours knowledge. Taking these epistemological and psychological facts into consideration the Yoga thinker is trying to control the resultant knowledge by controlling both the senses and the residual potencies. By constant practice and will, it is sought to replace *kliṣṭa vṛtti saṃskāras* by *akliṣṭa vṛtti saṃskāras*. All memory leading to pain and worry is sought to be erased by the substitution of less harmful memories. Probably this is what is sought even in modern psycho-analytic treatment, whereby a process of associational recall, harmful and wrong habits and memories are sought to be brought to light and erased or sublimated by conscious substitution of right habits and memories.

But this replacement of *kliṣṭa vṛttis* by *akliṣṭa vṛttis* should not be understood as a process of repression where the higher modes of thought are made to suppress the lower modes of thought. The very idea of repression is that the repressed ideas sinking into the unconscious act always as a source of danger to right ways of thinking. The *saṃskāras* on the other hand are neither completely ignored, nor are they suppressed. The mind is a material substance and therefore it is capable of retaining traces of thought-life. In the modern conception of analytic treatment, such a repressed idea is brought to the surface, i.e., into the conscious field of activity, and

then it is sought to be replaced by less harmful ideas. In Yoga system, the practice starts with the realization that there are these subliminal impressions which are always acting as a source of danger. This realization helps in counteracting these *saṁskāras*, and these counteracting *saṁskāras* are made by exercise to take the place of the originals. Since mind is subtle matter, the Yoga psychologist can say that at one stage the impressions left by a particular action can be removed. But the aim of the Yogin is to achieve a mind which is free from any sort of activity. So there is progressive restraint of the forming of *saṁskāras*. It is the nature of thought to incline towards objects. When the nature and number of the objects is limited consciously, concentration on one thing and the corresponding *saṁskāras* occur. It is a fact of biology that, when a structure or organism is not active for a considerable time, it ceases to function, i.e., becomes atrophied, and thus dies out. Similarly here, the Yogic thinker says, by concentrating on something higher, the lower modes of thought can be removed. Here *nirōdha* means, even in the beginning stages, destroying some structural tendencies and finally burning out all such tendencies, leaving the mind or *citta* blank.¹

The soul or self is eternal. The Sāṁkhya Yoga philosophy says that from the beginning the soul is bound up with matter or *prakṛti* and its release from matter is dependent on its own exertions. *Citta* in its passage through time gathers up experiences in different lives. These stored up experiences, which must have their appropriate effects, are the *vāsanās*. The words *vāsanā* and *saṁskāra* evidently mean the same thing. But *vāsanā* is prior to *saṁskāra* and has a determinative effect on the present and the future. The difference between *saṁskāra* and *smṛti* is that while the former is the unmanifested subconscious, the latter is the manifested memory. The former is inferred from the latter. Vācaspati says, "The power which generates mental potencies is inferred by memory".²

After the aspirant has attained a certain status in spiritual progress, the capacity to know not only the *saṁskāras* as *smṛti*, but the capacity to know the *vāsanās* also is achieved. This may not be a case of actual memory, but a knowledge of these past *saṁskāras* is

¹ "We must assume that there are not only different systems, but different levels of systems in the organism of the nervous mechanism. Systems upon one level would control directly the systems at the lower level, just as the lower systems control the activities of the single cells." Pillsbury, *Attention*, Swan Sonnenschein and Co. Ltd., London, 1908, p. 255. ² *Vārtika* on III, 15.

arrived at by the individual due to spiritual training. The *Yoga Bhāṣya* gives an analysis of these *saṁskāras*: "those appearing as habits and causing memories and afflictions and those appearing as virtue and vice and causing fruition",¹ (*Vāśana rūpa* and *dharmā-dharma rūpa*). It may be said that those *saṁskāras* which appear as habits and which cause memories and afflictions are those which depend on sense-perception. In other words, they are the *saṁskāras* which result from the direct experience of things. The senses provide the bare external sensations. The meaning for these sensations is provided by these *saṁskāras*. It is a well-known fact of attention that a sense-perception is interpreted according to the disposition of the mind of the perceiver. The mental modes determine the nature of knowledge based on the sensations. It is these cognitive dispositions that are responsible for the day-to-day life of the individual. The *Vārtika* says that this fruition of the afflictions of nescience or *avidyā* is caused by that which has the forms of virtue and vice (*dharmādharmā rūpa*).² The *citta* which is the constant factor in all different lives keeps a memory of all its experiences in the form of *saṁskāras* or potencies. These are responsible for all instinctive tendencies of all beings. The instinctive fear of death is explained as being due to this innate memory of painful experience involving death in previous lives.

This theory that mind has different levels of existence is one of the most dominant ideas in modern psychology. Freud distinctly separates these three levels one from the other, viz., the unconscious, the preconscious and the conscious. Writing on the Freudian concept of the unconscious, S. Herbert says, "It is well known that certain facts (and acts) that have been forgotten come to consciousness with more or less promptness as soon as one tries to remember them, while others can be recalled only with some difficulty. All such mental facts though strictly speaking, out of consciousness at a given moment, still can become conscious with more or less effort . . . there exists in addition another unconscious which is that part of the mind that is not thus easily capable of recall, having become deeply repressed. This may be termed unconscious proper in the Freudian sense."³ A similar account of the levels of mind is also

¹ *Yoga Bhāṣya* on III, 18, also reference to *Bhāṣya* on II, 13.

² *Vārtika* on III, 18.

³ *The Unconscious Mind—Psycho-Analytical Survey*, S. Herbert, Associate member of British Psycho-analytical Society, A and C Black Ltd., London, 1923, p. 15.

given by Jung in his various books. Quoting from Mr. Herbert's book again, "Jung distinguishes a personal and an impersonal or collective unconscious. The personal unconscious contains the psychic images (thoughts and feelings) of the individual's past so far as they have either been forgotten or repressed, whilst the collective or the absolute unconscious goes deeper and includes primordial images, the most ancient and universal 'thought feelings' that are the common inheritance of all mankind. They are archetype ideas, 'instinct forms' for they occupy the hinterland of the mind, dominated by the instincts."¹

These ideas of the unconscious and the subconscious are not exactly what the *Yogadarśana* gives us. The most important point of similarity to be noted is that, according to both these psychologists and Yoga, this unconscious is taken to be that which is the determining factor in conscious life. The Yogin considers that no progress towards salvation is made, so long as the *vāsanās* and *saṁskāras* retain their potencies. The nature of the contents of the preconscious and the unconscious vary with different schools of psychology, but they agree that the preconscious can be recalled to memory easily, since it belongs to the immediate past like the *saṁskāras* whereas the unconscious cannot be recalled so easily and is comparable to the *vāsanās*.

Another point of common interest between the Freudian concept of the unconscious and the Yoga concept is that the urges of the unconscious are dynamic. The conscious life is ever at the mercy of the unconscious. Again both agree that pleasure is the main guiding principle of the unconscious, but Yoga, in addition, says that there is always a feeling of pain accompanying that of pleasure. As a man progresses in knowledge, the realization comes to him, slowly but steadily, that all experiences of pleasure lead only to sorrow. Hence begins the process of *nirodha* or removal of these *saṁskāras*.

Reference has been made to Jung's collective unconscious. This collective unconscious is described as follows. "This psychic life is the mind of our ancient ancestors, the way in which they thought and felt, the way in which they conceived of life and the world, of gods and human beings. The existence of these historical layers is presumably the source of the belief in reincarnation and in memories

¹ *The Unconscious Mind—Psycho-Analytical Survey*, p. 145.

of past lives. As the body is a sort of museum of its phylogenetic history, so is the mind. . . . It is only the individual ego-consciousness that has for ever a new beginning and an early end. But the unconscious psyche is not only immensely old, it is also able to grow unceasingly into an equally remote future." ¹ These observations of Jung about the unconscious bear a comparison with the *Vyāsa Bhāṣya*. "This mind-stuff like a fish-net made in different shapes on all sides and having, from time without beginning, a form fixed (*sammūrchitā*) by sub-conscious impressions which are like knots, caused by the experience of the fruition of the *karma* from the hindrances, is spread abroad. Therefore these sub-conscious impressions are said to be more than one existence." ²

But, to Professor Jung what influences man's conscious and unconscious mind is not so much his own past as the past of the whole race, whereas according to Yoga, the subconscious is primarily that which is made up of one's own past lives and the resultant *karma*. But the life of an individual is always influenced and moulded by those around him and the customs and codes of the society in which he lives. The contents of this subconscious which is created by one's own past thoughts and actions can always be changed and transformed.

Both Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara deal with the problem of memory and recognition only indirectly. The *Kārika* does not give any positive empirical rule for the arising of knowledge or memory since they are true only empirically; it is not the concern of the *Kārikas* to explain them. Criticizing the Nyāya view of *sannikarṣa* relation of knowledge, the *Kārikas* admit that, while the relation between the object and sense-organ is understandable, it is not possible for any such relation to exist between mind and self. For the mind is only a product of *māyā*, and the self which is partless cannot enter into any relation which implies the existence of parts. To argue that such a relation is imperative for memory to so arise is not correct, for, if it were to arise, the mind being always in contact with the self, there must be simultaneity of memory also, and since the self is ever present, there can be no cessation of memory at all. Śaṅkara also deals with memory and recognition only while answering the Buddhist charges. Mental impressions can

¹ C. G. Jung, *Integration of the Personality*, Tr. by Stanely Dell, Kegan Paul, London, 1939, p. 25.

² *Yoga Bhāṣya* on II. 13, Tr. by Woods.

only be caused by external things.¹ An impression is a kind of modification and there can be no modification unless there is something to be modified. Hence the mind which receives impressions and the object which causes impressions must also be a part of this experience. Then again, unless there is the continuity of *manas* to connect up the past, the present and the future, there can be no remembrance, recognition. Hence these are caused by objects of perception which leave traces in the mind. Śaṅkara agrees with the Yoga mental modes, viz., right knowledge, error, imagination, slumber and remembrance.²

Thus we find that according to the major Indian philosophical systems, knowledge or *jñāna* which is a quality of the self, is manifested by the mind, by getting into contact with the external object either in the form of its own modes (*citta vṛttis*) or by means of a contact established between the mind and the object through sense-perception. Even modern thinkers grant the necessity of mind-object contact for knowledge to arise. But whether it is the mind that goes out, or it is light from the object that comes to the mind is the point on which there is difference of opinion. That mind is a passive entity, merely taking in the impressions from the external object is not accepted by any form of Indian thought. If the self is to gain knowledge then mind must be active not only in the task of co-ordinating the received atomic sensations, but also in the actual gaining of these sensations. Mind being material, it can reach the object which is also material, but the mind is saturated with *sattva guṇa* which is capable of reflecting the *jñāna* of the self, whereas the object, being predominantly *tāmasic*, is not capable of doing so. The mind, as it were, forms the liaison between the self on the one hand and object on the other hand. Although the three factors of knowledge, viz., the subject, object and a relation between them are also present here, these three are governed by a continuous regressive capacity to reflect knowledge. The self, the subject of all experience, is of the nature of knowledge or *jñāna*; the mind which establishes the cognitive relation is capable of reflecting knowledge and the object is merely the object for knowledge.

It is this mind which determines the nature of knowledge and gives rise to either valid knowledge or invalid knowledge.

¹ *Vedānta Sūtras* with *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya*, Tr. by G. Thibaut, Sacred Books of the East Series, II, 2, 30 & 31.

² *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, II, 4, and *Yoga Sūtras*, Aph. 7.

Recognition and memory are possible because the mind being material in nature is capable of retaining traces or *saṃskāras* of all its activities. And it is these that are responsible for continuity of knowledge and experience.

Self-cognition is possible either because of *anuvyavasāya* or because the mental mode has itself for an object. A cognition, says the Śāṅkarite, is self-luminous and does not require another cognition to manifest it as the Naiyāyika holds. A cognition is conscious, whereas an object is unconscious; hence, no cognition can be an object of cognition. It must be directly intuited. Otherwise no knowledge of the self which is of the nature of self and consciousness would be possible.

The mistake of the Naiyāyika lies in the fact that there is a confusion between the psychological self "me" or the empirical ego and the pure self or the "I". As Dr. Ward says, to identify these two is impossible, but the "me" cannot be there without the "I".¹

¹ *Psychological Principles*, op. cit., p. 379.

CHAPTER III

KNOWLEDGE AND THE OBJECT

IN the last chapter, we saw how perceptual knowledge arises and how *manas* functions in the different types of perceptual knowledge. Perception is direct or immediate knowledge and it is possible only of things which are presented here and now, and which lend themselves to be perceived. Mind and the object are interdependent and determine each other. If there is no object there can be no cognition of it, and if there is no mind there can be no cognizance of the object. The object and the mind must be empirically real for epistemological and psychological enquiry. Granting, for purposes of argument, that the object is present out there, the question arises what is it that is perceived by the process of perception? Any knowledge situation involves the threefold division of the knower, the process of knowing and the object known. What aspect of the object is it, that is known, making use of the perceptual process? It has already been said that the senses function in a unitary way. The mind can be in contact with one sense at one time only. For example, if a tree is presented to the sense of sight, what is perceived at one moment is only a part of the tree and never the whole tree. Still, our knowledge is always of the whole tree and not of the part singly, by itself. Hence perception can never give us the complete knowledge of an object. The knowledge of the whole of the object is always a result of inference. The Naiyāyikas do not accept this theory. They say that inference is not possible unless there is *vyāpti jñāna* or knowledge of universal concomitance. If inference is possible without this universal knowledge, what is known like this is only another part. So even then knowledge of the whole is not possible. All the schools of Indian Realism believe that the universal is real, eternal and can be perceived. The Naiyāyika specially believes, that the universal is a category capable of existing apart from the individual. This means that things which are perceived must have both universality and particularity. Unless the object is of limited dimension, it is not possible to perceive it. Hence the

whole that is perceived must always be made up of parts. The associationist school of psychology maintains that we constantly perceive different parts together and the corresponding ideas appear as belonging together, because of the association. The Naiyāyikas say that this would mean not presentation but representation leading to inference. What we have here is a mental construction and not a perceived object. Hence they say, the whole resides in every part and it is not a mere aggregate of parts, but a whole of parts.

In indeterminate perception, it is the universal nature that is perceived more than the particularity. The Buddhist maintains that the universal is only a *vikalpa*, a product of imagination; but the Naiyāyika says that this cannot be so since universal nature of objects is always an object of perception. Even though one may not know the nature of an object, still when several of them are presented together, one at once perceives the nature of universality involved in them. The whole, according to the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika, is a unit having the several parts as its constituents.¹ We have a similar view held by Russell according to whom the whole is "a new single term, distinct from each of its parts and from all of them. It is one, not many, and is related to the parts, but has a being distinct from theirs."²

The Sāṃkhya thinkers say that what is perceived as denoted by a word is not the *jāti* but the *vyakti*.³ A substance which has limiting qualities such as colour, form, etc., is usually denoted by the word "that". Also in practical life, we always refer to individual things and not to universal classes, e.g., "In the expression 'he gives the cow to the *vaidya*', the giving must be of an individual cow and not of the universal."⁴ Hence in perceptual knowledge of all qualities and objects, there is always a reference only to the particular and never to the universal. But the Naiyāyikas say that the word refers no doubt to the individual, but to an individual which belongs to a class. What is meant by the word "cow" in the example given above is not a mere, bare, individual but an individual that is distinguished by having the generic quality of cowness.

The Jainas put forward the theory that what is perceived is always the configuration, neither the *vyakti* nor the *jāti*. One thing is

¹ *Nyāya Vārtika*, II, 1, 30.

² Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, Cambridge University Press, 1903, p. 141.

³ *Nyāya Bhāṣya*, 2, 2, 60.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2, 2, 60, Poona Oriental Series, No. 59.

distinguished from another because of its configuration. The Naiyāyika does not accept this theory also, for the form by itself does not constitute the object.¹ A clay model of a cow is not a cow by any standards, although it possesses the configuration of a cow.

The Vedāntin and the Mīmāṃsaka say that what is perceived is the genus or the class-character of the object. The different individual objects are perceived to be the same because of their genus. The older Naiyāyikas like Gautama and Vātsyāyana have said that the object is perceived as possessing all the three characteristics (*vyakti*, *jāti* and *ākṛti*), the emphasis varying according to its context. But some later Naiyāyikas say that an individual is that which is characterized by the universal—*jāti viśiṣṭa vyakti*.² Against all these views the Advaitin maintains that what is perceived is a universal. In determining what the primary sense of a word is and consequently what the basis of perceptual knowledge is, the Advaitin maintains that the word must primarily symbolize a universal, as otherwise it cannot be applied to particulars. For instance, when we say the word "cow" we assume a knowledge of the universal cowness. The particular is the substantive which is qualified by the universal as an adjective.³ Such a position raises an epistemological question. How does the knowledge of a universal help us to denote a particular? To this the Advaitin replies that the particular is always subsumed under the universal. The universal is known by the same knowledge that reveals the particular.⁴ Psychologically also, a classification of particulars based on perceived similarities is that which leads to naming the particulars.⁵ Similarly the Gestalt psychologists also say that what is perceived is the whole and not the bits of experience somehow put together. And H. H. Price observes that perception although apparently is only of a surface, still is always of a complete whole.⁶

The object that is so perceived is real and out there, according to the Naiyāyika. The "thing" is neither a product of imagination nor

¹ *Nyāya Bhāṣya*, 2, 2, 63-64.

² A. C. Chatterjee, *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, University of Calcutta, 1939, p. 361.

³ Datta, *Six Ways of Knowing*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1932, p. 264.

⁴ *Vedānta Paribhāṣa*, IV; 16-18, also *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, 1, 3, 28, op. cit.

⁵ Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, pp. 597-98. "Each word stands for some general aspect of the concrete detail of actual perception—in other words it stands for what is called a *universal* or *concept*."

⁶ H. H. Price, *Perception*, pp. 153-54.

of *māyā*. It is an existent real which comes into contact with the self as an external object. The Buddhist, who is a thoroughgoing nominalist, says that there is no entity behind and beyond the attributes which are given as sensations. Even pragmatically speaking, for example, what is experienced when eating a fruit is only the sensations and never the substance.¹ The Naiyāyika cannot accept this position. The status of the object which is given in perceptual knowledge through *sannikarṣa* cannot be that of an imaginary thing. If there is no identical object giving rise to different sensations of touch and colour, then these sensations by themselves can never produce the synthetic vision of the whole object.² The qualities that are perceived are many, and they are all held together because of the substantive status of the object. To the Advaitin, everything except the self is only an appearance caused by nescience. But from the empirical standpoint, the external world is an existent and becomes the object of sense-perception. In the *Gauḍapāda Kārika*³ there is a discussion about the nature and status of the external object which is given in physical perception. If the position of the Advaitin is true, then it is said that there can be no difference between the ideas in the mind which are purely mental and the objects of physical perception which are imaginary. The Advaitin replies that objects which are imagined last only as long as the imagination lasts. Beyond that they do not exist. But the external objects are not so, since they are determined by "two points in time".⁴ This means that the external objects exist not only when one is perceiving them, as it happens in the case of subjective ideas, but also at times when others are perceiving them. The two points of time referred to are the two aspects with which a thing is viewed and which determine each other. For example, the statement that "he remains till the cow is milked" can be interpreted in two ways. It can mean that the man's time is determined by the milking of the cow, or the time of milking the cow is determined by the man. In this manner these two external things determine each other. Just

¹ S. C. Chatterjee, "The Identity of an Object", article published in the Indian Philosophical Congress Proceedings, 24th Session, Patna, 1949, pp. 36-37.

² *Nyāya Vārtika* on 1, 1, 14.

³ *The Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad with Gauḍapāda's Kārika and Śaṅkara's Commentary*, Tr. by Swami Nikhilananda, Ramakrishna Centenary Publication, Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1936, II, 14.

⁴ "Dvaya kālāḥ", II, 14.

as in dreams the different points of time are all present in the dreamer's mind for a few moments only, it is also reasonable to believe that the world of external objects is also illusory.¹ The whole world of perceived duality is an act of the mind. It is because of the modifications of the mind (*citta vrttis*) that the external world appears as dual.² For all practical purposes the self perceives the external world through the instrumentality of the mind. But from the standpoint of the self both the mind and the objects of the mind are mere illusions. The mind perceives the object, and the object depends on the mind for its perception; hence each determines the other. But for empirical purposes, as the *Kārika* says, the difference between the dream object and the physical object lies "only in the sense-organs".³ The internal objects of the dream world, the external objects of the waking world are both forms of thought although one is unmanifested and the other is manifested. Ideas are cognized by the mind alone, whereas things are cognized by the external sense-organs in conjunction with the mind. If knowledge is to occur, then, some relation between this organ and the external object has to be established. Śaṅkara says, "Hence because the variety of manifold experiences exist, it is necessary to admit the existence . . . of external objects which are outside the ideas of the perceiving subject".⁴ This postulation of an object and its relation to the mind holds good at the ordinary level of knowledge which involves the use of the causal relation. But if "we proceed to find the true nature of the thing by going from one cause to another till language fails us, we do not find any (final) cause".⁵ Hence there can be no such relation between the mind and the objects, because in the final resort, there are no objects at all.⁶

A question is raised here. If there is no true object, and if still there is knowledge of an object, say a jar, then it follows that the mind takes on the shape of false knowledge at times. Such being the case, there must be right knowledge as opposed to wrong knowledge. Replying to this objection Śaṅkara says that the false knowledge has no correlation with true knowledge, since there is no real object at all. The mind, because of illusion, imagines there are

¹ Durant Drake, op. cit., pp. 28-33.

² *Kārika*, 72, Bk. IV, op. cit.

³ *Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya* on *Kārika* III, 24, *ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, III, 25.

⁵ *Ibid.*, III, 26.

⁶ II, 15, op. cit.

real objects. Hence there are neither real objects nor a knowledge of them.

The position so far outlined as given in the *Kārika* is also the theory of the *Vijñāna Vādin*, who is a subjectivist. But the *Advaitin* is not a subjectivist, in the sense that he does not say that there is no basis at all for knowledge. For the *Advaitin* consciousness alone is real, it has no beginning nor an end and it is wrongly thought of as having a beginning and an end. This consciousness, therefore, is the basis of all empirical knowledge.

Similarly, *Śaṅkara* also says that "the non-existence of external things cannot be maintained",¹ since there is consciousness of them in us. *Śaṅkara* does not agree with the Buddhist school of *Vijñāna Vāda* which says all things are mere ideas. *Vijñāna Vāda* maintains that from the fact that we are always conscious of the act of knowledge and the object of knowledge, it follows that these two are identical. This simultaneous consciousness would not be possible if the two were essentially distinct, for then we can also be conscious of the one without the other. To this, the *Advaitin* replies, that consciousness of essentiality is a prerequisite for knowledge to arise, for it is not possible to be conscious of perception only, but one is always conscious of the perceived object. Then again, to say we have ideas of things and our cognition is only of ideas and not of things is a contradiction in terms, for no idea of a thing is possible unless the thing is, and the invariable concomitance of these two only means that the thing is the basis for the idea and not their identity. A thing is known by perception and the idea is formed by remembrance. Mere mental impressions are possible because of the variety of perceptual experience. Hence if cognition is to arise, then both the knowing self and the known object must be there, says *Śaṅkara*.

In order to avoid another type of immediate knowledge derived through *śabda* or verbal testimony, the *Vedānta Paribhāṣa* adds a qualification for the perceptibility of the objects. It must be *yogya* or capable of being perceived.² It must not be an object which is imperceptible by its very nature such as *dharmā-dharma*. The *Advaitin* agrees with the realist in the perceivability of objects, but he differs from the realist on the point of relationship of these objects

¹ *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, Tr. by Thibaut, II, 2, 28.

² *Vedānta Paribhāṣa*, op. cit., 1, pp. 47-48.

and the sensations. A relation of identity is established between the object and the self by the mental mode taking on the form of both, according to the Advaitin, whereas the realist Naiyāyika assumes a series of external relations to explain the perceptibility of the object by the sensations. The Advaitin says that, when an object is perceived by the sense, its universal as well as the relation by which it is related is also perceived along with it.

We have so far been discussing the mechanism of knowledge and the nature of the object of knowledge. Knowledge arises due to certain conditions pertaining both to the means and to the object of knowledge. Knowledge so derived must be valid. To the Naiyāyika, valid knowledge or *pramā* is that knowledge which represents reality truly. But then, how does such a judgement come to be true? All the factors involved in the knowledge process such as *manas*, senses, objects and even the self are not responsible for the judgement to be true. The Naiyāyika maintains that neither truth nor falsity is a characteristic of knowledge. The subject implying the self, *manas*, the senses and the object, are correlated factors, and there can be no knowledge without these coming together. Hence, if any particular knowledge is true or false, that does not depend on these but on some other extraneous factors. Truth or falsity is therefore *parataḥ-prāmānya* to the Naiyāyika. Even then, a further process is necessary to reveal this truth or falsity to the knowing self. It is not given in *anuvyavasāya* or reflective knowledge since the factors which give rise to *anuvyavasāya* cognition are not themselves those which generate truth or falsity. Hence, we come to know that a judgement is false or true by an external reference, viz., fruitful activity. The logical validity of a knowledge is determined only secondarily after a pragmatic test is carried out (*Samvādi-pravṛtti*).¹

The view of the Sāṃkhya is that knowledge is characterized by both truth and error. Nothing new is produced at any time. Hence truth and error, since they occur in knowledge-activity must be there already in knowledge. But this is a contradiction in terms. If both validity and invalidity belonged to knowledge at the same time, then it follows that there is no knowing which is a valid cognition and which is an invalid cognition. If it is said that

¹ Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1932, pp. 259-61.

circumstances reveal the nature of particular knowledge, then it is going beyond knowledge to prove its validity. Hence it is not possible to maintain that knowledge is intrinsically valid. The mental *vytti* which envelops the object can be shown neither to be valid nor invalid.

To the Advaitin, the nature of knowledge itself is to be valid. It does not require any other factor than that from which it originates, to be valid. But invalidity or error depends upon conditions which are other than those required to produce knowledge. This truth or validity which is revealed by *pramāṇās* is not the absolute truth, but only serves empirical purposes. It is only empirically real or true. All truth is only relative, till the identity of the Self and Brahman is realized.

An object is known by the *antaḥkaraṇa vytti*. In other words, the condition of knowledge is that the *antaḥkaraṇa*-determined consciousness must go out and assume the form of the object. The valid knowledge of the object then is not immediately known, but only on condition that the *vytti* takes place. To this difficulty the Advaitin answers that one must never forget that the nature of the self is consciousness, hence no mediator is required to manifest knowledge. From this point of view all knowledge is self-manifest. The *vytti* condition is that which gives rise to a knowledge of the object which is immediate and valid. Till this knowledge is sublated or contradicted, this remains true. Even then, non-contradiction is a negative condition of truth. This Vedāntic view of truth as unsublatable corresponds, to a certain extent, to the coherence theory of truth of the Western philosophers. But this coherence, says the Advaitin, is to be understood on the basis of the self-evident consciousness of the individual. The *manas* and its contents have already become identical, for otherwise knowledge cannot arise. This state of knowledge and the object of knowledge have been made identical by the *vytti*; so when one is aware of oneself as being valid, one becomes aware of the knowledge of the objects as valid knowledge.

This discussion of the validity of knowledge leads to the implied question on the invalidity of knowledge. All schools of Indian philosophy give a psychological as well as an epistemological explanation of erroneous cognition. All illusory perception or invalid knowledge is because of some defect in the conditions of perception, e.g., wrong functioning of the sense-organs or wrong association by the mind. Even prior to the determination whether a knowledge is

ontologically valid or invalid, there must arise in the mind of the person the doubt as to the validity of the knowledge first received. Therefore the *Nyāya Sūtras* first state how this doubt or *samsāya* arises.

According to the *Nyāya Bhāṣya*¹ doubt may arise out of five causes. First it may be caused from the perception of common properties alone; second, from the perception of any peculiar and unique property alone; third, it can arise due to conflicting testimony; fourth, due to irregular perception; and fifth, doubt can also arise from irregularity of non-perception. But it is not so. Doubt cannot arise because of the following reasons:

(1) Cognizing of properties that are either common or different is not sufficient. For instance, if we see in the twilight a tall object which moves, there can be no doubt that it is a man. Although a post and a man have the common properties of tallness, the distinguishing property of man is his capacity for locomotion. Hence doubt cannot arise if both the generic and particular qualities are noted. Similarly, doubt about an object can never be produced if only the common or the uncommon properties are noticed. For instance, when there is the perception of man and of the post as being tall, and when there is the perception of man with his differentiating quality of movement, then in both these cases there can arise no doubt about the nature of the object.

In reply to this the *Nyāya Sūtra* (2. 1. 6) says, "The recognition of properties common to many objects etc., are certainly causes for doubt, if there is no reference to the precise characteristics of the objects. . .".² Definite knowledge regarding the object being absent, doubt must arise. The *Bhāṣya* commenting on this *Sūtra*, says "I am perceiving now a property that is common to two things known to me (i.e., perceived by me before) and I am not perceiving any property that belongs to any one of them. Specially . . . how may I find some such specific property whereby I may be certain as to one or the other?" Hence doubt must arise.

(2) Doubt cannot arise from the cognition of diverse opinions or uncertainty of perception. To this objection the *Bhāṣya* says,³ just because there is diversity of opinions stating that the object possesses diverse properties, it is not possible, in the absence of previous

¹ On 1, 1, 23.

² Ganganath Jha's Translation, op. cit.

³ Ibid., 2, 1, 6.

knowledge, to be definite about the nature of the object. Similarly doubt must arise when there is uncertainty of perceptual evidence.

(3) Even granting the above position, it is maintained by the objector, that doubt cannot arise because even with respect to conflicting opinions there is certainty regarding these diverse opinions. Each individual upholder of each of the diverse opinions is convinced about the certainty of his opinion. Hence, no doubt can arise for him. In reply the *Nyāya Bhāṣya* says that this is no argument at all, since the very fact that the disputants hold so definitely to settled opinions each contradicting the other, will throw the observer into a state of doubt. There is no determining factor in favour of any one view. Hence doubt must arise out of the very certainty of the conflicting opinions.

(4) "Uncertainty itself being quite certain in its uncertain character, there can be no uncertainty at all."¹ The *Vārtika* on this *Sūtra* gives the reply that this is not right, for it involves self-contradiction. Here "uncertainty" is used in the sense of "fixity" and "definiteness"; the fact of doubt still remains. Because it is a certain uncertainty it does not lose its character of being a doubt.

After replying to the objection so raised, the *Nyāya Sūtras* say that wherever there is argument, there is sure to be doubt, and hence an examination should be conducted in all such doubtful cases. The *Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms* give a different account of *saṁśaya*. Doubt arises because of several causes. It is due to the perception of common property, non-perception of the differentiating particular between the alternatives and the knowledge only of the alternatives.² The *Nyāyakaṇḍalī* takes up the common example of the post and man, which have distinctive features as well as common properties. Due to some reason or other, when the common properties alone are observed, failing to perceive their distinctive features, although remembering these features because they were perceived before, there arises doubt. But then, it is said, if the differentiating characteristics are remembered, then the perception of the common properties alone will be destroyed and there will be no room for the arising of the doubt. To this, it is said that memory is brought about by impressions; it does not interfere with the existing perception of common qualities.

¹ Ganganath Jha's Translation, 2, 1, 4.

² *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, II, 1, 17-20, op. cit.

Doubt so roused is said to be of two kinds, that which has an external object and that which has an internal object. Śrīdhara in his *Nyāyakandali* gives the following example.¹ "An astrologer, having consulted the positions and motions of the planets and stars, makes certain calculations as to a certain event having happened, happening or likely to happen (in the past, present, and future); and he finds them true; on another occasion however he finds his deductions from the same causes turn out to be false; and then when on a third occasion he makes similar predictions from the same causes, he has his doubts whether it would turn out to be true or not." Here doubt arises because of uncertain effects following from the same knowledge. Sometimes knowledge brings about valid results and sometimes it does not. Then doubt arises as to the capacity of that knowledge to fulfil its purposes.

The external doubt is again of two kinds, that which pertains to perceptible objects and that which pertains to imperceptible objects. As an example of the latter, Praśastapāda gives the following in his *Bhāṣya*: "When in a forest we see the horns only, we doubt whether the animal seen is a cow or a *gavaya*". From the perceptible, we have a doubt of the imperceptible. Doubt which pertains to perceptible objects is that which is roused when we perceive the common characters of things given to perception. The distinctive or differentiating features are not perceived. These are only remembered and applied alternately to one or the other of the objects perceived. This constitutes doubt according to the Vaiśeṣikas.

Doubt or *saṁśaya* is not valid knowledge. It has the character of *anubhava*, but it is neither definite (*asaṁdigdha*) nor is it true (*yathārtha*) and hence there is no fruitful activity. Still doubt is not error. For the latter is definitely wrong knowledge, whereas with regard to doubt as cognition there can be neither truth nor falsity. This account of doubt or *saṁśaya* is interesting because it, as a mental state, has neither belief nor unbelief. When alternative characteristics are attributed to one and the same thing, there is bound to be a doubt. Bosanquet says that the alternatives of a disjunction must be exclusive and contradictory, but he goes a step further and says that doubt reveals the questioning attitude of mind and not a judgement at all.² There is no assertion involved in *saṁśaya*.

¹ Ganganath Jha's Translation, op. cit., p. 373.

² B. Bosanquet, *Logic*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1911, Vol. I, p. 356.

Bradley also asserts the same idea in his *Principles of Logic*. "Partial ignorance does not make any knowledge fallacious. . . ." ¹

The later Naiyāyikas specially of the syncretist school of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika recognize another form of doubt also. When one of the alternatives of the doubt is suppressed and the other is manifest it is known as *ūhā* (conjecture). ² When two alternatives are suggested, due to association, one of the alternatives alone is strengthened while the other is suppressed. But still it is in the realm of doubt or *saṁśaya*. In doubt both the alternatives are presented to the mind and the mind oscillates in its choice of the alternatives. But in *ūhā*, because the perception of the common quality being more strongly associated with one object, that object is said to be probably the perceived object. Hence more definiteness is involved here and this borders on almost wrong perception on one side.

In *viparyaya* or illusory perception, the mind makes a definite wrong perception. Praśastapāda defines misconception or illusion as that which pertains to objects of sense-perception and inference. Śrīdhara says that when a cow is mistaken for a horse because of many common characteristics and also because of something going wrong with the organs of sense, misconception arises. Praśastapāda gives two more reasons for misconception. First, when the mind-soul contact depending on a previous impression (*saṁskāra*) of a previous cognition of an object, not at present before the eyes, is perceived as belonging to present content, this conception arises. In the example given above, a horse was perceived sometime previously and the impressions left by that cognition now affect the contact of the mind and the self when there is the perception of the cow. This raises a series of questions. How can the sense-organ which belongs to an object which is deranged give rise to the apprehensions of distinct characteristics which belong to an object which is not present before the sense-organ? If this were granted, then, it follows that the sense-organ can produce apprehension of any object at any time without any reference to the object that is actually in contact with the sense-organ. To this argument Śrīdhara ³ replies that in *viparyaya* what is misconceived always bears a similarity to the object in contact with the sense-organ. This perception of similarity revives the subconscious impression left by a previous perception.

¹ Vol. I, p. 11.

² Jadunath Sinha, *Psychology of Perception*, pp. 266-71.

³ *Nyāyakandālī*, op. cit., pp. 375-77.

When this revived impression is brought into contact with the self by the mind, there is the cognition of the object of which these impressions were originally formed. Hence any object cannot be perceived at any time, the determinate factors of *viparyaya* being similarity between the presented object, the object of *viparyaya*, and the revival of the subconscious impressions. The perverted sense-organs must come into contact with these in order to produce illusions. This misconception is that which is caused by deranged sense-organs due to some bodily ailment. Another kind of misconception which is purely mental is also cited by Śrīdhara. This happens even when there is no physical basis for the perception. Perceiving nacre as silver is due to the sense-organs being stimulated by the object out there. But in the case of illusions which have no presentative basis, it is the mind that is diseased. Here there is no cognition of similarity, for there is no present external object at all. Śrīdhara says, "... as for instance when a man infatuated with love for a woman perceives the semblance of his beloved here, there and everywhere. Impressions (of previous perceptions) is the cause only in cases where the misconception is determinate and concrete, when it is indeterminate and abstract the cause lies in the disarrangement of the sense-organ also" ¹

The logical implications of erroneous knowledge that arises are dealt with differently by different systems of thought. According to the Naiyāyika, correspondence between the psychic complex and the objective complex is essential before a judgement can be said to be true. We have already discussed how misconception in this can arise when the peripheral excitation is not valid due to diseased sense-organ or when mental impressions are vitiated due to recollected obsessions. When the three elements involved in perception constitute a single complex whole which is not found in the external world, then there is erroneous cognition. But the Naiyāyika says that there is another kind of erroneous perception where the objective part of the perceptual process is partly out there. The predicative element is recollected and attributed to the mere "this" that is perceived at present. The sense-organs perceive the object, but the mind imposes its recollected predicative qualities on the perceived object and error results. It is this kind of illusion which is a combination of presentative and representative

¹ *Nyāyakaṇḍalī*, p. 378.

elements that is interpreted differently by different schools of thought.

Theories of error may be divided into two groups, the *satkhyāti vādas* and *asatkhyāti vādas*. The latter theory is advocated by the Mādhyamika school of Buddhists. To a follower of this school unreality is ultimate and error consists in cognizing the unreal as real. Delusion has no substrate. The silver-cognition has no basis in reality; there is no locus on which it is superimposed. The sublation of silver which was made manifest in delusory experience is unreal. If this were not so, then there could be no sublation. Now, the sublating cognition is that which reveals to us the nature of the real cognition. It cannot destroy what is real. In the cognition of silver the sublation can only be of silver which is unreal. Such an experience would be inexplicable if silver were to be really an existent. Again if the sublating cognition is of the real then it cannot sublimate a cognition of the real, nor a cognition of the unreal. Hence the silver that appears in delusion is unreal, because it is sublated, and sublation cannot be of the real. So silver which is unreal cannot appear in delusion, but non-silver appears as silver. To the Mādhyamika silver-nature is only a form of the cognition of the void which alone is real. But, if the silver-nature is only an adventitious character of the void, then that silver-nature must be real elsewhere, for it to be cognizable. The *satkhyāti vādin* argues that there can be no cognition without a substrate. There cannot be pure negation. The sublation of "no silver" must end in "nacre only". Otherwise sublation can have no meaning. There can be no cognition of the unreal. In shell-silver experience, the content of the illusory experience, namely silver, must be real.

All the different interpretations of *satkhyāti* have the common basis that they believe that there is a cognition of the real in erroneous cognition. *Ātmakhyāti* is advocated by the Yogācāra school of Buddhism. It means self-apprehension. The Yogācāra school which believes in *Vijñāna Vāda* maintains that reality is nothing else but a fleeting, perishable, psychic presentation. It is only a mental mode, having no external basis. Hence error consists in thinking what is mental as material. The sublating cognition, "this is not silver", only negates the externality and not the experience of silver. The silver is real as it exists in the mind and not as it exists in the external world. Both the experience of delusion and the sublating cognition become intelligible only by the sublation

of externality. Even then the real nature of silver is only a product of *vāsanā*.

This position of the *Vijñāna vādin* is not sound. If it is possible to cognize externality in that which is non-external, then it follows that it should be possible to cognize what is of intellect in non-intellect. This would cut at the very roots of the subjectivist's position.

Akhyāti is the theory accepted by the Prābhākara school of Mimāṃsakas and the Sāṃkhya thinkers. *Akhyāti* literally means no-knowledge. According to the Prābhākaras there is no invalid cognition at all. All knowledge is either true knowledge or memory. Erroneous cognition is a composite cognition, made up of perceptual and memory cognitions. In the example of delusory perception of silver in shell, the "this" is actually given to sense-perception. Some features of the shell which resemble silver are also perceived. This similarity makes us recollect silver and the erroneous cognition "this is silver" arises. Hence such delusions are the result of perception immediately followed by memory. Both these cognitions are true. Because of a defect in the memory the two cognitions are identified. Because of the similarity between the two cognitions, they are identified as one. Hence it is a failure to recognize a non-relation between the presented content and the remembered content—*asamsargā-graha*. From the point of view of cognitions there is no error. Truth and error belong to the relative experience. Knowledge, because it is self-valid, can never be wrong. The sublation "this is not silver" destroys the non-relation and arranges the two cognitions in their proper order.

But the Mimāṃsaka forgets that the delusory silver is as much a presented perception as real silver. The sublating cognition negates only the delusory silver and not the real silver. Delusory cognition cannot be a complex cognition. Just as in normal cognition, in delusory cognition also there is only one single presented content.

The same idea of insufficient knowledge being the cause of error is also advocated by the Sāṃkhya thinkers. Error arises when there is insufficient knowledge of two things brought together under one cognition. Sublation helps fuller knowledge of both separately, and error vanishes. In sublation no cognition is made untrue. What is given in knowledge is always true. Error, because it is deficient, is supplemented by true knowledge. This theory is also known as *sadasatkhyāti* which means that error is the result of a wrong combination of what is given and what is not given.

Just like the Mīmāṃsaka the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika school of philosophers say that illusory perception is a single psychosis made up of both presentative and representative characters. The "this" of the delusory judgement is presented externally to the senses. The common qualities of shell and silver are perceived in shell. This perception brings to the mind a recollection of another object which is elsewhere and which also possesses similar qualities. Such a mental association produces a wrong perception of silverness in shell which is given in present perception. Here the illusory perception is not merely a mental recollection but it is immediately given as a presented content. It is not an absolutely non-existent silver that is perceived, for what is so absolutely non-existent cannot be an object of perception. The silver is non-existent here and now. Here, the shell is the cause for the illusory perception of silver. This theory of the Naiyāyika is more psychological than logical. Criticizing this theory of the Naiyāyika, S. S. S. Sastry says that the silver content cannot be either unreal nor real elsewhere, for then there would be no contact with it, and the Naiyāyika's theory of perception rests on the cornerstone of *sannikarṣa*. Still it has to be admitted, since, if it were not there, there would be no sublated cognition "this is not silver but shell".¹ The Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsakas agree with the Naiyāyikas in this interpretation of illusory knowledge which is known as *anyathākhyāti*. The Advaitin agrees with the Naiyāyika to a certain extent, since according to both "illusion is a simple psychosis of a presentative character. According to both, an illusion is produced by a sense-organ vitiated by a certain derangement in co-operation with a subconscious impression revived by the perception of similarity."² But these two differ in their epistemological interpretation.

To the Advaitin the object of illusion is indeterminable *anirvacanīya*. The silver cognition cannot be real, for it is sublatable. Also if it were real, even those who are not experiencing the illusory cognition would also perceive silver, but this is not so. The sublated cognition "this is not silver" negates silver at all times in that locus. Hence it is not real silver that appears in illusory cognition. Nor can we say that the silver so experienced is unreal. For as a fact of experience, it cannot be controverted. Then again what is unreal can never be perceived, e.g., the horns of a hare. Hence it is

¹ *Vedānta Paribhāṣa*, op. cit. p. 183.

² *Ibid.*, p. 283.

not possible to maintain that the silver that is cognized in shell-silver illusion is either real or unreal, for these being contradictories cannot be found in the same locus. Therefore, this silver is *anirvacanīya*. This kind of existence belongs to the level of *prātibhāsika sattā*. As far as the mental mode is concerned the experience of silver is real, though this is later proved to be wrong by the experience of the shell.

A discussion of dreams as an illustration of illusory experience is given by all Advaitins. Waking and dreaming are the soul's different states. There is a third state where the soul alone exists and has no commerce with either body or mind. The dream state is called the intermediary state by Śaṅkara,¹ following the *śruti*.² It is called so because it lies where the two worlds, the place of sleeping and the place of waking, join. Here the things that are created by the mind must be real. But their reality is only relative, for it is sublatale by waking experience, and there are contradictions involved in dream experience which pertain to time and space. In dream, which is in the mind, there is no space for chariots etc., nor can a person travel vast distances in a moment, as he apparently does in a dream. Answering the Bauddha view that the two sets of ideas, of the waking and of the dreaming, are identical since they have the same external source, Śaṅkara says that it cannot be so, since they differ in the following ways. Dream cognitions are usually negated by waking experiences. Also the visions of a dream are representative of waking experiences. "Dreams are reproductions of past waking perceptions owing to the revival of their subconscious impressions; so they have the semblance of waking perceptions."³ The reality of the dream is that of the *prātibhāsika* and *anirvacanīya* as distinguished from the reality of the *vyavahārika* or empirical experience.

For the Advaitin, knowledge arises because of the *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* being determined by the nature of the object. But in dreaming the channels through which the mind reaches out to the object, viz., the sense-organs, are all turned inwards. Hence the visions of a dream are mere illusion.⁴ What is sought to be proved here is that the whole experience of dream objects is purely mental, being

¹ *Sūtra Bhāṣya* III, 2, 1.

² *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* IV, 3, 9.

³ *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya* III, 2, 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2, 3.

projected into space, as it were, and not having any validity apart from imagination.

Śaṅkara goes a step further and says even the objects of the *vyavahārika* experience are all illusory and have only a relative reality. The practical distinction between the knower and the objects of knowledge is no doubt acknowledged. But this distinction depends upon the relation of cause and effect. To the Advaitin, the cause is non-different from the effect.¹ So from the higher standpoint, the objects of the world do not have a separate existence and reality of their own. "Just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper wakes",² so also at the *vyavahārika* level the objects of knowledge appear to be real till the knowledge of *Brahman* as the only ultimate reality arises. At this level, what is known as the self is the combined passive *sākṣin* and the acting *antaḥkaraṇa*. It is this unity that is responsible for all empirical knowledge, feeling and willing. The *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* by itself cannot produce knowledge. It becomes knowledge only when consciousness that is determined by the *sākṣin* becomes identical with the *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti*. This *antaḥkaraṇa* as well as the objects of experience all belong to the substantive material world. This is an effect and hence, as such, is non-different from its cause which is the ultimate *Brahman*. *Brahman* can be understood only as consciousness. The effects are unreal, but not the consciousness of these effects. Dream effects are sublated by waking effects, and dream consciousness, i.e., consciousness of having had a fearful or a pleasant dream, is not sublated by waking consciousness.³ Similarly the waking consciousness, though making us aware of the objects as effects of perception, does not guarantee their reality.

We have already stated that Śaṅkara does not say that there can be knowledge without an object. In the process of knowledge, the terminii, the subject and object are essential. Both in illusion and in waking life, there is always an object of experience. Both are real in their own respective spheres. The distinction then between the illusory object and the object of waking experience lies in their difference in character. The illusory object is seen by only one person, whereas the object of empirical perception is common to all. Professor Hiriyanna characterizes these two types of experiences as "private" and

¹ Ibid, II, 1, 14. Śaṅkara cites *Chāndogya* VI, 1, 4 as his authority here.

² Ibid, II, 1, 14.

³ Ibid, I, 1, 14.

"public" respectively. Illusory experience of mistaking a rope for a snake is "private" because it is one's own personal experience, whereas the experience of rope as rope is "public" since it is the common experience of all. The latter is more enduring than the former. But it should also be borne in mind that the dream object or the object of illusion is not purely mental in the sense in which the subjectivists maintain it is—not mere ideas. The illusory object is an object for the mind, just as in the waking experience the object is an object for the mind or *antaḥkaraṇa*. That both these objects are illusory is what is maintained by Śaṅkara. The illusoriness is caused by illegitimate transference as Śaṅkara says in his introduction to the *Sūtra Bhāṣya*.

The internal organ or *antaḥkaraṇa* is therefore common to both the dream and the waking experience and functions only in these two states. But in man there is still another state which must be accounted for, and that is the state of deep sleep.

Deep sleep or *suṣupti* is characterized by the absence of all cognitions, both internal and external. Hence that which gives rise to knowledge, viz., *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind, could not have merely disappeared in deep sleep. It has already been said that the empirical self or *jīva* is a complex of the *antaḥkaraṇa* and the *sākṣin*, the latter being the ultimate reality *Brahman*, limited by *māyā*. This *antaḥkaraṇa* loses itself in its creator *māyā* or *avidyā* leaving the *jīva sākṣin* alone. Hence in sleep, there is no subject or the knowing self at all. No doubt individuality persists even in this state, because the self is still identified with *māyā*. Only the continuous and mutually excluding flow of the mental *vṛttis* are absent here.¹

Gauḍapāda also uses the experience of dream to prove that the waking experience is also like the dream, a creation of the mind. That the objects of the dream life are illusory cannot be denied, for in dream we see mountains and elephants which as objects cannot exist inside the mind. These objects of dream have no special existence, and hence they cannot be real. Time also has no meaning in a dream experience. Dream objects are therefore objects only for the mind.² It is said that the waking experiences of the mind, on account of their similarity, are the cause of dream experiences. If the dreams are effects and waking experiences are the causes, then the latter must have the same type of existence that the former have,

¹ *Kārika*, IV, 37.

² *Ibid.*, IV, 34-36.

viz., subjective existence.¹ It is a fact that the illusoriness of dream experience is realized as soon as a person wakes up. Similarly the whole of the waking experience is said to be the result of illusion. The common point between dream experience and waking experience is that of perception. In dream life as well as in waking life there is perceptual evidence. If one is false, the other cannot be true. Hence both are illusory. Also, that which is between two non-existences cannot be real. From the standpoint of waking life, the dream experiences being purely mental modes are not existent as external realities. They are related to the mind alone, whereas the external objects are not only related to the mind but to the sense-organs also, which as has already been stated, work with reference to two points in time.

Now a question is raised. If both the dream experience and waking experience are illusory, for whom is this illusory cognition? The ordinary individual cannot distinguish that which is due to *māyā*, for he himself is a product of *māyā*. To this objection it is answered that the cosmic self, who is responsible for this illusory creation, cognizes this also. The Advaitin disproves the realist doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika from the point of the *Vijñāna Vādin*, but he does not stop there. He posits the cosmic self or *Ātman* as the basis of all experience. The world is not an objectless and baseless imagination of the subjectivist, but it is like the illusion of the snake in the rope. No doubt the perception of the snake is mental, but it is superimposed on the object rope. So also, all mental activities are illusory, but they are superimposed on consciousness as reality.² Hence it follows that from the ultimate standpoint even mind is illusory. But empirically speaking, the *Kārikas* recognize the fact, that mind as an instrument gives rise to knowledge—whether true or false—and this mind will have to be controlled and disciplined to see that which is ultimately real.³

Śaṅkara, although he maintains that dreams are illusion and creation of *manas*, says that these are indicative of future good or bad. In other words, dreams are prophetic in nature.⁴ The things indicated in the dream may be real, while the dream itself would be illusory.

¹ M. Hiriyanna, op. cit., pp. 347-49.

² *Kārika*, II, 13.

³ Ibid., III, 41-46.

⁴ *Sūtra Bhāṣya*, op. cit. III, 2, 4.

The Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas give a different interpretation of dream. Just as memory is purely a mental act, based on some past sense experience, so also, dreams are mental experiences based on some past experience. Kaṇāda defines dream-cognition as the consciousness produced by a particular conjunction of the self with the *manas* and its subconscious impressions.¹ Commenting on this Praśastapāda says, dream cognitions arise, when negatively the senses cease to function and positively when the mind has retired ("then there come about certain mental cognisings through the sense-organs"); and these are known as dream.² The internal organ retires within itself and therefore the external organs of sense cannot function since their connection with the mind is absent. Praśastapāda says, "sleep" is a particular state of contact between the mind and the self, and in this, when the impressions of previous cognition appear, it looks as though these dream cognitions are direct sense-cognitions.³ During this retired state of the mind, although the external sense-organs are not functioning, the automatic actions such as breathing and digesting are taking place.

According to the Nyāya, dream cognitions are all memory cognitions and hence untrue. *Svapnetu sarvameva jñānam smaraṇam ayathārtham ca*.⁴ The causes for dreams according to Praśastapāda are remembered impressions or *smṛti*, organic disorders, and the influence of the past *adṛṣṭa*. All these are things which are liable to give false knowledge. Although the objects in the dream have been experienced before, that experience was in the past, and it is shown as if it were present. That is, in a dream there is false cognition of the real, because it represents that which is not present as present.

But this view of the Naiyāyika cannot be correct; for it reduces all dream cognitions to false memory. Evidently it does not take into account the fact that dream cognitions are more like perceptions than memory. The difference between dream and ordinary perception is that in dream the causal order and the uniformity that we find in waking life is not present. At best it may be said that dreams are false perceptions. Dreams are experiences which have and which leave their marks not only on the dreaming self, but also on the waking self. When a person has pleasant experiences in dreams, the emotional effects of these experiences remain even

¹ *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, op. cit., IX, 2, 6-7.

² G. Jha, *Praśastapāda Bhāṣya*, op. cit., p. 386.

³ *Ibid*, p. 386.

⁴ *Tarka Bhāṣya*, Poona edition.

after the person wakes up from the dream. This is also what modern psychologists indicate.

According to Śrīdhara dream cognitions are presentative in character. He says, "There appears, through the sense-organs, a dream cognition resembling direct sense-cognition, with regard to objects that have no real existence".¹ That is, these dream cognitions are not only direct, but also immediate, hence they are presentative in character. Udayana criticizes this representative theory of dreams² and says that in dreams we never recognize that those dream cognitions are mere reproductions, and then again we have dream cognitions of things which were never experienced before in waking life, such as our own decapitation. Not only that, we also witness our own decapitation which is normally impossible.

Praśastapāda classifies dreams into four types dependent on the causes of their origination. (1) Dreams that are caused by disorders of bodily humours (*dhātudoṣa*). Commenting on this Kiraṇāvali says, "the humours of the body are serum, flesh, fat, marrow, bone and semen; and these are called *dhātu* because they hold or support the body (*dhāraṇāt*); and when these are deranged by disorders of the wind, bile, and phlegm, then there appear certain misconceptions. To explain, a man in whose constitution wind is the predominant factor, or one in whom wind has been much disordered by some cause or other, perceives as if he were floating in the sky or running about here and there. . . ." The physiological basis of dreams is accepted by modern abnormal psychologists also.³ (2) Those which are due to strength of impressions. Again to quote Śrīdhara, "When a man is in love with a woman, or when he is angry with his enemy, and while thus thinking goes to sleep, then the series of thoughts or mental images appear by the strength of the impressions left on the mind, in the form of the direct sense-cognitions of something directly in contact with his organs of perception." These dreams are due to the stimulation of the internal sense-organ, since they are the result of excitement due to intensity of emotions. The subconscious impressions are so strong that they appear to be immediate.

A slight variation of this is suggested by Udayanācārya in his *Nyāya Kusumāñjali*.⁴ He says the subconscious impressions are

¹ G. Jha, *Nyāya Kaṇḍali*, op. cit. p. 386.

² Jadunath Sinha, op. cit.

³ Conklin, *Principles of Abnormal Psychology*.

⁴ J. Sinha, op. cit., p. 319.

revived by both extra-organic and inter-organic stimuli. (3) The third type of dreams is those which are caused by *adr̥ṣṭa* or unseen forces. These are usually prophetic in character, either auspicious or inauspicious caused by *dharma* and *adharma*. (4) Sometimes there is a dream within a dream. This state is known as *svapnāntika jñāna*, which Dr. Jha translates as a "dream-end" cognition. These are said to be recollections of dreams and as such are representative in character and belong to the field of memory or remembrance.

The important thing to be noted in the above discussion of dreams is that all dreams are the result of impressions or *vāsanās*. The strength of the suppressed impression is so great that it sets in motion the laws of perception, viz., the law of configuration, reducing to time and space. But for *manas*, where these impressions are stored, dreams would be impossible. The contact between these impressions, *manas* and self is necessary for dreams. In that state which is called the third state of existence, *susupti*, even the *manas* as an organ does not function. Just as in dreams there is no cognition through the function of the external sense-organs, so in deep sleep there will not be knowledge arising out of the internal organ, since it is quiescent during that state.

All schools of Indian philosophy, except the Cārvāka and the Mīmāṃsaka schools, believe that ordinary modes of perception do not set the limit to human cognition. The mind of man is capable of soaring up to higher levels of understanding which are not impeded by sense perceptions. But all the schools give only a description of these super-normal perceptions without explaining them. These super-normal perceptions transcend all known limits of time, space and causality; it may be impossible to explain these with the terminology of time, space and causality. The Mīmāṃsaka rejects the possibility of any such super-normal cognition, for all knowledge of the past, present and the future is to be derived from the Vedas. Sense-organs as such can only perceive sensuous objects, which are brought into contact with them and by their very nature cannot go beyond them.¹

In the original *Sūtras* of Nyāya there is no mention of super-normal perception or *alaukika pratyakṣa*. In the Navya Nyāya schools, beginning with Gaṅgeśa, there is an account of supernormal

¹ J. Sinha, op. cit., p. 336-37.

perception given. These are of three kinds: (1) *sāmānya lakṣaṇa*, (2) *jñāna lakṣaṇa*, and (3) *yogaja*.

The knowledge of a universal is said to be because of *sāmānya lakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*. While the individual is given to perception, the universal or *jāti* of the individual is also perceived along with the particular. This is not omniscience, but a knowledge of the universal nature of the particular given to perception. If this is not admitted, then a knowledge of the universals becomes impossible. Borrowing the famous criticism of Mill against enumerative induction, we might say, even according to the Indian logician, a universal can never be revealed by a mere counting of similar instances. The known and the unknown instances, all of them are perceived in their generic nature of *sāmānya lakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*. The mind is capable of perceiving not only the particular which comes within the ordinary modes of *sannikarṣa*, but also the generic nature involved here and which is beyond these ordinary modes. Merely to have a conceptual knowledge of the *jāti* is not enough to identify a particular. The universal must be perceived in the object, and also, all other objects of a similar type must be known to have that characteristic. Hence a knowledge of the universal is a supernormal cognition. Since this type of knowledge occurs only in positive instances, presented to sense-perception the question of omniscient experience arising out of this is not relevant.

Jñāna lakṣaṇa is the second type of supernormal perception accepted by the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas. When we see a thing like sandalwood and make a judgement "I see a fragrant sandalwood in the distance", the fragrance of the sandal is not given to sense contact. But a memory of past experience of fragrance, now intervenes with the sense of sight and then a perception of fragrance is also produced. In *sāmānya lakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* as well as in *jñāna lakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* the present perception works through the medium of another knowledge. In the former it is the knowledge of the universal which makes it possible to see the individual as belonging to the class; in the latter, it is past memory which leads to the perception of its object in present. These two types of supernormal cognitions are not accepted by the Advaitin, since these can be explained by different forms of inference.

There is still another type of supernormal cognition recognized by the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika known as *yogaja* or born of Yogic practices. By constant meditation on things which are super-sensible such as

the self, *ākāśa* etc., a knowledge of these can be gained by the Yogin. Also there are various degrees of perceptual capacity. A cat can see in complete darkness, whereas a vulture transcends the barriers of normal distances. Hence a human being also can attain these capacities with regard to perceptual knowledge just as gold reaches a high state of purity by constant heating; so also by constant meditation the *buddhi* of the individual which has a permanent substratum, receives better and better impressions and thus reaches the highest limit from where it can perceive things in their real nature and independent of the sense-organs. If it were not so, how can Yogis who are also living beings like us have such extraordinary capacities? ¹ Śrīdhara says that the character of being omniscient is not inconsistent with the character of being a living being. At best the concomitance between these two is only doubtful and not negative. The positive concomitance can only be proved by experience. There are two types of this Yogic experience. The first state is where the Yogin has attained supra-conscious state of meditation. At this stage, he perceives the self, the atoms, etc., most clearly, and also all that has been in the past, present and that which will be in the future. This is called perceptual knowledge, because there is neither a *vyāpti jñāna* or *hetu jñāna* involved in this. It is achieved by *manas* directly with the help of certain Yogic powers acquired by meditation and austerities. The second variety of Yogic *pratyakṣa* is that where the Yogin has conscious knowledge. He perceives objects which are too subtle for ordinary perception and those which are hidden from view. This is achieved by the fourfold contact of the self, *manas*, *indriyas* and objects. Only in this case, the *indriyas* and *manas* are sharpened by constant meditation.

The discipline of the mind and the consequent powers acquired by the mind given by the Yoga is the most famous in all Indian thought and almost all other schools accept the psychological principles given by this school of thought.

The modes of the mind have already been stated as the *kṣipta*, *mūḍha*, *vikṣipta*, *ekāgra*, and *niruddha*. Of these the first three have already been dealt with. In the fourth stage the mind is withdrawn from all objects except one which is chosen and is concentrated on. The last stage is that where even this activity of the mind is withdrawn and only the unconscious potencies are left. These two types

¹ Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakaṇḍalī*, Tr. by G. Jha, op. cit., pp. 413-15.

of trance of Yogic consciousness are called the *saṁprajñātā* and the *asaṁprajñātā samādhi*. Depending upon the objects of concentration, several extraordinary mental powers result.¹ By concentrating on the nature of time, as represented in the past, the present and the future, and also as responsible for all change, the seer comes to have a knowledge of the past and the future. He is able to see into the future as well as the past. When the mind becomes steady, it is able to move with ease into the past and the future, or to use Western terminology, to have precognition. The evidence for this precognition is growing stronger and stronger in the West day by day. The concept of time that is given by Dunne in his *An Experiment with Time*² is almost akin to what Yoga says.

Similarly the Yogin can also hear sounds produced by various animals. The organ of speech, viz., the vocal chords, produces only different sounds. The organ of hearing also can perceive only the different sounds in order. But it is the *buddhi* or understanding that grasps the word as a whole. Neither the production of sounds, nor the hearing of sounds can achieve this, for they are always unitary, occurring in succession. It is the *buddhi* which assigns a conventional meaning to these several sounds and makes them objects for consciousness. The attribution of meaning to words is that which has been handed down to man from his forefathers, and the analysis of words into syllables and sounds is a latter work of man based on his memory of the meaning of words. Words therefore convey both actions and relations as in the example given by the *Bhāṣya* on *Yoga Sūtras*; "*Svetate prāsādaḥ* (the mansion shines white) means an action; the words *svetaḥ prāsādaḥ* (a white mansion) signify a noun". That is, the words, the meaning and the idea of the sentence are distinct from each other, although due to usage, they all appear as unitary. By performing *saṁyama* on the distinction of word, meaning and idea, the Yogi becomes capable of hearing and understanding the sounds of all animals, insects, etc.

The *Yoga Bhāṣya* on III, 15, says, "Restriction and right living and subliminal impressions and mutations and vitality and movement and power and external aspects of mind-stuff excluded from sight". These are the invisible aspects of the mind and cannot be directly perceived as the conscious states. But these can be inferred that,

¹ *Yogasūtras*, op. cit., Bk. III, 16 & 17.

² Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 3rd edn. 1934, pp. 119-20.

when the Yogi brings by constant practice these subconscious phases of mental-life into the conscious focus, he becomes aware of the subliminal impressions or *saṁskāras* of other lives. One important factor to be remembered with these *saṁskāras* is that they can never be remembered apart from time and space. Just as ordinary memory is always limited and controlled by time and space, viz., an act is usually remembered not as an act by itself, but as an act which was done at a time in the past and in a particular place. Similarly even these subliminal impressions or *vāsanās* can be remembered or brought into consciousness as pertaining to a particular time and place. This is how a knowledge of previous births arises for the Yogi.

When the ideas as presented or concepts as they are formed, are meditated upon, there is cultivated a capacity for the knowledge of other minds. But the knowledge here is limited to the mental states of the other's mind and not the objects of these mental states, for the latter are not the objects of the Yogin's mind. The *bhāṣyakāra* says, "He knows the mental emotion of love, but does not know the object of love, because that which has been the object of the other man's mind has not been the object of the Yogi's mind."¹

Researches in telepathy and precognition are carried out in a scientific manner in the West today. That it is possible for the mind to get itself tuned up to receive impressions and sensations which are not ordinarily available to all is what these experiments are trying to prove. Whately Carington showed by various experiments that the capacity of the mind to know the other minds does not diminish with distance, as would be the case if it is the result of some mechanical force like wireless or radiation.²

Usually such phenomena are referred to as Extra-Sensory-Perception (E. S. P.), by Western thinkers like J. B. Rhine of Duke University, who are carrying out extensive studies in this field. The term can be applied in two ways. It may mean that this type of knowledge is the result of another extra sense not yet discovered, or it may mean that this type of perception is completely independent of sense-activities. Both these meanings cannot be applied to the Yoga views. For here, it is not the presence of another unknown sense-organ that is responsible for this knowledge, for the mind itself is

¹ *Yoga Bhāṣya*, Wood's translation, Bk. III, 19.

² *Telepathy*, Methuen, London, 1945.

considered an organ of sense, though subtle. Consequently it follows that it is due to the intense activity of this *citta* in the state of concentration that brings about a knowledge of other minds. Westerners are just now coming to realize that the ordinary sphere of activity of the mind is not exhaustive. That the mind goes beyond the present limits of time and space, if it is properly trained, is already a known fact to Indian psychologists. J. B. Rhine says, "There is but one ESP of which clairvoyance and telepathy are different manifestations".¹ He says that he has established that ESP is free from spatial dependence, and that it is similarly independent of time. But Rhine holds that these capacities of the mind are somewhat similar to some known mental functions such as creative imagination. That is because, although these are independent of space and time, they depend on the mental capacities of the individual. But the difference between these Western views of supernormal functions of the mind and the Yogic views lies in two very important aspects. As already stated, the knowledge of the mind of the other person is limited only to his mental states and not to the objects of his mental states is the view of the Yoga, whereas time and again, the nature of the experiments carried out in telepathy in the West has been to find out if the objects seen by one person are reported exactly by the person having telepathy. For instance Carington says, "some subjects . . . appear to pick up an impression of the linear form of the original without succeeding in interpreting it directly. For example, one of the originals in my sixth experiment was a bow tie, and I was for a long time puzzled by a striking and highly significant crop of hour-glasses in the drawings of these subjects, till it occurred to me that these were almost certainly misinterpreted bows."² Whether it is an unconscious sympathy established between the two minds or not, it is definitely assumed that in telepathy the object presented to the other mind is also cognized.

Probably this may be explained on the basis that every cognition leaves its mark on the mind. So in perceiving the states of the mind, these subliminal impressions are also perceived, hence a knowledge of the object may arise. While the Westerner says these capacities are to be found in just sporadic chance specimens of humanity, the Yoga says every man can attain these capacities provided he

¹ J. B. Rhine, *The Reach of the Mind*, Faber and Faber, London, 1948, p. 46.

² Carington, op. cit., p. 66.

undergoes certain discipline and practises dispassion. Dr. J. B. Rhine says, "They are too erratic, unstable, and unpredictable"¹ to be depended upon. The Yoga holds that every individual, if he wishes to have real knowledge which will give him salvation, must undergo the Yogic practices of suppressing the *kleśa vṛttis* and attaining that stage when the mind ceases to have any contents including itself. In the course of this mental development such supernormal powers result for the mind, but these also are to be thrown aside as distracting the aspirant.

There is still another point of difference between the Western view of mind during these mental states and the Yoga view. According to the former, there is a suggested dissociation of mental faculties during telepathic activity. For example, all cases where the person has telepathy are either hypnotic states or voluntary trance states. But according to Yoga, the mind is made more integral, more whole by these experiences. These are not hallucinatory or dream experiences, but the conscious effort of the Yogi to concentrate and acquire genuine knowledge. These experiences do not weaken the personality, but on the other hand, since they are governed by subtle mental laws, it leaves the mind and the personality of the individual stronger than before.

By concentrating on the form of the body, the body can be made to disappear. The body is an object of perception through the sense of sight because it has colour residing in form. When *saṁyama* takes place with reference to the form of the body, then the power of being known, dependent on form, disappears. Then the sensation of colour being born of the eye due to the form also ceases to function. Then the body becomes imperceptible.

Karma is said to be of two types: that which fructifies fast and that which takes a longer time to fructify. By performing *saṁyama* on these, the seer knows when the *karma* ceases to be or when bodily death will occur. He often sees in his mind the signs of approaching death also. These indications are threefold.

(1) On closing the eyes and ear, he does not hear the inner sounds or have the inner sight.

(2) When one sees unexpectedly the departed forefathers or messengers of the Lord of Death.

¹ Op. cit., p. 108.

(3) When even the ordinary things of life appear as if they are heavenly. When these signs occur, the Yogi knows that death is near.

By successive concentration on qualities of friendship, sympathy, etc., the Yogi achieves powers over them and can make others have these qualities at will. Similarly by concentrating on the physical strength of the elephant, the flying capacity of the eagle, he acquires these capacities. In other words the highest in every type of activity is gained by concentrating on that type of activity. *Yoga Sūtra* 32 says that all knowledge as described above is gained by the Yogi due to *pratibhā* (prescience). "When *saṁyama* is performed with the object of attaining the highest intellection, then at the time of the height of practice, there takes its rise a power which, as it were, draws in all knowledge."¹

By concentrating on the seat of the mind, namely the heart, a knowledge of the mind is attained, and by *saṁyama* on his own self as object, knowledge of the *puruṣa* arises.

There are several other supernormal powers arising in the Yogi, such as the power of being still without breathing or hibernation, the mind entering another body at will, attaining a state when the body becomes light as cotton, bright as flames, mastery over the elements, or not being affected by them in any way, and finally beauty, grace, and strength are attained by the body. To quote the *Bhāṣya*,² "Supremacy over all states of being comes to him who, having the essence of the will-to-be, in the highest state of purity on account of the impurities of *rajas* and the *tamas* having been destroyed, and when the consciousness of power is at the highest, takes his stand at the manifestation of the distinction between the objective essence and consciousness (*Puruṣa*)."

All these powers mentioned above are in the nature of obstacles to trance, if the mind is allowed to dwell on them. But even here, if the mind is controlled, it leads to the realization of *kaivalya* for the individual.

So, the object which is not metaphysically real is to be taken as an existent for epistemological reasons. Such an object is given for perception in its universal aspect under which the particular knowledge is subsumed. The existence of the object at the empirical and illusory level of our experiences cannot be questioned, as there

¹ *Vārtika* on *Sūtra* 32.

² On Bk. III, 48.

must be some substratum for these. At the same time, these experiences cannot be classified as unreal. These have only relative reality. Just as illusory knowledge which appears to be real till sublation at empirical level takes place so also empirical knowledge is also sublated and proved to be illusory when transcendental knowledge is realized. Knowledge by itself is self-valid, only error is imposed on it due to ignorance. Dreams which are caused by the activity of the mind alone seem to be real but only as long as the dream lasts. The consciousness of dream is not invalid, but the dream objects and experiences are sublatale, hence cannot be permanently real.

All these ways in which the mind works are but hindrances to the control of the mind. The Yogi who by constant practice and developing an attitude of passionlessness attains certain mental and physical powers is always facing the danger of forgetting the goal of his search in the power given by the extraordinary capacities. Each and every mind is capable of attaining these powers, provided the correct ways and means are adopted to attain these. But these are still not the final goal, but must be transcended to reach that goal where mind along with all its objects and activities vanishes, leaving the self alone in its knowledge that nothing else is real.

CHAPTER IV

DISCIPLINE OF THE MIND

THE Yoga system, while accepting the Sāṃkhya theory of liberation, lays emphasis on the means for the achievement of liberation, which is the suppression or destruction of all mental activities. All the outer layers of mental functions are sought to be removed in an effort to reach the inner core, which in its turn leads to liberation of the spirit. The five stages of the mind already referred to in the last chapter involve concentration. But concentration, of whatever degree, is impossible unless the mind is disciplined. To be able to redirect our consciousness, then, would require a more strenuous discipline. This, the Yogic thinker says, is possible only when there is *vairāgya* or dispassion. This can only be achieved by *abhyāsa* or practice. Vijñāna Bhikṣu says that by *abhyāsa* is meant the "endeavour to fix the mind" and this "fixing" is the final stage of meditation and consists in a stream of unmoved concentration. The endeavour for concentration consists in the bringing back of the mind to the object of meditation whenever it happens to stray away from it.¹

Dispassion or *Vairāgya* may be said to be the negative aspect of practice or *abhyāsa*. It is not a mere negation of attachment, but it is the development of a sense of "enough" towards all attachment. It is not merely absence of desire, for then there is no merit in such desirelessness, since a man has no desire for things which he has not experienced or which are beyond his experience. It is knowing an object as unworthy of desire that is truly *vairāgya*. To say that one does not desire a thing although one has not experienced it is a contradiction, because desire is the result of experience, and when this is controlled or removed *vairāgya* results. This controlling of desire is not an easy achievement for ordinary man. It becomes

¹ Vijñāna Bhikṣu's *Yogasāra Saṃgraha*, Tr. by G. Jha, Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, 1933, pp. 50-51. Also refer to *Gītā*, VI, 4. "One is said to be a Yogā-rūda when he does not become attached either to any action or to any object of sense and when he has given up all desire (properly, expectation of advantage from an act)."

possible only when the person cultivates *śraddhā* or faith, which frees the mind from all doubts. "Belief is the mental approval (of concentration); for like a good mother, it protects the Yogin" (*Vyāsa Bhāṣya* I, 20). This is positive faith of the mind which helps in attaining *vairāgya*.

Vairāgya is of two types, superior (*para*) and inferior (*apara*). The *apara vairāgya* is caused by the knowledge that all perceptible objects, such as food, drink, power, women, are vitiated by defects. Even heavenly objects such as the attainment of *videha* etc., are not perfect. Regarding these latter objects of knowledge, it is questioned, how a dispassion to objects not yet experienced can arise. It is answered that what is experienced here is indifference towards these objects and not desirelessness. There is a "consciousness of supremacy" which is free from attachment and aversion. The troubles that attend upon desire for objects are listed by Vijñāna Bhikṣu as the yearning for them, guarding them, pain consequent on their loss, slaughter of animals and other such things for the sake of gaining enjoyment of the desired objects. Intellectual illumination consists in the recognition of the fact that these are causes for pain and that these causes are removable. There are four stages for their removal mentioned in the *Vārtika*.

(1) *Yatamāna*. Where the objects of sense are discovered to be defective and the mind recoils from them.

(2) *Vyatireka*. Where there is discriminative ascertainment of the senses which are yet to be conquered.

(3) *Ekendriya*. Having the senses conquered, there is no possibility for them to go out to things, since all desire is destroyed, the taints persist in the internal organ. All attachment to even mental passions, such as getting honour and being involved in dishonour is sought to be removed at this stage.

(4) *Vaśikāra*. Here the individual perceives the futility of all attractions whether they be mental or physical and no attachment whatever remains.

The next type of *vairāgya* mentioned is the *para vairāgya*. This is "identical with the rise of the final *prajñā* leading to absolute independence".¹ During this stage discrimination between the qualities and the self arises. Once knowledge is gained that the qualities are

¹ Das Gupta, *Study of Patāñjali*, The University of Calcutta, 1920, p. 132.

different from the *Puruṣa*, then liberation of the *Puruṣa* from bondage is the automatic result.

Here a question is raised, viz., the processes of *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya* described above can only remove *saṁskāras*. There is still left the *vāsanā* or the *saṁskāras* of previous births to be removed, for otherwise there can be no discriminative knowledge for the self. Unless these *vāsanās* are also removed, the *Puruṣa* cannot attain isolation from *prakṛti*. What are so achieved by practice and passionlessness (*abhyāsa* and *vairāgya*) are said to be two types of trance: the first one being the cognitive trance (*samprajñatā samādhi*) and the other being that which is characterized only by residual potencies and which is known as *asamprajñatā samādhi*. These two types of trances are meditative states of the mind. The *samprajñatā* or cognitive trance is accompanied by *vitarka* (philosophical curiosity or deliberation), *vicāra* (meditation or reflection), *ānanda* (elation or joy), and *asmitā* (egoism or sense of personality).

Vitarka is explained by Vācaspati as that where the mind has direct experience (*ābhoga*) or perception of an object. This is a superficial phenomenon, for the object of such a perception is a gross object and what is learned is the nature of the external objects as made up of the *mahābhūtas*. Just as a beginner in archery, so the *vārtika* says, first aims at large objects and then at finer ones, so also the aspirant after first knowing the nature of gross objects begins to concentrate on subtle objects. This second state is the state of *vicāra* or meditation. Those which are the causes of gross elements, viz., the subtle elements, are now the objects of concentration. But all these are objects which are known externally. The processes which are to be known internally and which make knowledge of external objects possible are *ānanda* and *asmitā*. The sensations and the sense-organs arise out of the sense of personality (*ahamkāra*) and are as such made up of *sattva*. *Sattva* gives happiness. Hence all sense-organ activities give pleasure, and again they are capable of illumination because of their *sāttvika* predominance. But they have for their objects gross matter; hence, the sense-organs can only provide a gross form of enjoyment. These organs of sense have the sense-of-personality or *asmitā* as their cause. Egoism is the consciousness of being one with the self. The knower is submerged in this "I"-ness, and hence, at this stage, there is concentration on the knower of these objects. In all these four forms, there is cognition present and the cognitive forms are

the causes of this knowledge. "Cognitive trance consists in the assumption by the mental Essence of the forms of the knower, the knowable, and the act of knowledge, and the consequent showing of itself in the shape of the phenomenon which has entered therein."¹ This is illustrated in the *sūtra* 42. What vitiates ordinary knowledge and makes it always a source of pain is the fact that it is based on *vikalpa* or predicate-relation, as already explained. Thus a cow will not only have a name and form, but also it gives rise to an idea in the mind, but in the process of knowing these are not distinguished. By meditation and concentration, all conceptual notions of time, space, etc. are removed and the mind becomes fixed on any one of these things.

At this stage, an epistemological question is raised by the Yoga thinker. What is presented to perception is a gross object, having its predicate-relation in the form of an idea, which idea is the result of inference from the seen form. According to the Sāṃkhya ontology, the objects are made up of units, which are collected together into a manifold, each group having a different form and name.² Granting that these atomic units are real it follows that each one of them has a predicate-relation in the form of an idea inferred from a given form. If this were so, then either the form of the gross object that is perceived must be the same as that of the composing atoms or different. If it were not different, the object would be as subtle as the atomic units, and if it is different, it cannot be made up of those units and have them as their substrate. In answer to this Vācaspati cites the theory of identity-in-difference. In so far as the object is identical with its cause, it has the form of the cause. And it has different characteristics inasmuch as it serves the business of life. The whole objection is an argument against the Buddhist doctrine which denies grossness to bodies. Also it reminds one of the position of Kant. The thing-in-itself is the basis for all knowledge. All determinate knowledge depends upon the mental categories. So here, the atoms are the basic reals. When perception of gross forms is present, such a perception is the result of *vikalpa* whose function, as already stated, is the establishing of relations between substance and qualities. Perception of the pure atoms, devoid of their characteristics as wholes is given

¹ *Yoga Vārtika* on *sūtra* 41, Sacred Books of the Hindus Series, Vol. IV, 1924.

² *Yoga Sūtras*, I, 43.

only to the Yogi at a certain level of attainment of concentration.

When this stage of cognitive trance is reached by the Yogi, he acquires newer and newer *samskaras* which, because they are the opposite of those mental *vyttis* which tend to distract the mind, are themselves helpful in concentration. But even these are mental *vyttis*. In the final stage the roots of all residual potencies must be cut off. All the modifications of the *citta* cease from action. The mind having no object for its activity becomes, as it were, non-existent. As the potencies of the *samprajñatā* state become weaker and weaker, those of the *nirodha* state become more and more stable, till that stage is reached when the *citta* having nothing more to do ceases to function altogether. At this stage the Yogi knows the nature of *Puruṣa* as being pure consciousness, not contaminated by the bonds of *prakṛti*.

So far all that has been discussed is the theory of achieving the trance states. There are certain practical accessories which are of help in attaining discriminative knowledge. These are known as *yogāṅgas*. These are the causes which produce discriminative knowledge. A cause, whether it be mental or physical has nine functions. In the *Yoga Vārtika*¹ are listed the ways in which the mind works as a cause. "A cause is said to operate in nine ways—as the cause of birth, of preservation, of manifestation, of modification, of sequential cognitions, of attainment, of separation, of differentiation, of upholding."

(1) The mind is the cause of knowledge, because it gives birth to knowledge.

(2) The objects of the *Puruṣa* are the sustaining cause for the mind. Being born of *ahamkāra*, *manas* is preserved as long as the *Puruṣa* does not realize his entanglement in *prakṛti*.

(3) The objects are placed under different conditions and the mind is the cause of knowledge of the different conditions under which the objects exist, e.g., different colours.

(4) The *vyttis* of the mind change because of the changes in the objects that are presented to the mind. If the mind is not capable of having different *vyttis* based on sense-perception, there may not be as much of distractions for the self.

(5) Mind is the cause of understanding of sequence. Because of ideas in the mind of sequence and causation, we find sequence and

¹ On Bk. II, 28, Sacred Books of the Hindus, op. cit.

causation in the outer world also. 6, 7, 8 and 9 are the functions of the mind where it acts as the cause of attainment of discriminative knowledge, by separating the impurities and differentiating between the different forms of the same thing. The knowledge in the minds of the wise becomes the cause for the idea so that finally there is nothing that is purely pleasurable or painful. Lastly it is the cause of the sustaining of the body.

Hence to control such a mind, the Yoga system gives the *Yogāṅgas*. These are eight in number as described below.

(1) *Yama* (restraint). There are five *yamas*: *ahimsā* (abstinence from injury), *satya* (veracity), *asteya* (abstinence from theft), *brahmacharya* (continence), and *aparigraha* (abstinence from avarice). The word *yama* is variously translated as restraint or abstinence. Of these restraints *ahimsā* ranks highest. As the *Bhāṣya* says, "The restraints and observances that follow have their origin in it. They are meant to achieve it. They are taught with the object of teaching it."¹ It is defined thus: "Abstinence from injury is the not causing of pain to any living creature in any way at any time." In other words, it demands a spirit of friendliness towards all creatures. It is a universal duty which every one must cultivate. The mind is made to forget all hatred, selfishness, jealousy which often result in injury to others. So the first step in mental discipline is the cultivation of the spirit of friendliness.

Satyam or veracity is the conformity of word and thought to facts. The other *yamas* are all meant to discipline the mind and body and set it in a state of equanimity and control.

(2) *Niyamas* are observances which have the purpose of cleaning the body and mind of obstructions. These are *śauca* (cleanliness), *santoṣa* (contentment), *tapas* (purificatory actions), *svādhyāya* (study), and *Īśvara-praṇidhāna* (devotion to God). All these are meant to produce in the mind of the individual a state of balance which is necessary for the condition of trance.

(3) *Āsana* and (4) *prāṇāyāma* are the control of the body and breath so that they may not distract the mind, and thus the mind is made fit for concentration.

(5) *Pratyāhāra* is the abstraction of the *citta* from all objects which are contracted by means of the senses. Since the mind is

¹ Bk. II, 30.

restrained with reference to knowledge of external objects, the senses have no work to do.

(6) The most important aspect of these *yogāṅgas* is concentration or *dhāraṇā*. "Concentration is the steadfastness of the mind." This is usually done by concentrating the mind on an external object. It is a well-known fact that pure abstraction or vacuity cannot be produced in the mind at one step. The nature of the mind or *citta* is always to flow out in the form of its *ṛttis*. Instead of allowing the *citta* to flow in very many directions, it is always better to concentrate it on only one thing at a time.

(7) This gradually leads to the next stage of meditation. This is the unchanging flow of mental effort to understand the nature of the object of concentration. This is *dhyaṇa*; when once the nature of an object is realized, the mind ceases to have any more functions, for it has learnt the nature of reality and this results in the final stage of *samādhi*.

(8) *Samādhi*. In this stage, the differences of the knower, the known and the processes of knowledge, all vanish. Self-cognition becomes nil. The *citta* takes on the form of the object completely and every other type of knowledge is forgotten.

Of these *yogāṅgas*, *dhāraṇā*, *dhyaṇa*, and *samādhi* are mental aspects of control. After first controlling the body by the foregoing forms beginning with *yama*, the individual aspirant begins to control his mind by these methods. These three together are called technically *saṁnyama*. *Saṁnyama* is applicable at all stages of life. When once the lower stage is conquered, it is applied to the higher stage of meditation. It is a means up to the cognitive trance stage, where the *ṛttis* of the *citta* become one-pointed or *ekāgra*. But in the *nirbīja samādhi* or higher cognitive trance, even this *saṁnyama* ceases to be, because this stage of experience comes into existence only after the cessation of even *citta*, not to speak of *citta ṛttis*.

The *Yoga Bhāṣya* says, "All-pointedness is a characteristic of the mind. One-pointedness is also a characteristic of mind. The destruction of all-pointedness is its disappearance. The rise of one-pointedness is its appearance. The mind puts on both these characteristics. This mind then following along both these characteristics of destruction and manifestation which make its very nature, inclines towards contemplation.¹" This means that the mind has these two as its

¹ *Bhāṣya* on III, 11.

qualities. When these two aspects, viz., the quiescent and the up-risen, become similar or identical, then the mind reaches the stage of concentration. This position of the Yoga thinker involves him in a discussion of the nature of time and how change is to be explained in terms of the three aspects of time, the past, the present and the future. The last sentence of the *Bhāṣya* sums up the whole lengthy discussion and says, "(mutation) is the rise of another external aspect in a permanent matter, after an earlier external aspect has been repressed".¹ Applying this to *citta vṛttis*, the changing ideas which are externally cognizable are based on the *saṁskāras* which are the permanent aspects of the mind. The ideas change due to time and space, but the *saṁskāras* constitute the latent basis. When the outgoing external aspects of the *saṁskāras* are controlled by the *yogāṅgas*, only the *saṁskāras* in the form of one object remain. When these *saṁskāras* are also rooted out, the *citta* becomes purely *sāttvika*, its original state, and the *puruṣa* realizes his real nature and purity.

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga system is a frank dualism of *Puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Hence the means to attain perfection are limited by this dual aspect. Mind as a material entity is the product of *prakṛti* and cannot be completely dissolved. The *citta vṛttis* which are the result of the interaction between *Puruṣa* and *prakṛti* can be destroyed in the process of disentangling *Puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. This is done both by physical as well as mental control. Making use of the mind itself, the processes of the mind are destroyed.

This idea is more clearly seen in the Advaitic conception of *mokṣa* and the means to release. To the Advaitin the nature of ultimate reality is one. But this reality cannot be grasped by intellectual means for, if it were to be so grasped, it becomes limited. The self that is ultimately the real cannot be particularized within finite intellectual limits. *Māyā*, the principle of nescience not only has the capacity to veil the nature of ultimate reality, but also shows up the unreal as the real. When this is understood, then there can be no more *saṁsāra*. "Since ignorance is the cause of bondage, the removal thereof is the means to release." But the absolute is seen to be bound from the standpoint of the appearance. For itself, there is neither bondage, nor release. "All that is required is the removal of ignorance through knowledge."²

¹ *Bhāṣya* on III, 13.

² T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Gauḍapāda*, University of Madras, Second edn. 1954, p. 166.

Gauḍapāda prescribes a course of discipline for the aspirant to discriminative knowledge and calls it *asparśa-yoga*. "*Sparśa* means touch; and as transferred epithet it stands here for the sensibilia. '*Asparśa*' which is the negative of '*sparśa*' would then mean the super-sensible or metaphysical reality. Śaṅkara says that the *asparśa-yoga* is so called because it is devoid of *sparśa*, a term which indicates all relations."¹

The goal of this Yoga is the same as that given by Patanjali, viz., to control the ever-flowing current of mental psychosis and induce gradually a state of mindlessness. To the Advaitin, *antaḥkaraṇa* is a name which refers collectively to the various mental modes. When these mental modes are destroyed, the mind itself becomes non-existent. When the desires, and longings are removed, the mind becomes atrophied for the very lack of activity. This is the state of *amanibhāva* or *amanasā*.² The external and internal forms of control envisaged by the *Yoga Sūtras* are also accepted by the Advaitin as a means to reach the end in view.

The obstacles that have to be conquered are listed in the *Vedānta Sāra* of Śaḍānanda. They are *laya* (lapse), *vikṣepa* (distraction), *kaṣāya* (passion) and *rasāsvāda* (satisfaction).³ *Laya* is the state when the mind lapses into sleep, failing to rest on the absolute. When this occurs, the mind must be roused from sleep and made active. Sleep is not the end, since it is the result of inertia caused by tiresomeness. The mind does not become non-existent here, only it is inactive. Even within our ordinary experience this happens. When there is need for intense concentration, the mind plays truant and lapses into sleep. It must be brought back and made to concentrate, just as it is brought back from wandering to the external sensations. *Vikṣepa* or distraction is the normal state of the mind. The mind, not being capable of concentrating on the impartite absolute, slides back into its normal activities, such as being attracted to the objects of sense. Mind takes the forms of psychosis and thinks that the objects so known are those which give real enjoyment. The Yogin must withdraw the mind from these, because these lead only to sorrow and suffering and never to peace. His purpose must be to bring all mental psychoses under one form—the form

¹ Ibid., pp. 174-75.

² *Gauḍapāda Kārika*, 31-32.

³ Śaḍānanda's *Vedāntasāra*, Tr. by Swami Nikhilananda, Advaita Ashrama, Almora, 1931, verses 209-14, pp. 119-21.

which shows that all these are nescience—born, and hence not real. But this is not easily done. Age-long practice of indulging in affections and aversions (*rāga* and *dveṣa*), the environmental influences, physical and physiological, all make it impossible for the mind to be moved away from these polaric activities. If one were to believe absolutely in Freudian thought, the very basis of existence as an individual being is to be sought in these polarities of love and hate, desire and aversion, life and death. But the Yogic conception of the goal of man's endeavour rises above these dualities. However deep-rooted may be the tendencies of the human nature, these must be conquered and equanimity must be achieved, if man is to realize his true nature. "These attitudes of pleasure and pain are determined by the force of habit. There is no obligation to be pleased with success and pained at failure. We can meet them with a perfect equanimity. . . . When the mind becomes free and disinterested and sinks into that secret serenity, when its consciousness becomes illumined, it gladly accepts whatever happens, knowing full well that these contacts come and go and are not itself, though they happen to it."¹ But the very fact that these tendencies have been functioning for a long time makes them a considerable obstruction to concentration and the attainment of equanimity. *Kaṣāya* or passion is that stage when the mind is not pliant and is unbendable. It becomes insensitive to all exhortations and it becomes difficult to bring the mind back to a state of pliability and achieve concentration.

Even now, there are dangers. The Yogic trance so induced gives rise to several supernormal perceptions which may prove to be the downfall of the Yogin. This danger is the *rasāsvāda* which the mind, having tasted the quietness and calmness of the *saṁkalpaka samādhi*, refuses to get out of. But even this experience is still an experience of duality. Hence it is not the true *nirvikalpaka samādhi*. When this stage of *nirvikalpaka samādhi* is reached, the triple forms of the knower, known and the process of knowing are all resolved. There is no mind here, nor speech. It is beyond all thought and hence indescribable.²

According to the Advaitin, the organs of perception, including *manas* are all creations of *ajñāna*. When the pure self is limited by

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *The Bhagavad Gītā*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1948, p. 105.

² *Gauḍapāda Kārika*, Swami Nikhilananda's translation, Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1936, III, pp. 37-38.

māyā, the individuality of the *jīva* appears. There are two distinct elements in the self, i.e., the self as consciousness, and the mind or *antaḥkaraṇa* which perceives the external and internal objects. The former is the unchangeable constant witness self, the latter is the changeable, unreal part. Release or *mokṣa* is possible only when the knowledge of the unreality of all empirical things, including mind, arises in the self. All forms of bodily control and mental concentration lead only to the attainment of this knowledge. They are not the ultimate means to release, but only subsidiary or secondary means. But with reference to Advaita, it is futile even to talk of a *means* to release. For release or *mokṣa* is not something that is to come yet in the future. It is already there, only it is veiled by *māyā*. The veil has to be torn asunder, if there is to be real knowledge. Hence while *jñāna* leads to this realization, all other means only lead up to it. Withdrawing the mind from external and internal objects and attaining *samādhi*, all bring about the rise of the knowledge.¹ When this true knowledge arises, even mind has no place to exist, for mind involves the knowledge relations between "this" and "that", and these have no meaning in the final experience of oneness.

In such an intuitive state of *nirvākalpa samādhi*, even the difference between knowledge and the object of knowledge vanishes. The whole process of mental discipline resulting in such a *samādhi*, only makes it clear that intellectual certitude is a necessary preliminary to the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. But the certitude is given in experience and not as a result of intellectual arguments. In most of the treatises on Advaita, a question is raised—which is directly the instrument of release? Is it *karma* or activity that is responsible for release or *mokṣa*, or is it knowledge that is solely responsible? The question itself arises because it is wrongly said that "Brahman is attained". This is only a figurative way of saying. Release has neither beginning nor end. If there is a beginning, then it must have an end also. If it has an end, it cannot be release. Therefore release is the natural state of the self. When the self knows its real nature, release is obtained, *as it were*.

If Brahman-knowledge is born out of deep, attributeless meditation, then it is said that that knowledge being the result of a *pramāṇa* (deep meditation) must be a valid *pramāṇa*. But the enumeration of

¹ *Sūtra Bhāṣya of Saṃkara*, op. cit., III, 4, 27.

pramāṇas does not include this particular means. To this the Advaitin says in reply that, although this is not recognized as a *pramāṇa*, still validity can be ascribed to the Brahman-knowledge, for this meditation is based on the previous understanding of the identity of the self and Brahman.

There is also the other theory that mind or the *antaḥkaraṇa* is the instrument of the intuition of Brahman. The knowledge that is Brahman, is immediate knowledge. The Bhāmati School holds that sense-organs alone are capable of giving rise to immediate knowledge and hence mind which is the *karaṇa* for Brahman-knowledge is also a sense-organ. Contact with the object gives rise to knowledge and this is what happens when the mind through contemplation envisages the absolute. But the Vivaraṇa school of Advaita does not accept this, but says that Brahman-knowledge arises directly from Śruti texts such as "that thou art". Whatever the superiority of the intuition gained through mind be, it is yet not free from the distinctions of knower and known. What appears here is a conditioned mode of cognition and the content of such a cognition must itself be conditioned. If this is so, then there can be no knowledge of the unconditioned absolute—so argues the Vivaraṇakāra against mind being the instrument of highest knowledge. To sum up the two positions, "so long as one looks for what is apprehended in knowledge, even the highest knowledge can give only the conditioned Brahman, since we continue to look for what can enter into the knowledge relation; but when we seek what is to be realised through knowledge, as the fulfilment of knowledge through its transcendence in the infinite, impartite experience, what is thus known is the pure Brahman. . . . But in any case the path to release is in and through knowledge; no other path exists."¹

In the *Pañcadaśī*, Bharatitīrtha tells us that there are two paths for the attainment of release, Sāṃkhya and Yoga. The path of Sāṃkhya is that of knowledge and enquiry into the meaning of the Vedas. But all people do not possess the high intelligence necessary for grasping the purport of the Vedas. There are dull-witted people for whom the path of Yoga or concentration is advocated. Of these two, the path of Sāṃkhya is the right path, whereas the path of the Yoga is secondary, being capable of yielding results only on the

¹ Introduction to the *Siddhānta leśa saṃgraha* of Appayya Dīkṣita, Tr. by S. S. Sastri, University of Madras Publication 1935, p. 64.

trial and error method. Contemplation has been compared to the *saṁvādhībhrama* or a delusion which leads to fruitful results. Mistaking steam for smoke, one infers the existence of fire. On verification, he finds there is actually fire existing. So from illusory causes one is led to real existences. The fruitful result does not make his inference valid although it serves the purpose. Similarly the man who starts on the path of Yoga has no knowledge of Brahman in the beginning. He starts in ignorance, each step luring him on to the next, and he may end in the achievement of the result. It may be questioned here, how is contemplation possible for the person who is ignorant of the object of contemplation? To this it may be replied that the Yogin is not completely ignorant of Brahman. He has mediate knowledge of the identity of the self and Brahman gathered through studies of Vedānta. So he begins to concentrate on the attributeless Brahman and thus starts his Yoga.

But then, is it possible for the human mind to contemplate on something which has no attributes? In answer to this question, we should understand exactly what is meant by "attributeless" or *nirguṇa*. To suppose that because Brahman is indefinable and unknowable it is beyond the reach of words, would be to deprive the Upaniṣads of their purpose. Granting that Brahman can be defined only negatively it does not mean that it is a blank, since all negation is meaningful only because of its positive implication. Brahman may not be grasped as an object of knowledge, but this knowledge of Brahman is being it. This type of experience is not strange to us. There are rare moments in every individual's life when one transcends oneself and even the experience of so transcending is not cognized.

The purpose of concentration is to remove all possible obstacles put up by the mind and the body in the path of realization. The goal of man's endeavour is to discover his real nature and attain it. This becomes possible only when the trammels of externality imposed on him by body and mind are seen and known to be what they are. This can be achieved only by concentration. The intellect must be sharpened and refined, and whatever drags the mind to the senses and makes it waver from its purpose must first be eliminated. When an attitude of renunciation is developed and when the senses are conquered, the mind is free to concentrate on the nature of the self. But even here, the dangers are not yet over. In the efforts of making the mind refined, the nature of mind as *sāttvika* develops.

Supernormal powers which are not manifest at the normal level of experience, because of the trammels of the physical body now become manifest and lure the person away from his legitimate efforts. But the real Yogin is not tempted by this, for the quieting peace attained in the *samādhi* state is infinitely more attractive than these supernormal powers. Knowledge of the self, which is the fruit of both Sāṃkhya and Yoga paths, must be attained by every seeker. The mind is only an instrument which can guide the self to a certain experience, which experience deletes all other things excepting itself. Mind destroys itself when the fruit of its search is attained.

CHAPTER V

A COMPARATIVE ESTIMATE

A STUDY of the Indian concept of mind will not be complete unless it is viewed in the light of the Western concept. The functions of mind are common whether it be for the Easterner or the Westerner, but an interpretation of these functions to mean what mind is, has been different not only between the East and the West, but also as between different types of philosophies. The bias of the Indian philosopher has been towards the self as the basic principle, for which everything else exists and acts, and mind is not an exception to the rule. The Western thinker, on the other hand, very rarely sees any difference between the mind and the self, or he is not prepared to give any ontological status to self as an independent existent. The non-recognition of the self makes the problem of body-mind relation easy in a way, for all that he has to think of is whether mind itself has an existence apart from its functions, which are mostly reducible to events in terms of physiology.

Mind is *psyche* and the study of mind is psychology—i.e., mind is soul or consciousness. Knowledge which is the province of mind is impossible unless there is consciousness: so it follows that whatever is mental, is consciousness. The self and the mind are identical. "When we speak of mind we mean above everything else consciousness."¹ "I mean then by mind a consciousness of which I am aware in myself."² "Consciousness appears to us as a sensory organ which perceives a content proceeding from another source."³ "A distinction has been made, chiefly by theologians, between mind, soul and spirit, but this distinction has been avoided by most philosophers and 'mind' used to cover the whole of man's inner nature and not merely his intellectual side."⁴ These are some of the statements of

¹ Bergson, *Mind Energy*, Tr. by H. Wildon Carr, Macmillan & Co., London 1920, p. 5.

² A. H. B. Allen, *Mind*, July 1952.

³ Freud, *Interpretation of Dreams*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, Chap. 4.

⁴ A. C. Ewing, *The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy*, Rutledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, p. 102.

Western thinkers testifying to the fact that for them mind and self are identical. The various schools of psychology and epistemology, specially the recent psychophysical discussions of mind evoked by Prof. G. Ryle's book *Concept of Mind*, all point in the same direction.

The problem of the status of mind in the scheme of the body, mind and soul is sought to be solved by identifying mind with consciousness or soul and sometimes both, in turn with matter. To explain "I" it is said to be equal to "mind", to explain "mind" it is said to be equal to "body", or even a lesser subdivision of the body, the "brain". There seems to be a confusion of terminology here. When mind is used as an equivalent of the "I" it means the conscious self, the knower, the one which has memory and recollection and the capacity to perceive, as its characteristics. Then logically it follows that such a mind cannot in its turn be the equivalent of matter or "brain". When epistemological problems arise it is termed consciousness, and when psychological problems arise it becomes equivalent to "brain". When mind is used as an equivalent of matter or "brain" it is given the connotation of that which has reflex activities and which is almost identical with glandular and other physiological activities. On the face of it, these two meanings of the word "mind" cannot be identical nor can they refer to the same object. Probably it is this confusion of terminology which has made certain thinkers to relegate mind to the limbo of oblivion and maintain that what is commonly called mind is nothing else but certain dispositions. This is discussed later.

Very often the difficulty of accepting a self that is not mind arises because there is no way of knowing the self separately, apart from the functions of the mind. "The notion of a pure ego or any substance over and above its qualities could not be defined in terms of anything else, so how can I know at all what it is like, how can I attach any meaning to statements about it?"¹ This question of A. C. Ewing is typical of the difficulty experienced by Western philosophers to give a separate status to the self.

To the Indian philosopher, if the self is not recognized to be an existent, separate from all the other functions, as the knower of knowledge and the enjoyer of experience, there can be no philosophy at all. The purpose of the Upaniṣads, which are the primary philosophical treatises, is to reveal the nature of the supreme self.

¹ A. C. Ewing, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

A distinct warning is sounded to the seeker after truth, not to be carried away by *manas* and its attributes, but to try to know the thinker (*mantr*).¹

If there is such a self how are we to know it? It is not enough if it is merely postulated and authority is shown to support it. There must be some way by which we can gain certain knowledge of the continuity of the self. The identity of such a self has to be established, and it must be shown whether the self is merely functional or something else. That our experience from day to day reveals an identity behind it cannot be denied, for to do so would be to fly in the face of facts. Then, is this identity only a functional identity? A. C. Ewing is strongly of the opinion that it can be only a functional identity.² He says that all the arguments that can be advanced to support the idea that the self is an absolute identity apart from its functions are all derived from its functions and reveal only its functions. Hence it is illogical to assume, asserts Prof. Ewing, something over and above its functions. This is not true. For a function is an activity, and activity is always to attain some object or end. Activity takes place also through some agent. A functional identity means that something always acts in the same manner to get the same ends. The sense-organ of sight may be said to have a functional unity for it always produces the visual perception. This does not mean that the act of seeing or perceiving is the same in all cases, since the objects perceived and the mode of perception are different in each case. Still there is a functional identity, because the purpose is the same in different actions, viz., knowledge for the self. This means that functional identity is possible only for things which are means to an end. The self is never a means to an end, but always an end in itself. The identity of the self, therefore, cannot be reduced to a functional identity, for then that would mean the self is a means for something else which uses it as an instrument. This will lead us to an infinite regress. Hence, although the existence of the self is indicated by its many experiences, the experiences themselves do not constitute its nature.

But then, it may be asked, what is this self? Usually, we mean by self that which feels, thinks, wills and also *is conscious of doing all these things*. If it were to be only that which feels, thinks and wills, then it may be equated with mind, for these are the characteristics

¹ *Kaushîtaki Upaniṣad*, 3, 8.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 117.

of mind. But the nature of the self *as consciousness* is something more than these, because it is also in addition conscious of itself as the knower and feeler. This idea of self-consciousness poses two questions. First, what is the nature of the self which is conscious of every passing thought and feeling and which therefore must be having changes in itself along with this momentary mental existence? Second, granting there is self-illuminacy, what is its epistemological explanation?

We may answer the first question by discussing the several possible relations that can exist between the changing mental states and the permanent conscious self. The empiricist maintains that there is no identical subject behind, but only a series of conscious states which are mistakenly given the name of an identical self.

This means that the self is a continuous series of existences which are all different from each other. But in all our experiences there is a felt identity. This felt identity cannot naturally be explained by the differents which are supposed to be continuous. Continuity cannot explain identity. Even this continuity of waking experience is a doubtful factor, since in sleep and in unconscious states of swoon etc., there is no continuity of acts of experience although there is a continuity of consciousness. All this can only be explained on the basis of an identical self. Such an identical self cannot be viewed as a basic "substance" in which the qualities reside, because such a conception would lead us into all the difficulties about the relations between substratum and qualities. That there is an identical self existing through our variegated experience is a fact. The fact of the changing experiences by which the self is known is also there. Hence, one solution out of this difficulty would be to view the self as an identity-in-difference as Hegel and his followers have done. But, of all logical relations, the relation of identity-in-difference is the most suspect. It appears plausible, but actually is fraught with more difficulties than the two relations of which it is a hybrid.

Hence, in answer to the question posed, we have to think of the self as that which has an essential nature and a contingent nature. As pure self, it is that which is apart from everything else although witnessing everything, and from the empirical point of view which alone we can experience, it is that which acts, knows and feels. Thus, to use the much hackneyed terms, the self is both immanent and transcendent.

There are certain phases of man's experience when this truth is borne upon him strongly. Negatively speaking, we know that consciousness can never be produced merely by the conditions of knowledge such as sensations or ideas, which are only the conditions of its manifestation. This pure consciousness or self may be shown to exist on the evidence of the experience of deep sleep. The conscious principle, which is identified with the self, exists alone, shorn of its encumbrances of sensations and images. That there is something which continues to exist before, through, and after deep sleep cannot be denied, since there is the awareness of such a continuity after we wake up. Analogically arguing, we know of the existence of sounds beyond the range of our limited hearing by inference from indicators. The instruments are first indicators of experienced sounds expressed symbolically. When similar symbols without the perception of immediate sound are seen, we infer that sound, as a cause of such symbols appearing in the indicator, must be present in the atmosphere. So also, from the experience of sleep, in which the person exists free from all mental and physical attributes but still which bears the continuity of consciousness, we can infer the existence of the soul whose nature is consciousness. This consciousness cannot be defined, for to define it we must have a differentia and a species. There is neither the one nor the other where the self is concerned. It is *sui-generis*. We can only define it, if at all, in a negative way as not this and not that, never forgetting that negation always implies an assertion. To be conscious is its essential nature, whereas its contingent nature is to be associated with all activities as the knower and enjoyer.

Philosophers who believe in the self as a separate entity base their arguments mostly on what is known as self-luminosity or self-consciousness of the pure self. This idea is not generally accepted by Western thinkers. One way of interpreting this idea to the Western mind would be to say that it is something like self-observation. Here the self is both the content of observation as well as the subject of consciousness. The self is aware of what it is observing and also of itself as the observing agent. So, this consciousness comes very near to the meaning of self-consciousness used by Indian philosophers to denote the essential nature of the self.

The evidence for this self-luminosity or self-consciousness is as follows. Things like tables and chairs are not self-luminous for they are only objects for a knowing person. That is, they are dependent

on a knowing person for their illumination. An object which is not known by any human being is as good as non-existent. This is not Berkelian "*esse est percipi*", because it is not maintained that things exist because we see them. It is not purely sense-perception that gives meaning to things that exist. It is only when the object is known by the mind that it acquires a meaning. It is not so with the experience of the self. Experience of any sort, as soon as it occurs, is known. If this were not so, we would need another act to make experience knowable. But experience is immediately known; if it is to be known by a subsequent act, there would be doubt or denial of one's own experience, since there is no certainty. But this does not happen. There is nothing of which we are more certain than our own experience. Hence, this experience which is conscious experience, must be described as being self-luminous. It reveals itself. The ultimate principle of knowledge, viz., the self as consciousness, always knows itself. This immediate character of self-awareness is not a thing that can be denied, for then we will be false to our own experiences. It is this self-awareness that makes possible all concentration and contemplation. The objects of such concentration may be either external or internal. But in all these we are aware of ourselves as the subject of experience.

Therefore, the self which is the basis of all knowledge cannot be perceived as an object. This is as impossible as to step on the shadow of one's own head or climb on to one's own shoulders. This does not mean that it cannot be known. Perception is not the only means of knowledge. But all that we are really aware of is the self that is limited by the mental categories. In ordinary experience we are aware of the self as the knowing self. In the judgement "I know this table is brown", the implication is that there is a self which knows that the table is brown. As Bosanquet is never tired of saying, the object is an object only by virtue of its being an object for a knowing subject.

The argument so far can be summed up beautifully in the words of Dally King, "The denial of consciousness comprises within itself the denial of everything else including the original denial".¹ To quote another philosopher in support, "The units which make up our mental states and the rest of the universe, are not *aware* of anything—neither of anything else nor of themselves. They just

¹ Dally King, *The Psychology of the Consciousness*, p. 52.

exist. . . . It is the *organism* that is aware (or conscious) not the units. Awareness (or consciousness) is a very special function to be sharply distinguished from the mere psychic nature of existence—though the *latter is a sine-qua-non of the former.*"¹

Having thus established that mind and self must be different and separate to make experience understandable, let us consider the several ways in which mind is viewed in Western philosophy. From the time of Descartes there has been an increasingly subjectivist explanation of experience. But his *cogita ergo sum* has raised so much dust of speculation, that our vision of philosophical problems is still clouded. Probably Descartes assumed too much when he maintained that his *cogito* establishes a permanent self. But there is no doubt at all that this argument proves the existence of thought as an experience and that there is no evidence to prove that thoughts can exist by themselves.

Steering in the opposite way we have the realists and behaviourists who maintain that mind is nothing else but brain. For them outward behaviour is all there is in mind, and the cause of this outward behaviour is physiological and neurological events. For example, the movements of the vocal chords is equated to thought, because thought is speech whether it be expressed or unexpressed. On the face of it, this is absurd, for everyone knows that a felt experience is not the same as an observed experience. When a person in sorrow cries, all that the observer can observe are the physiological occurrences and the muscular changes. These by no means adequately explain the feeling of sorrow behind. The very fact that these changes can be and are duplicated successfully on the stage should be a warning against such identification. Again the same event produces different reactions in different people, and this cannot be if they are all nervous and reflex activities. So this extreme view of mind is not acceptable.

There are some philosophers who reduce mind to a machine. The contention of these philosophers is that there is no special consciousness in human activity and that all such actions can be done by machines. Hence, minds also are a sort of machines. What is a machine? A machine is a manufactured thing capable of sensing light, sound and other environmental conditions; it can speak, write,

¹ Durant Drake, *Mind and its Place in Nature*, Macmillan & Co., New York 925, pp. 97-98. *Italics mine.*

calculate, duplicate, move, give appropriate answers to direct questions, etc. That is, it is capable of duplicating most human behaviour. But are these machines capable of conscious activity as human beings are? This implies the other question whether the machine is also capable of non-behavioural activity such as imagination and conceptional thinking. Can a machine feel love, pleasure, self-pity? Can a machine appreciate sympathetically others' difficulties? Since, as far as present human knowledge goes, machines are not capable of all these activities, we have to say that they are incapable of being conscious, and since man is capable of such activities, he is a conscious being.

Again, outward signs are not always indicators of consciousness. A man may be paralyzed in his limbs and vocal chords. He is still conscious. So, although behaviour suggests consciousness, it is not itself consciousness. A complex behavioural pattern is not necessarily a conscious act, for as we know the behaviour of an anti-aircraft gun-predictor is more complex than that of a live child, still, we cannot say it is conscious. The facts of freewill and choice which are peculiarly human concepts have no meaning for a machine. A lie-detector may be able to distinguish between the nervous reactions of a person telling lies and those of one who tells the truth, but it can never distinguish between truth and falsity, good and bad.¹

Even granting that it may be possible in the future to develop robots which can have all these human qualities, there are certain problems to be faced. The main contention is that, since brain which is equivalent to mind is matter, it can be reconstructed with all its intricacies. When this is done, we have a human mind-equivalent in every respect. But this is impossible since they differ in the very conditions of their structure. An organism's brain is made up mostly of protein molecules which are very complex whereas a machine is made up purely of simple metallic molecules. Also, these machines, being manufactured out of metals, have a large difference of electric potential which enables transmission and mobilization of large quantities of electricity very quickly. This results in phenomenal speed in activity. On the other hand, in the organism of the brain there is more uniform distribution of energy potential, which makes it mobile to a much lesser degree than the machine. The human

¹ For many of the above arguments regarding machines, I am indebted to the article "Mechanical Concept of Mind" by Michael Scriven, published in *Mind*, Vol. LXII, April 1953.

brain, it must not be forgotten, has an enormous power of adjustment which is lacking in a machine. The latter may be able to choose between a number of given pathways, but it can never fashion a way for itself, if the existing pathways are physically obstructed. In such matters the ingenuity of the human mind is stupendous. This only proves that though brain and nerves are necessary, the mind is still not there, and that the mind imposes itself on the brain according to its own laws. This fact is very much in evidence when we study cortical integration in the brain. Lashly states that particular areas of the cortex carry on their complex learned activities, even when they are completely isolated from other parts of the cortex.¹ This can only mean that the cortex by itself is not completely responsible for the integral activities of the personality. In the field of memory and recognition, if it is maintained that these are purely results of *engrams*, i.e., markings on the brain matter, then the recognition of objects geometrically similar, but not producing identical stimuli, either because of their position or because of their size, becomes inexplicable. Similarly recognition of the same song sung in different keys and tones cannot be explained.

It is asking for too much when a solution of the problem of mind is sought in the field of pure physics and physiology. There is, so far, no *a priori* reason to suppose that the integration of mental activities is to be found in the nervous system moved by either electric fields or impulses. Nor can we say that memory in the form of *engrams* is limited to the three-dimensional spatial relations, which must be so if they are to be found in the cerebral cortex. The only way of arriving at any possible explanation of mental activities is by the method of introspection strengthened by behavioural studies. All that the observed facts suggest is that there is a close correlation between mental events and cerebral events. This regular synchronism suggests, not that they are identical, but that there is some other unity whose behests are thus obeyed. The knowledge derived from introspection fills up the framework of events got by pure perception.

While discussing this, we have to distinguish between perception and awareness. We may perceive a thing without being aware of it. So many sounds strike our ears, although we may not be aware of

¹ "Physiological Mechanisms in Animal Behaviour", *Symposium of the Society of Experimental Biology*, No. IV, 1950.

them. It is the adjustments of the organism which give a transcendental reference to perception that makes the person aware and conscious of the thing. We are not, indeed, directly aware of our visual or auditory sensations, but we are conscious of their meaning. All these strengthen the view that brain cannot be equivalent to a machine. Troland and other modern psychologists have affirmed that sentience can never actually reside in matter.¹ This is all the more so, for when we closely examine the dualism of physical and psychical activities, we find there is a close parallel only on the sensory side and not on the motor side. Learned responses such as driving a car on a straight stretch of road does not involve any mental activity. It is almost mechanical. But when an object obstructs the road, or when an accident with an oncoming vehicle is imminent, the mind leaps into activity taking full control of motor as well as sensory activities. But in sensory activity, unless the mind is also acting, there cannot be a knowledge of sensations. This is what Bosanquet says is a characteristic of all human knowledge—viz., its constructiveness. The correlation between mind and brain is inevitable in sensory action, but not to that extent in motor action. Hence the parallelism is not inviolable. The responses are varied and cannot be reduced to set patterns, whereas sensations are particular and can easily conform to a pattern. Hence, to say that mind is mechanical on the evidence of sense-perception alone is not right.

There is yet another method of explaining mind and the synchronized activity of mind and brain. If mind is not equivalent to brain and also, if it is not comparable to a machine in its work, then two things follow. If the existence of the mind is accepted, then it must be either material or spiritual. Otherwise, mind itself must be denied. That mind is a spiritual entity, i.e., that it is non-matter, is not acceptable to many modern philosophers. Then they must say that it is a material entity. The whole problem, then, rests on the meaning of the term "material". Till the nineteenth century, the concept of substance was that it is some substratum which persists as a unity underlying its changes. These changes are the attributes of the substance. Science seemed to support this view with its theory of the atoms as the basis of substantive reality. But twentieth century has broken up the indestructible atoms and its successors the electrons, etc., such that their existence can only be proved

¹ Troland, *The Mystery of Mind*, Chapman & Hall Ltd., London, 1926, p. 233.

by mathematical inferences. This leaves us in doubt as to what the nature of matter is which can be the cause of mind. If substance is defined "in terms of a relation between successive events constituting the substance",¹ then it becomes necessary to explain the nature of substance as matter, and the nature of substance as mind, and the relation between these two types of substances. The difficulty of such an explanation assumes enormous proportions when we try to explain why material events such as drinking "produce" such tremendous events in the mental substance and *vice versa*. The man who takes alcohol passes through various mental experiences. The question must be answered: "Which influences which—mind or matter?"

A representative theory of the above view is to be found in the philosophy of Russell, which he calls Neutral Monism. Russell's contention is that the difference between mind and matter is only one of relations and not of "stuff". The neutral entities by themselves are neither mental nor material. But once they enter into a relational pattern they become either mental or material depending on the type of relations involved. Such a theory must show the nature of relations which transform the neutral entities either into material or mental units. This theory of neutral entities was first advocated by William James and later adopted and developed by Russell. The common feature of every such theory is that they are vigorous about denying any mind-matter dualism.

Such a theory of neutral monism must necessarily be empiricist, since these neutral entities are *real objects*. The whole of the mental and the material must be constructed out of the neutral stuff. There must be nothing either in mind or in matter which is not the product of these neutral entities.

Matter, according to Russell, is nothing else except sensations. On an analysis of experience, we find that "the immediate objects of sense depend for their existence upon physiological conditions in ourselves, and that for example, the coloured surfaces which we see cease to exist when we shut our eyes."² This account of matter in terms of verifiabiles may be valid with reference to perceived objects.

¹ A. C. Ewing, *The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy*, p. 131.

² Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, 2nd Edition, p. 68. Also compare with the following. "I contend that the ultimate constituents of matter are not atoms and electrons but sensations, and other things similar to sensations as regards extent and duration." *Analysis of Mind*, p. 121.

What about unperceived objects? We cannot hold with Berkeley that where there is no perception, there is no existence. But evidently this is what Russell means when he says that the presence of the sense-organ is necessary for the existence of sense-qualities. Still, all objects are made up of neutral entities and are material. Hence the quality of being capable of being perceived must be the same for all objects. The unperceived object must be the same as the perceived object but for the fact that it is beyond the field of perception. This would be naive realism. But Russell does not accept this. The object, no doubt, exists only because of perception. It is sensations which are responsible for percepts. But very often Russell identifies the unperceived object with the spatial radiations of the physicist. These become percepts when sensations are added on to them.

There is still another explanation possible. In the above quoted passage from *Analysis of Mind*, Russell says that matter is made up of sensations and "other things similar to sensations as regards extent and duration". Does he mean then that objects possess two types of qualities: one, qualities which are given as sensation, and two, qualities which are comparable to "extent and duration"? If this is accepted then Russell has not explained the nature of perception nor has he explained the nature of matter in terms of only the neutral monism. It means that he accepts at least an epistemological dualism. To quote Russell again, "But I should say that images belong only to the mental world, while those occurrences (if any) which do not form part of any experience belong only to the physical world."¹ So, on his own admission the neutral entities which are merely sensations are not enough to give an account of matter, and there should be something other than neutral entities to be really matter.

Similarly, we find Russell's account of mind also is not satisfactory. He says that mind is a construction of neutral entities plus, what he calls, images.² Over and above the structure of the neutral entities, there are also "images" which are necessary to characterize a thing as mind. Images do not belong to the neutral stuff, since they are never found by themselves in the physical world. They are not also anything like sensations which have part material and part mental meaning. They are purely subjective. Russell says that these are "like" the objects, but are not really "like" in

¹ *Analysis of Mind*, p. 25.

² *Ibid.*

the sense in which naive realism uses the word. Therefore even mind is not a structure of pure neutral entities.

Consistent with his hypothesis that mind and matter are constructions of a neutral stuff, Russell argues that there cannot be anything like consciousness and tries to explain all psychical phenomena like perception, memory, feeling, and will, without using the "conscious" principle at all. Russell has already maintained that the difference between mind and matter is one of structural relations. This means that the relation which goes to constitute mind is a unique relation and cannot be changed or translated into the relations which go to make up matter. This relation also cannot be found in the neutral entities themselves, for if so, it ceases to be particularly mental. Hence, these relations must be purely subjective. This is what is exactly termed consciousness by others. Only Russell changes the name and calls it a non-sensory relation. To know what this non-sensory relation is, we must refer to Russell's theory of perception. An "essential part of Russell's new view is that the appearances or aspects which now constitute the material object do not exist at the place where the material object is (i.e., at the place where it is ordinarily supposed to be) but rather at the places where they are, or could be perceived. . . . Thus the aspects of the penny are spread out all over space".¹ So, each object is a collection of aspects. If the object is x , then it is equivalent to $(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4 \dots)$. A collection of intersecting aspects like this provides a perspective. The perspective at any point in a room would then be the intersecting of all the various aspects of "things" which exist in the room. For this perspective to be transformed into mind, two more steps are necessary. At the point of intersection of these aspects, a brain must be present along with all its appurtenances, such as the nerves, the sense-organs, etc. Even then mind is not born. At this point, due to the brain and the perspectives co-existing, the *mnemic* phenomena are born and affect the two out of which such phenomena are born. The *mnemic* phenomena are a causal relation where the effect occurs long after the cause has been.² This is how perception takes place and how a mind is born.

This *mnemic* causation is nothing else but memory. Memory is definitely a non-material event and as such is purely mental and

¹ W. T. Stace, "Russell's Neutral Monism" in *The Philosophy of Russell*, Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. V, N. W. University, U. S. A., 1944, p. 358.

² *Analysis of Mind*, pp. 130-31.

subjective. Hence, in spite of all elaborate explanations, the dualism between mind and matter remains, although now it is transferred to the epistemological sphere.

Even granting this position of Russell, it looks as though he has not made any provision for the fact of subjective reference. A report of the sensory-experience is usually made in terms of an "I". This implies that the fact of self-reference or self-acquaintance has to be explained. If it is said, as Russell obviously does, that an occurrence is a mental act, then on his theory, he cannot assert it. Because, when a thing appears it always means two things. First, that it appears, second, that it appears for an observer. It is also quite possible that a thing may exist without appearing; for instance, the Parliament House in Delhi exists although it does not appear to me. As Russell himself has agreed, the unobservable object exists. The form in which it exists does not concern us here. Therefore, appearances are always for someone, otherwise they are unobserved existences. Whatever may be the name by which a referent is known—as ego, bundle of psychic experiences, "biography of the individual percepts",¹ or as self—it must be there for an appearance to come into existence. There is no meaning in saying, as Russell does, that these appearances are like photographic impressions. The "appearance" on a photographic plate is as much an object which "appears" to a mind, whereas the "appearances" experienced by a mind can never be so perceived.

The bug-bear of any neutral monist will be the fact of introspection which proves the self-reference of the "I" in judgements. The awareness of the unity of the self cannot be accounted for by a mere string of events. In an organism, habit and memory must be accounted for. The self exists not only in space, but also through time. This continuity is assured and known by introspection. If Russell does not accept introspection as a method of knowing, his whole theory is cut at the roots. For, how does he know that *mnemic* causation exists, unless it be by using introspection? The assertion of truth or falsity with regard to any theory is only possible if introspective knowledge is accepted.

In the field of emotions also the theory of mind given by Russell proves inadequate. Usually analytical psychologists and behaviourists maintain that all feelings and emotions are not aroused by any

¹ *Analysis of Mind*, p. 130.

external object, but are only the result of internal secretions. That is, the cognitive part of feelings and emotions does not count, according to them. Russell says that, by feelings, we mean normally physical sensations such as tooth-ache. Feelings then are equivalent to pleasures and pains caused by physiological sensations. Even emotions are, according to Russell, only organic sensation. "The ingredients of an emotion are only sensations and images and bodily movements succeeding each other according to a certain pattern."¹ This account is only true to a certain extent. Common experience shows that pleasures and pains do not always register the success or failure of antecedent processes, e.g., the pleasure derived from the perception of a beautiful painting is more due to the appreciation of the colour scheme and the representative quality of the picture, which are cognitive factors, rather than due to any previous physiological excitation. To accept Russell's theory of emotions, is tantamount to accepting James-Lange theory of emotions. The part of emotions which is explained by physiological changes is very small when compared to the large area of emotive experiences of man. If emotions are nothing else than physical sensation denoting a certain need or want of satiation, then we cannot explain the cases of fruitless love and long standing admiration which are spread over long periods of time even after finding that there is no hope of fulfilment. Also, the chief defect of equating any sensation to its awareness is to forget the fact that it is different to have a sensation and to be aware of it. Human mind is not confined to the level of merely having sensations. It goes beyond and judges the sensations, chooses and avoids and anticipates. It is the prerogative of the human mind to retain what has ceased to be and to anticipate what is not yet. Man experiences emotions even in recollecting them, when such memory becomes the cause of the fresh experience. No doubt, verification is one of the tests of knowledge. But we should not confuse knowledge with its tests. Scientific perception gives us only the pattern of things, and not how they become the private aspect of mental life. The latter cannot be empirically perceived, but should be taken on belief and faith.

In spite of these draw-backs Russell's theory of neutral monism is really a notable contribution to the solution of mind-matter problem. But where Russell goes wrong is when he tries to view

¹ *Analysis of Mind*, p. 284.

matter as one branch and mind as another branch of the neutral stuff. This, as I have already pointed out, only removes the problem one step further, instead of solving it. Indian philosophy is at one with Russell in believing that mind is material, or that mind and matter have the same origin. It goes even further and says that what is called mind is only a name for different functions. But the bias of Indian philosophy is different. To it, the self or *Ātman* is not only different from mind and matter, but it is the intelligent guiding factor responsible for all human activity. Mind is only a form of matter, far removed from the coarse matter by its fineness. As matter evolves into finer forms, mind becomes formulated. Such matter and mind are but the instruments through which the self expresses itself. To insist that, if the pure self or consciousness were to exist, it must be independently manifestable without the medium of sensations or ideas is to ask for the impossible.¹ Still the pure self may be shown to exist, on the evidence of the experience of deep sleep. It is indeed quite easy to prove on empirical grounds that the "I" as consciousness does not exist, but this does not dispose of the fact that sensing and perceiving are definitely a relation between sense-datum and something which knows this sense-datum. Russell's theory of equating collections of sensations and brains with minds leaves out of consideration an important fact that although this collection may constitute a mind, it does not cover the whole of what is usually known as mind. The mind is an inter-related whole having a continuity of awareness which is impossible if the mind were to be merely made up of sensations and brain. This continuity of awareness cannot be denied, as otherwise experience would become meaningless.

So, the problem of mind and matter can be satisfactorily explained only on the assumption that mind is a higher form of matter capable of reflecting the nature of the self which is pure consciousness. That matter is capable of existing in several forms has been proved by modern science. Hence there will be nothing strange in the belief that mind is a finer form of matter. But it should never be forgotten that both mind and matter have no meaning unless it be that they are instruments for the expression of the self. On the increasing evidence accumulated by psychical research, it will be foolhardy to deny the existence of the self as separate from both body and mind.

¹ A. C. Ewing, op. cit., p. 113.

At least it must be granted that there are no *a priori* grounds for such rejection. To quote no less an authority than Dr. Ewing on this: "For the *prima facie* suggestions of mortality are now countered by evidence which, if it does not conclusively prove, at least finds its easiest and most natural explanation in survival of bodily death."¹

In recent years there has been another notable contribution to the literature and philosophy of mind by Prof. G. Ryle. Philosophers, both Western and Eastern, have been sitting up and taking notice of what he has said in that most provocative book *Concept of Mind*.² It would be an impossible task to consider all that has been said in recent years about Ryle's work, either in criticism or in appreciation. We shall confine our discussion to a few fundamental aspects of his concept of mind.

The burden of Ryle's book is to show that the dualistic tendencies started by Descartes between the physical world characterized by publicity and the private world characterized by privacy is a "myth". The dualism of mind and matter born out of what Ryle calls "the privileged access view", i.e., that introspection is used in knowing certain events, is sought to be completely destroyed by postulating that "the sorts of things I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can find out about other people, and the methods of finding them out are much the same".³ Ryle arrives at this conclusion on an analysis of perception involving sense-data and feelings. He tries to show that all ordinary words which give an account of perception such as "know", "believe" do not have "corresponding acts of knowing or apprehending and states of believing",⁴ but that they are simply "determinable dispositional words".⁵ He wants to emphasize that ordinary psychological terms have no reference to any mental states known through introspection. These also are mere dispositional words. Dispositions are those which can be understood as referring to external behaviour through which alone they can be known. These dispositions have nothing else in them beyond their manifestations.

This theory of Ryle lends itself generally to the following interpretation. There is no difference between private and public activities, hence there is no difference between mental activities and

¹ Op. cit., p. 134.

² Hutchinson's University Library, London, 1949.

³ *Concept of Mind*, p. 155.

⁴ Ibid., p. 118.

⁵ Ibid.

observable physical activities. Secondly, the so-called mental activities are all reducible to dispositional determinants thus ruling out any lingering possibility of the existence of the "Ghost in the machine". By thus removing the possibility of any such dualism, and by interpreting all activities in terms of behavioural dispositions, Ryle is only giving a new logical dress to the old behaviourisms, and is as much open to criticism.

The arguments that Ryle offers to prove that there is nothing mental, are achieved by analyzing the knowledge processes. Commonly speaking, in knowledge, there is a knowing mind, the sensations and the object which gives rise to sensations. The existence of the object is not denied by Ryle nor the need for sensations. But he maintains that there can never be an observation of pure sensations. By implication, he means that there is no mind to know pure sensations. That is, propositions like "I see red", "I taste a bitter taste" are impossible; they are misuse of the word knowledge. These sensations cannot be events which are publicly observable. Ryle holds that to ask what these sensations are like is to ask the alphabet to be spelt out. Although we cannot spell the alphabet, we notice the letters of the alphabet as making up a word; similarly sensations, although they are never observed, still are noticeable.¹

In answering this charge, we should accept the fact that "I see red" is always "I see a red patch" or "I see a red object" where "object" stands for any publicly observable thing. That is, language propositions intimating a knowledge of pure cognitive sensations are not possible. But this does not mean that there is no knowledge at all of pure sensations. Sensations are events which cannot be observed by more than one person at a time unlike physical events like a horse race. Inverting the whole argument of Ryle we can show that seeing a red object would be impossible if there is no implied statement involving a report on the colour sensations. Of course that this experience is a post-mortem experience of the whole act cannot be denied. This becomes all the more clear with reference to "felt" sensations like pains and tastes. Ryle says with reference to taste, "to say that something tastes peppery is to say that it tastes to me now as any peppered viands would taste to anybody with normal palate".² This is presumably a statement which Ryle cannot use to deny pure sensations, because, in the

¹ *Concept of Mind*, p. 206.

² *Ibid.*, p. 202.

first place, unless I know what the taste of pepper is by my own introspective knowledge as a pure sensation, I cannot recognize its description given by others. Secondly, the similarity of taste perceptions cannot be conceded unless each person can report his personal taste experiences, which by their very nature cannot be publicly observed. Similarly a painful experience is a purely felt experience. A tooth-ache with all its subtleties of pain can never be objectified. To quote Prof. Ewing, "It is physically conceivable that if it were worth doing, surgeons might discover a way of attaching my nerves to somebody else's teeth or brain, and then it might be argued that I could feel his tooth-ache as well as mine."¹ The observable portion of a tooth-ache-experience is only the throbbings. All that we can do to study the feeling of pain objectively, is to count the throbbings, relate them to the pulsing of the blood in the arteries. But this analysis can never give us a picture of the actual pain. Prof. Ewing makes a very pertinent remark about this. "If I heard Prof. Ryle screaming, why should I feel any sympathy with him, or bother to try to remove the causes of his screaming, unless, I on the strength of the screams supposed the existence of mental states not observable by me, states of pain? If 'pain' just means screaming and other physical behaviour, why is it so important to alleviate it?"² Similarly memory-images. Who can deny that they have very personal experiences of recalling the faces of their dear and near ones? In this connection Ryle says, "ability to describe things learned by personal experiences is one of the knacks we expect of linguistically competent people; ability to visualise parts of it is another thing that we expect in some degree of most people and in high degree of children, dress-designers, policemen, and cartoonists."³ This exposition can never be an explanation of memory-images. It can at best be called only a description. Here Ryle, instead of explaining how memory-images can be translated in terms of public behaviour patterns, merely explains it away by saying that it is a "knack".

Generally speaking, Ryle's objection to such mental activities is that they involve introspection and that if introspection is accepted as a method of knowledge, it leads to *regressus ad infinitum*. Taking the latter objection first, Ryle says that if introspection is being

¹ A. C. Ewing, "Prof. Ryle's Attack on Dualism", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. LIII, p. 50. ² *Ibid.*, p. 56. ³ Ryle, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

aware of one's own cognitive process, then it involves the question whether one is also aware of the consciousness of one's consciousness of mental states. If this is admitted, it will lead to infinite regress. If this is not admitted then it means that it is possible to have states of knowledge which do not require introspection.

The trouble here is that Ryle deliberately mixes up the two meanings of the word "conscious". When we say "I am conscious of pain in my head", we are using the term as an equivalent to feeling. On the other hand when we say "I am conscious that I have not done my duty", we are using the term introspectively as being aware of one's own behaviour. In the first sense of "conscious" all experiences must be felt experiences. So even introspective experience is conscious in this general sense. But there is a special sense in which one is aware of one's own mental activity. This the Indian philosophers call self-awareness which has already been discussed earlier in this chapter. It is only when an intermediate perception is required to reveal the primary perception that Ryle's criticism holds good. But this is not the case. There is always, we find, a total experience of awareness. Knowledge does not require another knowledge to make it known. It always reveals itself. In other words, introspection is essentially bound up with some object. But this does not mean that we cannot be aware of the process involved apart from the object known. For example, we can always distinguish between willing and not willing something or between believing and doubting something.

Ryle is of the opinion that introspection is the result of mistaken use of language. Words like "witness", "observe", "discover" are not used with reference to introspection, because it is not really knowledge in the proper use of the word. He says there is no analogy between the instruments of knowledge of the external world and introspective knowledge. This argument only strengthens the introspectionist, for he also says that there cannot be any analogy since the two belong to different types of knowledge. Ryle himself admits this when he says, "... there are somethings which I can find out only, or best, through being told of them by you. . . . If you do not divulge the contents of your silent soliloquies and other imaginings, I have no other sure way of finding out what you have been saying or picturing to yourself."¹ When he admits the possibility of doing

¹ Ryle, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

sums in the mind and knowing it, he is cutting the ground under his own feet. Just as the biologist after strenuous and long analysis finds that he is not able to fit the fact of life into the framework of biological explanations, so also Ryle is forced, after a very conscientious analysis, to agree that there are some "mental imaginings" and "silent soliloquies" which cannot be known objectively. Ryle refuses to use the terminology of an epistemologist since such usage would involve him in theories of mind as the knowing subject. Nor can he use psychological terms which tend towards the same conclusion. Just because he cannot accept these usages of language, he cannot say it is wrong usage. The task of the epistemologist is to reconstruct experience and hence he must have his own terminology. The purpose of any such *a posteriori* analysis of experience is to lay bare the fact that in every ordinary sentence of knowledge, there is implicitly involved smaller units of thought. These may not be actually separable, but they can always be differentiated as experiences. Complex sense experiences such as hearing a particular noise and identifying it, if they are to be epistemologically explained, must be broken up into atomic sense-datum experiences. The mental event of identification is not these atomic sentences, hence to say that these do not imply anything like a mental event is like trying to meet an obstruction which does not exist.

That there are mental acts correlative with observable physical acts can easily be proved by the analysis of feelings and emotions. Ryle says that these are externally recognizable behaviours involving word-reports such as "thrills, twinges, pangs, throbs, wrenches, itches, prickings, chills, glows, loads, qualms, hankerings, curdlings, sinkings, tensions, gnawings, and shocks".¹ All these words indicate physical activity. So, feelings of pleasure and pain are reducible to and understandable only in terms of physical activity. Usually personally felt emotional tones are made the criteria for judging the presence of these emotions in other people also. To say that "feeling ashamed" is merely changing colour in the face and having a particular expression in the face which is designated usually as the "foolish look", is not to express correctly the feeling of being ashamed. Sentences like "I am feeling ashamed" are not the same as "I am weighing 160 lbs." The sentences of the former type can never be reduced to the latter type if they are not to lose their

¹ Ryle, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84.

import. It cannot be denied that when a person is jealous, angry or ashamed, something very different happens inside each time which can never be defined exactly, although the physiological reactions in each case can be determined. The physical concomitants only provide a clue to the actual feeling and cannot be equated to it.

It is believed that every act is either hindered or accentuated by feelings of pain or pleasure. So these are not special emotions, but qualities which are present in any kind of experience. Pain here is not the pain that results from a physical injury, but a feeling tone which accompanies the doing of a distasteful act, e.g., the pain of disappointment. But Prof. Ryle says there is no such thing as mental pain or pleasure. "Enjoying digging is not both digging and having a (pleasant) feeling",¹ and "delight, amusement, etc., are moods and that moods are not feelings".² Hence pleasure and pain are only moods in which actions are either done or not done. But this is not so. One cannot have a feeling of pleasure, unless it be pleasure in something. Perhaps there may not be conscious awareness of this throughout the time of activity, but on recollection one is aware of having enjoyed an activity. When a person sings, it is not only the vocal chords that are functioning, but there is also the accompanying feeling of pleasure. Such enjoyments can never be reduced to a physical act plus some sensation. It is a quality of experience of any act. Sentences of emotional and feeling experiences cannot be translated into observable behavioural pattern sentences without a loss of meaning.

The main purpose, then, of the *Concept of Mind* is to demonstrate that there are no real inner mental activities, and that all such falsely named activities are merely dispositions. There are no "experiences", only "facts". Ryle takes great pains to establish that there is nothing beyond the identifiable, verifiable acts, and that all actions are merely the result of dispositional beliefs. But what is a disposition? Ryle says that these "signify abilities, tendencies or pronenesses to do, not things of one unique kind, but things of lots of different kinds".³ But a disposition of this sort can only be understood from personal experience. For example, to understand what love is as a disposition there must be actually the experience of the emotion. This experience is something that cannot be explained in terms of physiology. To say that a man has a disposition to get

¹ Ryle, op. cit., p. 109.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., p. 118.


angry is only to say that he gets into a temper easily. To describe it in terms of physiological events is still to give only outward concurrent events and not to explain the precise nature of the inner happening.

The very basis of Ryle's theory is shaky. If we admit that any activity is "public" in the sense in which Ryle uses it, then the question arises, can any experience be really "public"? Can many people have the same identical experiences? What is the criterion, if any, for such judgements? Take, for example, such a physical event as hearing a sound and determining the direction of the sound. There will be as many different answers as there are people tested and this itself shows that there is nothing common about it. Again take the example of seeing a triangle and remembering it. Each person's triangle will be different from the other's. Perception of colours is another point in evidence. All physiologists emphatically affirm that in the perception of colours, there is no colour in the brain. Physicists are also emphatic about the fact that there are no colours in the physical world, only sizes, positions, velocities and waves. What then is the colour that is perceived by the individual? There is no doubt that both the groups of facts, the psychological and the physiological, will have to be explained and reconciled in any attempt to explain human activity. To give a completely satisfactory answer in either of the alternatives, the known elements of a situation must be explained to belong to either of the spheres completely. But this, as we have seen, cannot be done. The words of Prof. Ewing are very apt here. "Whether or not we hold the mind and the body to be different 'substances' we must admit as an empirical fact a radical dualism between their qualities."¹ Specially in the light of modern psychological developments in the West, it is meaningless to talk of a purely physical explanation of mind. "In telepathy and precognition we catch a glimpse of something at work in the personality which bears no ordinary relation to space and time, something, also, which is no mere unintelligent 'unconscious', but is full of planning and directed effort."² Here we find at least a halting proof for the existence of not only a mind, but what the Indian philosophers call "self" or *Ātman*.

¹ A. C. Ewing, "Prof. Ryle's Attack on Dualism," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. LIII, New Series, p. 78.

² G. N. M. Tyrrell, *Personality of Man*, Pelican A 165, Penguin Books, New York, 1946, p. 255.

The trouble generally with Western thinkers is that not only do they view mind and matter as disjunctively capable of mutual exclusion, but they imagine that these alternatives alone exhaust the field. Until this attitude is modified and the recognition of a self over and above mind and matter is made, there can be no satisfactory solution for the body-mind problem. It may be contended, that if the existence of the "self" is accepted, the problem is only removed one step further and not solved, since there will still remain the problem of the relation between the self and matter. But this is no problem at all, since matter and its finer form mind are only instruments of the self. This duality at the empirical level is unavoidable. Experience cannot be if there is no difference between the experiences and the experient. But what acts in experience is the self through *manas* or mind. Such a self cannot be an epi-phenomenon, a dependent of the body. It cannot be reduced to either a colony of cells or a system of electrons and protons. Matter may be interpreted in terms of energy, but it will never be equal to self. Nor can mind equal the self. Mind is only subtle matter, hence the qualities of matter such as origination and destruction also characterize mind. The self alone is not only meta-physical but also meta-psychical. That the experience of deep sleep is an evidence for the existence of such a self we have already seen. It is this self alone that is finally real. Mind and matter are only appearances. That which can be controlled, or that which can be destroyed, cannot be ultimately real. That the mind and body are controllable is unquestionable. Hence there must be an intelligent controller, viz., the self. This self is indivisible, eternal and intelligent. Still, at the level of relative experience, matter and mind cannot be ignored nor can we give up the duality of relative experience, as long as the self is bound by matter first and secondly by mind. When there is no duality, there is no mind, and there is no experience. When there is no experience at all the problem of body and mind gets resolved. On rare occasions when man is lost in the appreciation of something like music, all consciousness of body and mind vanishes, the objectiveness vanishes, and the self alone remains serene in its enjoyment. But in experience at the empirical level the problem is always present. Why it is present cannot be answered, since the perception of the many and the existence of the many is inexplicable, just as we can never explain why we perceive a snake where only a rope exists. This fact cannot be ignored whatever may be the point of view adopted.



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
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